Balshy v. Rank

• Decision Date: 02 April 1985
• Citation: 507 Pa. 384,490 A.2d 415
• Parties: John C. BALSHY, et al., Appellants, v. Gary W. RANK, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 415

490 A.2d 415

507 Pa. 384

John C. BALSHY, et al., Appellants, v. Gary W. RANK, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 21, 1985.

Decided April 2, 1985.

Maura A. Johnston, Andrew S. Gordon, Allen C. Warshaw, Harrisburg, for appellants.

Gilbert B. Abramson, Sharon M. Friel, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Justice.

We granted the petition for permission to appeal of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State Police, and John Balshy, Dean Shipe, Joseph Van Nort and John Holtz, individual Troopers of the Pennsylvania State Police, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702 and Pa.R.A.P. 1311 et seq., from an interlocutory order of Commonwealth Court, 475 A.2d 182, retransferring to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County a matter which had previously been retransferred from Common Pleas Court to Commonwealth Court, to decide which forum has subject matter jurisdiction of the underlying controversy. For the reasons which follow, we hold that exclusive, original subject matter jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Common Pleas.

The incidents on which the instant civil action is founded occurred during the investigation and prosecution, from approximately April 24, 1979 until appellee's acquittal on September 26, 1979, of criminal charges in connection with a homicide. After his acquittal, appellee commenced the instant civil action against appellants in Commonwealth Court. The complaint avers causes of action against all appellants under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1985 for violations of appellee's civil rights by the Troopers' allegedly obtaining a search warrant based on falsehood; obtaining an arrest warrant without probable cause; preventing appellee from seeing his counsel; fabricating, destroying or concealing evidence in the murder trial; and assaulting and battering appellee. Appellee seeks damages from the Commonwealth and the Pennsylvania State Police for failure to exercise due care in selecting, training and controlling the state troopers. He also seeks damages for battery, false imprisonment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation.

Believing the action to be controlled by § 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a)(1) (Supp.1984-1985), which generally vests in Commonwealth Court original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the Commonwealth government and its officers in their official capacity, on April 24, 1981 appellee filed a complaint in trespass in Commonwealth Court. That court, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a)(1)(iv) (1981) (since amended), which provided an exception to the jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court in "actions or proceedings in trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign or other immunity," sua sponte transferred the matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. On September 20, 1983, Common Pleas Court ordered the matter retransferred to Commonwealth Court inasmuch as Common Pleas Court could find no exception to the exclusive original jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court under § 761 for civil rights actions. We disapprove the practice of Courts of Common Pleas refusing jurisdiction and attempting to "retransfer " matters to Commonwealth Court. The proper practice in cases such as this one would be for Common Pleas Court to dismiss the action and for the parties to take an appeal. No appeal was taken. The statute having, in the interim, been amended, Commonwealth Court then reconsidered its original order in light of the amended § 761(a)(1)(v), and again ordered the matter transferred to Common Pleas Court. On motion of the Commonwealth, the matter was certified for interlocutory appeal under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702.

Both appellants, by the Attorney General, and appellee, by his counsel, have argued that jurisdiction of the underlying controversy is in Commonwealth Court under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a), and that paragraph (v) does not provide an exception to that court's jurisdiction. Based on our analysis of this particular case, the result would be no different if the matter were decided on § 761(a)(1)(iv) of the 1980 amendment.

The pertinent statutory provision is as follows:

§ 761. Original Jurisdiction

(a) General Rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except:

* * *

(iii) actions or proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 85 (relating to matters affecting government units) [dealing with sovereign, governmental and official immunity];

... and

(v) actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign immunity and actions or proceedings in the nature of assumpsit relating to such actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass.

(b) Concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction.--The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court under subsection (a) shall be exclusive except as provided in section 721 (relating to original jurisdiction [of the Supreme Court] )....

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761.

First, we affirm the order of Commonwealth Court that, as to those counts against the individual Troopers, Commonwealth Court lacks jurisdiction. The term "officer" as used in § 761(a)(1), which confers on Commonwealth Court original jurisdiction of all civil actions against officers of the Commonwealth acting in their official capacity, has not been defined by the Legislature. Guided by the principle of statutory construction that words and phrases be construed according to their common and approved usage, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a), in Forney v. Harrisburg State Hospital, 18 Pa.Commw.Ct. 17, 21, 336 A.2d 709, 711 (1975), Commonwealth Court distinguished Commonwealth officers from ordinary Commonwealth employees, describing officers as those persons to whom are delegated some of the sovereign functions of government, and employees as persons who merely exercise subordinate ministerial functions. More recently the definition of "officer," as that term is used in § 761, has been refined to include "those persons who perform state-wide policymaking functions and who are charged with the responsibility for independent initiation of administrative policy regarding some sovereign function of state government." Opie v. Glascow, Inc., 30 Pa.Commw.Ct. 555, 559, 375 A.2d 396, 398 (1977). The basis for this refinement was Commonwealth Court's conclusion that it was not the intent of the General Assembly to confer on that Court original jurisdiction over cases where local courts can much more conveniently and properly make the determination as to the liability of state employees who function on an essentially local or regional basis. Id. Commonwealth Court's conclusions were expressly approved by our Court. Rhines v. Herzel, 481 Pa. 165, 169, 392 A.2d 298, 300-301 (1978); Kulik v. Stotelmyer, 481 Pa. 57, 59, 391 A.2d 1313, 1314-1315 (1978). Although State Troopers may be commonly known as "officers of the law," as their duties do not involve the statewide formulation or administration of policy, they are not "officers" for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on Commonwealth Court under § 761. Thus, the actions against the individual state troopers are clearly not within the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court.

The more difficult question is whether Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction with respect to the counts against the Commonwealth. Commonwealth Court held that these claims fall within the exception to that Court's jurisdiction "for actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign or other immunity." § 761(a)(1)(v). Resolution of this question is aided by analysis of the evolution of § 761 in its historic context, ^* which shows that in every instance where the sovereign's immunity from tort liability was limited, the General Assembly immediately took action designed to vest jurisdiction of the new causes of action allowed against the sovereign in Common Pleas Court.

The Commonwealth Court was created in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968. Art. V, § 4 of that document provides that the Commonwealth Court "shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law." This section was implemented by the General Assembly by passage of the Commonwealth Court Act, Act of January 6, 1970 (1969 P.L. 434, No. 185), § 8, repealed and replaced by the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, § 401, subsequently replaced by the Judiciary Act of 1976, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 761, as amended. The effect of the Commonwealth Court Act and its successors was to vest in the Commonwealth Court jurisdiction of those actions against the Commonwealth which were formerly brought in the trial court for the seat of government, to-wit, the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Emhart Corp., 443 Pa. 397, 400, n. 1, 278 A.2d 916, 917, n. 1 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 981, 92 S.Ct. 451, 30 L.Ed.2d 364 (1971).

The Commonwealth Court Act provided, with exceptions not here relevant, for exclusive original jurisdiction in Commonwealth Court of (1) "all civil actions and proceedings against the Commonwealth, but this clause shall not be construed as a waiver by the Commonwealth of immunity to suit," and (2) "all civil actions and proceedings against officers of the Commonwealth in their official capacity." Section 8(a)(2)(ii) and (iii). Approximately one year later, and again in 1976, this provision was substantially reenacted in § 401 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, supra, and § 761 of the Judicial Code, supra. At the time of all ...