Ball v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund & the Workers' Comp. Court

• Decision Date: 13 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 112,122.,112,122.
• Parties: Jeanette Y. BALL, Petitioner, v. MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND and the Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

360 P.3d 499

2015 OK 64

Jeanette Y. BALL, Petitioner,

v.MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND and the Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 112,122.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 13, 2015.

Richard A. Bell, David Custar, The Bell Law Firm, Norman, Oklahoma, for the Petitioner.

Brandy L. Inman, Latham, Wagner, Steele & Lehman, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the Respondents.

GURICH, J.

Facts & Procedural History

¶ 1 Claimant sustained a work-related injury on July 14, 2009, while employed at Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company.¹On December 13, 2010, the trial court determined Claimant had sustained 24% permanent partial disability to her back and 5% permanent partial disability for psychological overlay and awarded her $49,590.00. In that same order, the court found Claimant had 6% preexisting permanent partial disability to her back and 8% preexisting permanent partial disability for psychological overlay. Such findings are Crumbyfindings²and are rated assessments by the Workers' Compensation Court of the amount of preexisting unrelated impairments suffered by a claimant at the time the on-the-job injury occurred.³At the time of her July 2009 injury, Claimant had no prior adjudicated on-the-job injuries.On June 14, 2012, Claimant settled the claim with her employer for $75,000.00 over and above the previous award due to the “known and unknown” injuries she sustained on July 14, 2009.⁴

¶ 2 Although Claimant had only onepreviously adjudicated injury, on August 15, 2012, she filed a Form 3F seeking permanent total disability benefits from the Fund. The Form 3F lists her oneinjury of July 14, 2009, notes the Crumbyfindings, and alleges as other preexisting disabilities “Obvious & Apparent–Hearing Loss, Both Knees, R. Elbow, R. Wrist.”⁵Claimant relied on expert testimony from Dr. Wilson who examined Claimant on September 4, 2012. Upon review of her medical history, Dr. Wilson concluded Claimant had prior non-adjudicated injuries to her knees

, right arm, and right wrist, and hearing loss and concluded: “[I]t is my opinion that due to the synergistic effect of Ms. Ball's work related injuries and resultant impairments, in combination with her age, educational background, economic status, and employment history, she is permanently totally disabled from performing any gainful employment for which she is qualified now or in the future.”⁶

¶ 3 The trial court appointed Dr. Munneke to conduct a medical exam. Dr. Munneke reviewed Claimant's medical history and concluded: “It is my opinion at this time the patient exhibits a residual disability of 29% impairment to the body as a whole due to her last work related injury. Her other injuries are not combinable, and it is my opinion the patient is not permanently totally disabled as a result of the combination of her non-work related injuries along with her work related injury, nor is she permanently totally disabled as a result of her work related injury alone.”⁷On October 30, 2012, Dr. Young examined Claimant on behalf of the Fund. After reviewing Claimant's medical history, Dr. Young found Claimant had 29% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, had no combinable injuries, and was not permanently and totally disabled.⁸

¶ 4 In the proceedings below, Claimant conceded she had to be a physically impaired person to seek benefits from the Fund.⁹The only contested issue was whether the Crumbyfindings of preexisting disability made simultaneously with the adjudication of the July 2009 injury could be combined to render the Claimant a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 § 171. On April 1, 2013, the trial court found that such were combinable and awarded Claimant permanent total disability benefits against the Fund. The court did not find any obvious and apparent injuries. The Fund appealed to a three-judge panel, and on August 15, 2013, the panel unanimously vacated the trial court's decision and found Claimant was not a physically impaired person under 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 § 171, and therefore, was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits from the Fund.

¶ 5 Claimant appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the three-judge panel's decision. The court held that because of amendments made in 2005, the Claimant was not required to show she was a physically impaired person before seeking compensation from the Fund. COCA concluded that Claimant's July 14, 2009 injury combined with the court's Crumbyfindings of preexisting disability rendered Claimant permanently and totally disabled and entitled her to compensation from the Fund. The Fund petitioned for certiorari review, and we granted review on March 2, 2015.¹⁰

Standard of Review

¶ 6 “When statutory language is unambiguous, no further construction is needed, and the unambiguous language will be applied as written.” St. John Med. Ctr. v. Bilby,2007 OK 37, ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 978, 979. If a strict, literal interpretation of the statute leads to an inconsistent or incongruent result between provisions, this Court will utilize rules of statutory construction to reconcile the discord. State ex rel. Okla. State Dep't of Health v. Robertson,2006 OK 99, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d 875, 878. “In determining legislative intent, this Court will not limit consideration to one word or phrase but will consider the context of the ambiguous provision.” Bilby,2007 OK 37, ¶ 6, 160 P.3d at 979. “Statutory construction presents a question of law and lower court rulings in this regard are reviewed de novo.” Holley v. Ace Am. Ins. Co.,2013 OK 88, ¶ 5, 313 P.3d 917, 920.

