Ballance v. Young
| Decision Date | 12 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:99-CV-00746. |
| Citation | 130 F.Supp.2d 762 |
| Parties | Kevin M. BALLANCE, Plaintiff, v. S.K. YOUNG and J. Fortner, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Kevin M. Ballance Big Stone Gap, VA, pro se.
Pamela Anne Sargent, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for defendants.
KEVIN M. BALLANCE, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, brings this action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction vested under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Plaintiff ("Ballance") alleges that S.K. Young ("Young"), the Warden of Wallens Ridge State Prison ("WRSP"), violated his constitutional rights by wrongfully confiscating three (3) scrapbooks from his cell. Ballance further alleges that J. Fortner violated his constitutional rights by confiscating a letter that Ballance wrote to his lawyer. As relief, Ballance seeks an injunction directing that he receive his three scrapbooks and his personal mail and that he be awarded $154.95 for legal fees and $250,000 in punitive damages. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the matter comes before this Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted and the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Insofar as Ballance introduces a new and distinct retaliation claim under § 1983, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court also dismisses Ballance's Motion to Compel.
Kevin M. Ballance, the plaintiff, is an inmate under the supervision of the Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC") and currently housed at Wallens Ridge State Prison. S.K. Young is the Warden of WRSP, and J. Fortner is an officer at WRSP.
On or about June 4, 1999, during the prison's initial inventory of Ballance's belongings, prison officials confiscated a number of unauthorized personal property, including twenty-five excess magazines, one fan, assorted clippings, and three scrap books. WRSP informed Ballance on June 10, 1999, that the confiscated items were unauthorized. Ballance acknowledged the confiscation by signing an inmate special status inventory form. That same day, Ballance signed a property disposition form designating that WRSP send his items to his "Mom" via United Parcel Service.
On June 18, 1999, Ballance filed an inmate grievance form, alleging that neither Division Operating Procedure ("DOP") 856 nor DOP 851 empowers the prison to confiscate his scrapbooks and clippings. In response to Ballance's complaint, a prison official filed an inmate grievance procedure investigative report on June 29, 1999, which determined the grievance unfounded, as DOP 856 does not allow clippings or empower the inmate to deem what constitutes a "book." Warden Young filed a Level I grievance form advising Ballance that DOP 856 does not allow scrapbooks at WRSP. Moreover, Warden Young explained that "copies or sections of publications, brochures, newsletters, materials printed off the Internet or other printed materials to be received in personal correspondence ... are not authorized for receipt with personal correspondence." Ballance appealed the Level I review to Regional Director Young. The Regional Director affirmed the Level I decision and determined Ballance's grievance unfounded. Level II was Ballance's last level of appeal for his grievance.
Ballance also alleges that J. Fortner violated his constitutional rights by confiscating a letter sent to his attorney. On September 8, 1999, Fortner delivered a letter from an attorney to Ballance's cell. Ballance opened the envelope, which allegedly contained a letter, two money-orders and a small envelope with hairs in them. Fortner confiscated the contents of the letter and filed a Major Offense Report on September 9, 1999, which Ballance signed at 6:05 p.m. The report indicated that J. Fortner discovered that Ballance sent hair samples to his attorney through the mail.
On September 13, 1999, the prison conducted a disciplinary hearing regarding Fortner's accusation that Ballance sent hair to his attorney in the mail. The Hearings Officer, J. Salyer, found Ballance guilty of the charge. Mr. Salyer based his decision on the fact that Ballance admitted to sending hair samples to his attorney through the mail. Accordingly, Ballance lost thirty (30) days of television privileges beginning September 13 through October 12, 1999. An institutional review, conducted on September 15, 1999, approved the hearing and penalty.
Upon motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts, and the inferences to be drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.1985). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). However, "[t]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
When a motion for summary judgment is made and properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or answers to interrogatories, the non-moving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. Instead, the non-moving party must respond by affidavits or otherwise and present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of disputed fact for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the non-moving party fails to show a genuine issue of fact, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against the non-moving party.
