Ball v. Cecil

• Decision Date: 14 February 1941
• Citation: 285 Ky. 438
• Parties: Ball et al. v. Cecil et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

285 Ky. 438

Ball et al. v. Cecil et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 14, 1941.

1. Contracts. — A person for whose benefit contract was made between others or who was party to consideration thereof may maintain action thereon, but mere fact that person will be incidentally benefited by performance of other parties' contract is insufficient to entitled him to enforce it.

2. Contracts. — An antenuptial contract, giving wife life interest in husband's farm with remainder in fee to his grandson, was not enforceable by grandson as to part beneficial to him after spouses' execution of separation agreement whereby wife released all claims in husband's property, entry of divorce decree adjudging that neither spouse should take any interest in other's property, and husband's death intestate, as grandson was not party to consideration of contract, which was not made for his benefit, and was only incidental beneficiary thereunder.

3. Appeal and Error. — In administrator's action for declaratory judgment, where judgment that decedent's grandson took no interest in decedent's farm under decedent's antenuptial contract giving his former wife life interest in farm, with remainder in fee to grandson, must be affirmed on appeal from such judgment and order striking certain allegations from administrators' pleadings, question whether such order was erroneous is moot and will not be considered by Court of Appeals (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 639a — 1 et seq.).

Appeal from Nelson Circuit Court.

Frank E. Daugherty and Garland R. Hubbard for appellant.

Andrew W. Nichols and William R. Gentry for appellee.

Before L.B. Handley, Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY SIMS, COMMISSIONER.

Affirming.

On Aug. 1, 1931, William F. Cecil, a widower 77 years of age and owner of considerable property, entered into an antenuptial agreement with Mrs. Willamina Dwight, a widow 56 years of age, which recited that the contracting parties were about to be married and desired to establish their respective rights in each other's property after marriage. Cecil took no interest in what little property Mrs. Dwight possessed, but in consideration of her marrying him and making him a faithful and helpful wife so long as he lived, he agreed she should receive from his estate at his death $500 in cash, and a life interest in the "home farm." Immediately following a description of the farm in the contract appears these words; "with remainder in fee in said farm to my grandson, Oliver Ball, the son of my daughter, Flora Ball, now, Mrs. Alfred Livers."

The marriage which was performed on Aug. 3, 1931, was of short duration, being followed by a separation on the following Nov. 9th, on which date Mr. and Mrs. Cecil entered into a written separation agreement by which he paid her $850 and she released all claims in her husband's property. A judgment of divorce was obtained by Mrs. Cecil on Feb. 18, 1933, which adjudged neither of the parties should take any interest in the property of the other.

Mr. Cecil died intestate in 1939, leaving a large number of heirs-at-law, some of whom were infants, being the issue of one of his deceased children. His administrators and adult heirs brought this action under Section 639a — 1 et seq., Civil Code of Practice (known as the Declaratory Judgment Act) against Oliver Ball, joining with him as defendants the infant heirs. The petition as amended alleged that the sole purpose of the antenuptial contract was to settle the property rights between the parties and that Ball took no interest in the "home farm" by virtue of such contract; that the subsequent agreement made between Mr. and Mrs. Cecil in contemplation of divorce, and the divorce judgment which followed, settled all their property rights. A judgment was asked declaring that Ball took no interest in the farm by virtue of the marriage contract.

Ball pleaded that the antenuptial contract was made partly for his benefit and that it gave him the farm in controversy after Mrs. Cecil's life estate therein terminated, and as Mrs. Cecil through the separation agreement and divorce judgment now had no interest in this farm, he was entitled to a specific performance of that part of the antenuptial contract made for his benefit. The infant defendants through their guardian ad litem filed an answer denying the contract was made for Ball's benefit and asked that he be denied any interest in the farm. The case was submitted to the chancellor for final judgment on the pleadings and exhibits. He adjudged Ball took no interest in the farm through the marriage contract between Mr. and Mrs. Cecil, and Ball appeals. The administrators prosecute a cross-appeal from an order entered by the chancellor striking certain allegations from their pleadings.

It is settled in this State, as well as most jurisdictions in America, that a third party for whose benefit a contract is made may maintain an action thereon; however, he must have been a party to the consideration or the contract must have been made for his benefit, and the mere fact that he will be incidentally benefited by the...