Ballantine v. Town of Falmouth

• Decision Date: 17 January 1973
• Citation: 294 N.E.2d 524,1 Mass.App.Ct. 47
• Parties: Henry Thomas BALLANTINE, Jr., et al. v. TOWN OF FALMOUTH et al. 1
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 524

294 N.E.2d 524

1 Mass.App.Ct. 47

Henry Thomas BALLANTINE, Jr., et al. v. TOWN OF FALMOUTH et al. ¹

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable.

Argued Dec. 12, 1972.

Decided Jan. 17, 1973.

Andrew F. Lane, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Henry P. Monaghan, Boston, and Francis W. Keating, Town Counsel, Falmouth, with him, for the Town of Falmouth and others.

Before HALE, C.J., and KEVILLE and GRANT, JJ.

GRANT, Justice.

This case is here on the appeal of the plaintiffs from a final declaratory decree of the Superior Court which determined the validity of certain actions taken by the defendant town of Falmouth (the town) and its board of selectmen in an effort to alleviate a chronic shortage of automobile parking spaces available to the public in the Woods Hole section of the town, particularly in the vicinity of the ferry terminal of the defendant Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority (the authority). The trial judge made voluntary findings of fact, and the evidence is reported.

The authority operates a passenger and freight service between the mainland at Woods Hole and the islands of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket and has its offices and its principal base of operations and ferry terminal in Woods Hole. ² It has always had a need to provide parking spaces for those of its patrons who leave their automobiles on the mainland while traveling to and from the islands. In 1964 the authority purchased from the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad ³ an area, known as the main parking area, which was immediately adjacent to the ferry terminal and which lay at the extreme southwesterly end of that portion of the railroad's right of way which ran from Buzzard's Bay to Woods Hole. The main parking area was thereafter constructed to provide a capacity of approximately 325 parked automobiles. In 1966 the authority leased from the railroad a portion of the right of way which extended in a northeasterly direction from the main parking area. The leased area, except for a strip twenty feet wide reserved for railroad purposes, was used by the authority to provide parking spaces for approximately 375 additional automobiles. The lease in question was, by its terms, to expire on June 30, 1971, and provided that the area so let could be 'used only for the purposes of a vehicular and pedestrian passway and of parking motor vehicles of the (authority) its agents, employees and business invitees.'

Since 1965 the defendant Corey has operated the main parking area, and since 1966 he has operated the parking area located on the right of way, for the benefit of the authority under some form of management contract not disclosed by the evidence. Corey has collected parking fees established by the authority from those who have used the two areas for parking purposes. Both areas have occasionally been used by members of the general public who have not been patrons of the authority.

In 1968 the railroad received authorization from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to abandon that portion of its line of railroad which extended from a point in the center of Falmouth to the main parking area of the authority, a total distance of some 3.34 miles. Such action of the ICC had the effect of freeing for sale by the railroad that portion of its right of way which ran between the same two points in the town, and which will sometimes hereinafter be referred to as the abandoned segment of the right of way. That segment comprises some twenty-five acres and varies in width from 30 to 126 feet. The railroad tracks were subsequently removed therefrom.

On September 13, 1968, the conservation commission of the town (see G.L. c. 40, § 8C, as amended through St.1967, c. 885) wrote the defendant selectmen advising them that the commission was interested in having the town acquire a substantial portion of the abandoned segment of the right of way for conservation purposes, including the portion thereof then under lease to the authority and used by it for parking purposes.

On March 18, 1969, the selectmen issued their warrant for a special town meeting to be held on April 2, 1969. Article 1 of that warrant read '(t)o see if the Town will vote to raise and appropriate or appropriate from available funds a sum of money to purchase or take by eminent domain for conservation and other municipal purposes that portion of the railroad right of way between Falmouth center and Woods Hole, that has been abandoned for railroad purposes . . .. Said taking to be under the jurisdiction of the Board of Selectmen' (emphasis supplied). Article 2 read '(t)o see if the Town will vote to authorize the . . . Selectmen to negotiate and enter into a lease with the (authority) or others, to allow the Authority or others to continue to use that portion of the railroad right of way now used by them for parking . . ..' (emphasis supplied).

