Balmuth v. Dolce
| Decision Date | 14 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | NC-2011-0131,NC-2010-0299,NC-2010-0298,NC-2011-0127,C.A. NC-2010-0296 |
| Parties | MICHAEL A. BALMUTH and JANET E. BALMUTH v. DAVID E. DOLCE, in his capacity as Assessor of Taxes for the Town of Portsmouth JOHN QUA and SUZANNE SCHUTTE v. DAVID E. DOLCE, in his capacity as Assessor of Taxes for the Town of Portsmouth WILLIAM S. ANTLE v. DAVID E. DOLCE, in his capacity as Assessor of Taxes for the Town of Portsmouth |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
For Plaintiff: Brian G. Bardorf, Esq. Mark B. Bardorf, Esq. Michael J. Richards, Esq.
For Defendant: Donato A. D'Andrea, Esq. Kevin P. Gavin, Esq.
Before this Court for trial and decision is a five-count consolidated tax appeal from decisions of the Portsmouth Tax Assessment Board of Review (the Board). The Plaintiffs homeowners Michael A. and Janet E. Balmuth, John Qua and Suzanne Schutte, and William S. Antle (collectively Plaintiffs), challenge the Town of Portsmouth's (the Town or Portsmouth) tax assessment on real properties during the Tax Years[1] 2009 and 2010. Plaintiffs challenge the valuations placed on their homes during those years and seek return of the moneys overpaid, plus costs and interest accrued. The individual Complaints have been consolidated; and, in lieu of a non-jury trial, the parties have executed an Agreed Statement of Facts and submitted individual memoranda of law. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 44-5-26. For the reasoning set forth herein, judgment shall enter for the Plaintiffs.
The following facts have been stipulated to by the parties. Plaintiffs Michael A. Balmuth and Janet E. Balmuth, as of December 31, 2007 and through Portsmouth's Tax Year 2010, were the owners of a certain condominium unit designated as Unit No. 9 in Carnegie Harbor Residence Condominium, located at 294 Carnegie Harbor Drive, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, which is identified as Lot 2A-9 on Portsmouth Tax Assessor's Plat 26 (the Balmuth Property). Plaintiff William S. Antle, as of December 31, 2007 and through Portsmouth's Tax Year 2010, was the owner of a certain condominium designated as Unit 11 in Carnegie Harbor Residence Condominium, located at 271 Carnegie Harbor Drive, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, which is identified as Lot 2A-11 on Portsmouth Tax Assessor's Plat 26 (the Antle Property). Plaintiffs John Qua and Suzanne Schutte, on December 31, 2007 and through Portsmouth's Tax Year 2010, were the owners of a certain condominium unit designated as Unit No. 5 in the Carnegie Harbor Residence Condominium, located at 264 Carnegie Harbor Drive, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, which is identified as Lot 2A-5 on Portsmouth Tax Assessor's Plat 26 (the Qua Property).
Defendant David E. Dolce (Defendant), the Tax Assessor of the Town of Portsmouth, conducted an updated valuation of all parcels of real estate located in Portsmouth-the assessment included those properties owned by Plaintiffs (collectively, the Plaintiffs' Properties)-as of December 31, 2007, pursuant to § 44-5-11.6. Defendant determined that the fair market value (FMV) of each property, as of December 31, 2007, was as follows:
The parties agree that the December 31, 2007 valuations were full and fair, and that for the Tax Year 2008 Plaintiffs were not overassessed. [2] For the Tax Years 2009 and 2010, Defendant did not reevaluate Plaintiffs' Properties. Instead, Defendant carried forward the values calculated on December 31, 2007, and Plaintiffs were assessed property taxes for the Tax Years 2009 and 2010 pursuant to the Tax Year 2008 property valuations-the December 31, 2007 fair market values. The parties agree that had Defendant reevaluated the Plaintiffs' Properties on December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2009, the fair market values for each year would have been as follows:
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs paid, in a timely manner, property taxes due for the Tax Years 2009 and 2010 as follows:
The assessments in the Tax Years 2009 and 2010 were a function of the December 31, 2007 fair market values that Defendant carried forward and the applicable tax rate for each year, 1.1265% and 1.1301%, respectively.
Believing the property taxes paid in Tax Years 2009 and 2010 were based on valuations that exceeded fair market value, and pursuant to their statutory right of appeal under § 44-5-26, Plaintiffs appealed the assessments to Defendant.[6] Defendant denied Plaintiffs' appeals on the grounds that the December 31, 2007 valuations were accurate at the time and thus properly carried forward to December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2009 for use in the Tax Years 2009 and 2010, respectively. Plaintiffs then appealed Defendant's decision to the Board, which concurred with Defendant and denied Plaintiffs' appeals on the same grounds.
Plaintiffs appealed the Board's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to § 44-5-26. All five matters were consolidated and heard before this Court without the intervention of a jury. The parties have stipulated to these facts and submitted memoranda of law.
In a nonjury trial, "[t]he trial justice sits as a trier of fact as well as of law." Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984). At times, parties will stipulate to the facts and execute an agreed statement of facts. "'An agreed statement of facts operates to submit a controversy for consideration when both parties have agreed upon the ultimate facts.'" Hagenberg v. Avedisian, 879 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Randall v. Norberg, 121 R.I. 714, 717, 403 A.2d 240, 242 (1979)). When the facts are stipulated to in a non-jury trial, "the [ ] court does not play a fact-finding role, but is limited to 'applying the law to the agreed-upon facts.'" Delbonis Sand & Gravel Co., v. Town of Richmond, 909 A.2d 922, 925 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Hagenberg, 879 A.2d at 441).
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that, pursuant to § 44-5-30, they are entitled to judgment in the amount of excess taxation, plus interest and costs. Plaintiffs argue that following the December 31, 2007 valuation, their Properties' values decreased significantly. As such, the assessments in Tax Years 2009 and 2010 exceeded fair market value, as they were assessed pursuant to the December 31, 2007 valuations. Defendant argues that he was required to carry forward the December 31, 2007 valuations and because the valuations on that date were fair and for the full cash value of the properties, Plaintiffs were not overassessed. The law governing Plaintiffs' appeals is clear and well settled and the Court will address the parties' claims in seriatim below.
Whether a tax assessment is challenged on the grounds of illegality or overassessment, "the taxing statutes provide the exclusive relief to any person aggrieved by any assessment of taxes against him by any city or town." Murray v Rockaway Blvd. Wrecking & Lumber Co., 108 R.I. 607, 609, 277 A.2d 922, 924 (1971); see also § 44-5-27 ). Sec. 44-5-26, "Petition in superior court for relief from assessment, " delineates the process by which a taxpayer may challenge his or her assessment, stating in pertinent part:
Sec. 44-5-26(a).
Sec. 44-5-26(b) provides the form that a taxpayer must file when making his or her appeal. For judgment to enter in favor of the taxpayer challenging the property tax assessment, the taxpayer must demonstrate: (1) that an account has been given; (2) that the tax has been assessed in excess of the property's full and fair cash value; and (3) that the taxes on the property have been paid prior to judgment entering. See § 44-5-30. If all three elements are satisfied, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the excess moneys paid will be returned to the taxpayer, plus interest and costs. See id.
The parties agree that Plaintiffs appealed their tax assessments "in full compliance with all time and other procedural requirements of R.I.G.L. §§44-5-1 et. seq." (Agreed Statement of Facts at 3). The parties also agree that Plaintiffs timely paid all taxes, as assessed, for the years being challenged. Id. at 4-5. The issue for this...
To continue reading
Request your trial