Analysis

¶ 7 The Legislature established the Fund in 1943 “to encourage employment of previously impaired workers.”¹¹The Fund protects employers “against additional liability for that class of individuals identified as physically impaired persons” in 85 O.S. § 171.¹²More specifically, the Fund “protect[s] employers from the responsibility to compensate a physically impaired person for disability resulting from the combination of the previous impairment and the subsequent impairment caused by an on-the-job injury.” Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Wade,2008 OK 15, ¶ 13, 180 P.3d 1205, 1209. “[T]he employer is liable only for the amount of disability caused by the subsequent accident”—the Fund “is responsible for excess awards resulting from combined disabilities.” Figgins,1992 OK 59, ¶ 6, 831 P.2d at 1382. “The Fund does not stand as a prime, original or substitute obligor.” Levi v. Special Indem. Fund,1964 OK 32, ¶ 9, 389 P.2d 620, 622. Rather, its liability “is derived from the anterior obligation of the employer” and “supplements the employer's obligation.” Wade,2008 OK 15, ¶ 16, 180 P.3d at 1209. The Fund's liability “does not attach until the extent of the employer's primary liability for the subsequent work-related injury has been judicially determined.” Id.

¶ 8“Awards against the Fund may be entered only for an obligation defined and authorized by statute,”¹³and “[o]nly upon authority of the statutecan additional compensation be awarded for increased disability resulting from subsequent injury.”¹⁴The Workers' Compensation Court lacks jurisdiction to enter an award against the Fund unless a Claimant proves that at the time of the subsequent injury he or she was a physically impaired person.¹⁵A Claimant's status as a physically impaired person is in fact “precedent to” the Workers' Compensation Court's jurisdiction over the Fund. Special Indem. Fund v. Estill,1997 OK 99, ¶ 10, 943 P.2d 606, 610.¹⁶

¶ 9 In this case, Claimant concedes she must be a physically impaired person to seek benefits from the Fund. The 2005 version of 85 O.S. § 171defines physically impaired person:

For purposes of Sections 171through 176of this title, the term ‘physically impaired person’ means a person who as a result of accident, disease, birth, military action, or any other cause, has suffered the loss of the sight of one eye, the loss by amputation of the whole or a part of a member of his body, or the loss of the use or partial loss of the use of a member such as is obvious and apparent from observation or examination by an ordinary layman, that is, a person who is not skilled in the medical profession, or any previous adjudications of disability adjudged and determined by the Workers' Compensation Court or any disability resulting from separately adjudicated injuries and adjudicated occupational diseases even though arising at the same time.¹⁷

At the time of her July 14, 2009 injury, Claimant indisputably had no prior adjudicated on-the-job injuries. Nevertheless, she maintains the Crumbyfindings of 6% preexisting disability to the back and 8% preexisting disability for psychological overlay are “previous adjudications of disability” under 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 § 171.

¶ 10 In Special Indemnity Fund v. Carson,1993 OK 64, 852 P.2d 157, this Court

addressed whether a Crumbyfinding of preexisting disability was a previous adjudication under 85 O.S. 1991 § 171. At that time, Section 171defined physically impaired person to include a person who suffered “any disability which previously has been adjudged and determined by the Workers Compensation Court....” 85 O.S. 1991 § 171. This Court held that a Crumbyfinding of preexisting disability made contemporaneously with an adjudication of the subsequent injury is not a previousadjudication as required by the statutory language. The Court strictly interpreted the statute and held that such “require[d] an enumerated loss or an adjudication of disability prior tothe subsequent injury for the Fund's liability to attach.” Carson,1993 OK 64, ¶ 11, 852 P.2d at 159(emphasis added). In response to this Court's decision in Carson,the Legislature, in 1993, amended Section 171to specifically include a Crumbyfinding of preexisting disability in the definition of a physically impaired person. Section 171was amended to provide: “ ‘[P]hysically impaired person’ means ... any preexisting disabilityadjudged and determined by the Workers' Compensation Court....” 85 O.S. Supp. 1993 § 171.

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