Ball v. The State

• Decision Date: 03 March 1890
• Citation: 67 Miss. 358,7 So. 353
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: J. L. BALL ET AL. v. THE STATE

7 So. 353

67 Miss. 358

J. L. BALL ET AL. v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 3, 1890

October 1889

FROM the circuit court of Pike county, HON. J. B. CHRISMAN, Judge.

Appellants Jesse L Ball and H. R. Badon, with others, were convicted in the court below on an indictment charging that the defendants "did wilfully and unlawfully disturb a congregation of persons lawfully assembled for religious worship at the China Grove meeting grounds, by shooting pistols," etc., and also by being intoxicated and by profane swearing. On the plea of not guilty the defendants were tried and convicted at the October term, 1889. At a former term of the court the defendant Ball was convicted on an indictment of two counts charging him with profane swearing and being drunk in the presence of two or more persons in a public place, to wit, at said China Grove camp-meeting grounds in said county, and the record of such former conviction and punishment thereunder was introduced in evidence on the trial of this case. It was admitted on behalf of the state that the drunkenness and profanity of which the said Ball had been convicted occurred at the camp-meeting on the said grounds in August, 1888, and that the "proof showed that such drunkenness and profanity occurred at the same camp-meeting or time of the alleged disturbance of religious worship by said Ball in this case."

After the introduction of such record and the admission of the district-attorney in respect to the same, the defendant Ball, moved the court to exclude all the evidence in this case as to him, on the ground that he had already been punished. This motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted. The evidence showed that a large number of persons including women and children, were in attendance at said camp-meeting grounds, for the purpose of participating in religious worship, at the time referred to in the indictment, and it was conclusively shown that Ball and some other persons were guilty of interfering with the services, and disturbing the worship by cursing, firing pistols and the like, as set forth in the opinion of the court. There was very little direct evidence against the defendant, Badon, but the circumstances tended to show that he participated with the parties who created the disturbance on the night in question. The shooting occurred in the woods near the place of worship and the tents of those in attendance at the meeting. It began about 11 o'clock, just as services closed, and was kept up, at intervals and in different places, nearly all night. About 2 o'clock A.M., a deputy sheriff, who was a police officer, heard and saw the defendant Badon and one Robbins in the road some three hundred yards from the camp grounds. Robbins used profane language and began firing off his pistol, when both parties were arrested by the officer. There was some evidence that Badon pulled back when arrested, and objected to being carried through the camp grounds.

Badon had a pistol in his possession, but it was broken and could not be fired, and there was evidence that he had the pistol for the purpose of having it repaired. The court instructed the jury that the defendants were presumed innocent; that they could only be convicted upon proof sufficient to establish guilt beyond all reasonable doubt; that the specific charge in the indictment had to be established; that a defendant is never required to establish his innocence, and that if the evidence taken as a whole leaves a reasonable doubt of guilt, the jury must acquit.

Defendants excepted to the action of the court in refusing the following instruction:--

"The court instructs the jury for the defendants, that before a jury can find a defendant guilty, they must be satisfied of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt exists in that state of the case in which, after consideration of all the evidence, the minds of the jurors are left in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. It is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary, but the evidence must establish its truth to a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. Such a conviction to a moral certainty is the state of belief, which considered by itself without reference to the thing believed in, and as a feeling, is a feeling of satisfaction--an easy and pleased feeling. Where we are convinced to a moral certainty, we are satisfied and need no further proof. When we doubt, we are dissatisfied and want more information. If a juror feels any uneasiness whatever as to the truth of the fact in saying guilty, and feels any desire for further evidence, he has a reasonable doubt under the law and must find for acquittal."

Motion for new trial overruled, and defendants appealed.

Affirmed.

S. E. Packwood, for appellants.

1. The court erred in refusing defendants' instruction. It is difficult to see...