On March 20, 1969, the railroad advised the town, the authority, the abutters and others who might be interested that it would entertain bids for the purchase of all or parts of the abandoned segment of the right of way. The abutters so notified included the plaintiffs, whose property adjoins the right or way for a distance of some 1,200 feet at the head of Little Harbor in Woods Hole. The plaintiffs and the authority, but not the town, submitted bids for the purchase of the entire abandoned segment.

On March 24, 1969, the finance committee of the town ⁴ met to consider the foregoing two articles but made no recommendation with respect to either article at that time. Its printed report to the voters in advance of the town meeting recommended under art. 1 that the town raise and appropriate the sum of $60,000 to purchase the abandoned segment of the right of way or take it by eminent domain 'for conservation, recreation, utilities ⁵ and municipal parking' (emphasis supplied). The printed report also recommended that action under art. 2 be indefinitely postponed, apparently because of doubt as to the legality of a possible lease to the authority. Subsequently, on the floor of the town meeting, the chairman of the committee stated that any such doubt had been resolved in favor of the legality of such a lease and that the committee recommended affirmative action on the motions proposed by the selectmen under both articles.

On April 1, 1969, the authority withdrew its bid for the purchase of the abandoned segment of the right of way, giving as its reason the discovery of an asserted defect in the railroad's title. On the same date the railroad accepted the bid of the plaintiffs, who were advised of such acceptance by letter dated April 4, 1969.

By the time of the special town neeting held on April 2, 1969, the traffic congestion in the public streets in the Woods Hole section of the town during the busy season of the year (from spring until fall) had reached such a condition of congestion that there was room for genuine doubt as to whether fire or other emergency vehicles could proceed through the streets during that season. By that time the authority operation not only the two parking areas already referred to but an additional parking area near the center of Falmouth from and to which it transported its ferry patrons without additional charge to them.

The unanimous vote of the town meeting under art. 1 of the warrant was to authorize the selectmen to purchase or take the abandoned segment of the right of way by eminent domain 'for conservation, recreation, public parking and public utilities purposes' (emphasis supplied) and to raise and appropriate $60,000 for that purpose. Under art. 2 the town voted to authorize the selectmen to 'negotiate and enter into a lease with the (authority) or others, to allow the (authority) or others to continue to use that portion of the railroad right of way now used by them for parking' (emphasis supplied). ⁶

By deed dated May 23, 1969, the railroad conveyed the entire abandoned segment of the right of way to the plaintiffs, at the same time assinging to them the 1966 lease between itself and the authority. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their efforts to negotiate satisfactory arrangements with the town or the authority for the future use of any portion of the right of way. By a vote and order of taking adopted on July 25, 1969, the selectmen, acting in behalf of the town, took the fee in the right of way 'for conservation, recreation, public parking and public utilities purposes' (emphasis supplied). The authority has paved the twenty-foot wide strip formerly reserved for railroad purposes on the portion of the right of way previously leased to it and has thus expanded the total capacity of that area to approximately 525 parking spaces.

Because of the threat or actual pendency of the present litigation the town has not entered into a formal lease arrangement with the authority for the use of any portion of the right of way. Rather, under an informal arrangement apparently agreed to my the parties, the authority has continued to occupy the portion of the right of way originally leased to it in 1966 (plus the area earlier reserved for railroad purposes) and to make periodic payments into an escrow account in the same amounts which it formerly paid to the railroad by way of rent.

The trial judge expressly found that all parties exercised good faith. For this reason we do not explore the indecisive evidence of the motives of the selectmen and the town in their respective actions. See Caleb Pierce, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 306, 310--311, 237 N.E.2d 63, and cases cited.

The present proceedings were brought by the plaintiffs under G.L. c. 231A to challenge the validity of the above recited actions of the town and to secure various binding determinations of the rights of the parties. The final decree from which the plaintiffs have appealed declares the validity of (1) the votes taken under arts. 1 and 2 of the warrant for the special town meeting, (2)...