Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel
Decision Date | 20 January 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 98-1078.,98-1078. |
Citation | 604 N.W.2d 639 |
Parties | Priscilla BALMER, Appellant, v. HAWKEYE STEEL, Appellee. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John M. Loeschen of Loeschen & Loeschen, Burlington, for appellant.
Martha L. Shaff and Peter J. Thill of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, L.L.P., Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by LARSON, P.J., and LAVORATO, SNELL, TERNUS, and CADY, JJ.
In this employment termination case, we must decide whether constructive discharge, standing alone, is an actionable tort in Iowa. The district court concluded it was not and sustained a motion for directed verdict as to an at-will employee's claim of wrongful termination. We agree and affirm.
Priscilla Balmer worked at Hawkeye Steel in Haughton, Iowa, from February 1994 to April 1996. She was an employee at will.
In July 1996 Balmer sued Hawkeye. She alleged that while employed she was subjected to verbal and mental harassment and abuse and that Hawkeye did nothing to stop the conduct. She further alleged that her employment conditions became so intolerable that she had to quit, resulting in what she claimed was a constructive discharge. However, she did not allege that Hawkeye breached an employment contract, or violated any state or federal civil rights laws or public policies of this state. Hawkeye denied it had constructively discharged Balmer.
The parties tried the case to a jury. At the close of Balmer's case in chief, Hawkeye moved for a directed verdict. Hawkeye contended, among other things, that Balmer had failed to show that Hawkeye's actions violated public policy. Balmer responded that she did not need to prove violation of public policy because constructive discharge could stand alone as a tort with no reference to underlying illegal activities by the employer.
The district court granted Hawkeye's motion for directed verdict. The court rejected Balmer's contention that, notwithstanding her status as an employee at will, she could nevertheless maintain her suit on the theory of constructive discharge alone.
Balmer appealed, challenging the district court's ruling that constructive discharge standing alone is not an actionable tort in Iowa.
I. We review rulings granting motions for directed verdict for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Lawrence v. Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Iowa 1995). When reviewing the ruling, we view the evidence in the same light as the district court to determine whether the evidence generated a jury question. Toney v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa 1990). In ruling on such motions, the district court must first decide whether the nonmoving party has presented substantial evidence on each element of the claim. Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1986). Evidence is substantial if a jury could reasonably infer a fact from the evidence. Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 317-18 (Iowa 1992). If the evidence is not substantial, a directed verdict is appropriate. Id. at 318.
II. Balmer argues the district court erred when it concluded constructive discharge alone is not an actionable tort. Before addressing her argument, we think it would be helpful to briefly review our law regarding employment at will, a status Balmer had until April 1996, at which time she claims she was forced to quit.
In Iowa an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time, "for any lawful reason, that is, a reason that is not contrary to public policy." Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 577 N.W.2d 845, 846 (Iowa 1998). The parties can modify the employment-at-will relationship by contract created through an employer's handbook or policy manual. Huegerich v. IBP, Inc., 547 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 1996). There is no record evidence of a contract created through an employer's handbook or policy manual. Nor is there any record evidence establishing a violation of public policy. Balmer, however, insists such lack of proof is irrelevant because a constructive discharge is actionable in itself.
III. In general, employment relationships are terminated by resignation or discharge. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 1238, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1994). An employee voluntarily severs the relationship by resigning; the employer does so by discharging the employee. Id.
Id. Simply put, courts over the years have attempted to prevent employers' "end runs" around the law by casting an employee's quitting as involuntary:
Although the employee may say, "I quit," the employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer's acts, against the employee's will. As a result, a constructive discharge is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.
Turner, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d at 1025. Constructive discharge therefore provides a mechanism to avoid the technical requirement that wrongful discharge be based on an employer-initiated discharge.
Constructive discharge was first recognized by the federal courts. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 890, 894, 104 S.Ct. 2803, 2808, 2810, 81 L.Ed.2d 732, 742, 744 (1984)
( ); Stetson v. NYNEX Serv., 995 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir.1993) ( ). State courts have since generally followed the federal courts in recognizing constructive discharge in the context of discrimination and wrongful discharge cases. See, e.g., Slack v. Kanawha County Hous., 188 W.Va. 144, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-58 (1992) ( ).
Constructive discharge arises "when the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation." First Judicial Dist. Dep't of Correctional Servs. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 315 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 1982). To establish constructive discharge, the plaintiff must show that the "`working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's position would be compelled to resign.'" Id. (quoting Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir.1980)).
315 N.W.2d at 86-89 ( ). We have also considered the concept of constructive discharge in the context of a common-law claim of wrongful discharge. See Reihmann v. Foerstner, 375 N.W.2d 677, 683-84 (Iowa 1985) ( ). In none of these cases,...
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