The Plaintiff asserts that S.K. Young and J. Fortner violated his constitutional rights, specifically the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, by confiscating three scrapbooks, clippings and the letter. Ballance asserts that under the First Amendment, he has a right to own and view the scrapbooks and assorted clippings and that he has the right to receive mail. Under the Fourth Amendment, the Plaintiff argues that S.K. Young unlawfully searched Ballance's property and confiscated the scrapbooks and clippings. Ballance further avers that J. Fortner violated Ballance's Fourth Amendment rights by seizing the letter that contained hair and two money orders. Specifically, Ballance alleges that J. Fortner violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when Fortner confiscated the letter's contents.
Ballance raises two distinct claims in his complaint: 1) Unconstitutional confiscation of his scrapbook and clippings, and 2) Unconstitutional confiscation of an envelope from his lawyer, which contained hair samples and, allegedly, two money orders. Although Ballance prays for different remedies, this Court will analyze the claims under the same rubric. Although Ballance appears to allege that the confiscation of the personal property, including the letter was unauthorized and not pursuant to any prison policy, WRSP still afforded him sufficient post-deprivation remedies to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns. Moreover, under the First and Fourth Amendment, the Prison had a viable security interest in securing each inmate's cell, which Constitutionally overrides Ballance's rights. Thus Ballance's claims fail to establish a genuine issue of fact, and accordingly, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement is granted.
The Supreme Court established that neither the barbed wire nor the cement walls of confinement completely sever an inmate's Constitutional rights. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977). Although housed behind steel and stone, no "iron curtain" separates an inmate from his "Constitutional rights." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
Prisoners are afforded those rights not "inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Limitations on these rights, however, arise from the realistic demands of prison enforcement and from "valid penological objectives-including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974)). The Supreme Court recognized that the difficulties and complications of prison control as well as issues of separation of powers demand that courts follow a policy of "judicial restraint." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
Ballance avers that S.K. Young and J. Fortner intentionally deprived him of his property, and that their decisions found no support under Division Operation Procedures. Ballance avers that Young was "acting on personal prejudice," and that Fortner "stoled [sic] Ballance's legal mail to pertect [sic] his fellow officers." The Supreme Court of the United States established that "an intentional ... deprivation of property by a state employee does not violate the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Thus, the threshold question before this Court is whether the state afforded Ballance a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Oliver v. Powell
...claim against a prison employee because such action may tend to chill plaintiffs exercise of constitutional rights. Ballance v. Young, 130 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va.2000). However, if defendant's actions did not "chill, impair, or deny plaintiffs right to exercise his constitutional right, the ......
-
Gordon v. Mullins
...Gordon as a means to seek compensation for his books. See Wadhams v. Procunier, 772 F.2d 75, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1985); Balance v. Young, 130 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (W.D. Va. 2000). Inasmuch as Gordon had adequate state remedies, I find that his allegations do not rise to the level of a constitut......
-
Lacey v. Braxton
...(holding the remedies available under the Virginia Tort Claims Act to be sufficient post-deprivation remedies); Ballance v. Young, 130 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (W.D. Va. 2000). Moreover, a claim that prison officials have not followed their own policies or procedures also does not state a const......
-
Rountree v. Clarke
...the VDOC grievance procedure, which Rountree utilized, and the Virginia Claims Act, provide adequate remedies. Ballance v. Young, 130 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (W.D. Va. 2000); Virginia Code § 8.01-195.3. Furthermore, a claim that prison officials have failed to follow their own policies or proc......
-
U.S. District Court: CELL SEARCH.
...v. Young, 130 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2000). A state prisoner brought a pro se federal civil rights suit against prison officials, arising out of their seizure of several items of his personal property. The district court held that the prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his......
-
U.S. District Court: CONFISCATION.
...v. Young 130 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2000). A state prisoner brought a pro se federal civil rights suit against prison officials, arising out of their seizure of several items of his personal property. The district court held that the prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his ......
-
U.S. District Court: MAIL RIGHT OF PRIVACY.
...v. Young, 130 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2000). A state prisoner brought a pro se federal civil rights suit against prison officials, arising out of their seizure of several items of his personal property. The district court held that the prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his......
-
U.S. District Court: PRIVILEGED CORRES.
...v. Young, 130 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2000). A state prisoner brought a pro se federal civil rights suit against prison officials, arising out of their seizure of several items of his personal property. The district court held that the prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his......