Quitmeyer v. SE PA. TRANSP. AUTHORITY, Civ. A. No. 89-0827.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 89-0827. |
| Parties | Edward QUITMEYER and Laura Quitmeyer, h/w v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); Thornbury Township and Sgt. William Harwood, Individually and as Police Chief of Thornbury Township; Police Officers Kelly and Fornia; James MacElree, District Attorney of Chester County; Martha Laynas, Assistant District Attorney of Chester County and National Medical Services, Inc. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
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J. Michael Farrell, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Mark Lipowicz, Philadelphia, Pa., for SEPTA.
Joanne E. Kleiner, Philadelphia, Pa., for Nat. Medical Services, Inc.
John S. Halsted, Philadelphia, Pa., for MacElree & Laynas.
William F. Holsten, II, Esq., Media, Pa., for Thornbury Tp., Harwood, Kelly and Fornia.
Plaintiffs commenced this action on February 3, 1989 against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") and various other defendants pursuant to the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq., the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. Presently before the court are the defendants' individual and joint motions to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The allegations of the Complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, are as follows.
On February 5, 1986, plaintiff Edward Quitmeyer,1 an employee of SEPTA, was the engineer operating a SEPTA train involved in a grade-crossing accident with an automobile. This accident resulted in the death of the driver and injuries to four other occupants of the automobile.
Following the accident, and also on February 5, defendants Kelly and Formica, officials in the Thornbury Township Police Department, administered a drug and alcohol test to Edward Quitmeyer.2 On February 10, 1986, Kelly and Formica delivered the blood and alcohol samples to defendant National Medical Services, Inc. ("NMS") for analysis.
NMS performed an analysis on March 26, 1986. The analysis showed quantities of alcohol and marijuana in Quitmeyer's blood, although not great enough presumptively to establish intoxication. The results of this test were forwarded to the office of the Chester County District Attorney and were marked confidential.
On or about April 2, 1987, SEPTA learned the results of the above tests, although the complaint does not precisely specify how or from whom. That same day, SEPTA removed Mr. Quitmeyer from service and required him to undergo another drug and alcohol screening. The results of this test were negative. On May 18, 1987, SEPTA discharged Quitmeyer. Plaintiffs do not make clear whether SEPTA ever returned Mr. Quitmeyer to service between April 3 and May 18, 1987.
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cognizable claim under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all of plaintiff's factual allegations and draw from them all reasonable inferences favorable to the plaintiff. D.P. Enterprises, Inc. v. Bucks County Community College, 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3rd Cir. 1984). A case should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with plaintiff's allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).
Count I of the Complaint asserts a cause of action against SEPTA under FELA for injuries plaintiff sustained because of the allegedly negligent design, construction and maintenance of the grade crossing where the February 5, 1986 accident occurred. SEPTA has not moved to dismiss this count.
In Count II, Edward Quitmeyer asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. Plaintiffs now concede that they fail to state a cause of action against any defendant under §§ 1985, 1986 and 1988. Accordingly, these claims will be dismissed as to all defendants.
While unspecified in the Complaint, in their response to the defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs assert that the § 1983 cause of action is premised on SEPTA's alleged violation of Mr. Quitmeyer's Fourth Amendment rights when it tested him for drugs and alcohol on April 2, 1987.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law, and must have deprived the plaintiff of some right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). SEPTA concedes that, as a government agency, it acts under color of state law, but contends that the drug and alcohol test administered to Mr. Quitmeyer did not constitute an unconstitutional search or seizure.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from "unreasonable" search and seizure. Government drug testing constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Transport Workers' Local 234 v. SEPTA, 863 F.2d 1110, 1115 (3rd Cir.1988). Whether such testing is unreasonable can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, and will depend on whether "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 748, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1502, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (plurality opinion). Further, the general requirement of individualized suspicion has been somewhat relaxed in the drug testing context where strong public safety considerations are at issue and where delay in testing could result in the disappearance of evidence. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (); Transport Workers' Local 234 v. SEPTA, supra ().
For SEPTA to test an engineer for drug use within 24 hours of learning that he had consumed alcohol and marijuana prior to a fatal accident is on its face quite reasonable. Where the engineer is removed from service, apparently with no intent to reinstate him, however, the public safety considerations that normally would make such a test reasonable are absent. There is no indication that the test on April 2, 1987 was conducted pursuant to a random testing policy or that the defendant agency had sufficient facts to support any individualized suspicion that the plaintiff was operating equipment on April 2 under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Although the plaintiff was discharged six weeks after testing negatively, the drug test of April 2, 1987 reasonably could have been part of an overall process for determining whether plaintiff's employment should be continued. There is nothing in the complaint, however, from which the court can conclude that this was in fact the case here. Thus, it is a question addressed more appropriately in a motion for summary judgment than a motion to dismiss.
The complaint in the instant case, however, does not specify the nature of the alleged § 1983 violation and is insufficient to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements for civil rights claims. See Frazier v. SEPTA, 785 F.2d 65, 69 (3d Cir.1986); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922-23 (3d Cir.1976). Moreover, insofar as the allegations of Count II are based on a theory of respondeat superior, they are impermissible. See Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir.1990). Plaintiffs conceivably can maintain an action for deprivation of Mr. Quitmeyer's Fourth Amendment rights if they can allege in good faith that the actions of SEPTA were taken pursuant to a particular policy of that agency. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Accordingly, Count II of plaintiffs' Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice to file an amended § 1983 claim if a valid one can be asserted consistent with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.
Count III of the Complaint alleges a cause of action against SEPTA for wrongful discharge "in violation of federal and state public policy." SEPTA contends that because plaintiff was a union member and contract employee, he cannot maintain an action for wrongful discharge. If SEPTA's factual assertion is correct, then so is its legal conclusion. See Engstrom v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 668 F.Supp. 953, 958 (E.D.Pa.1987). However likely it might be that all SEPTA engineers are union members and employed under the terms of a negotiated labor-management contract, plaintiff's employment status does not appear in the complaint. Accordingly, it is appropriate to note that even if he was a non-contract employee, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable wrongful discharge claim.
Under Pennsylvania law, an at-will employee may have an action for wrongful discharge against his employer only if the discharge violates a significant public policy or there is a specific intent to harm the employee. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 178-85, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Darlington v. General Electric, 350 Pa.Super. 183, 208, 504 A.2d 306 (1986). This is an exception to the general right of employers to terminate at-will employees for any reason at any time, and is to be narrowly construed. Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 918 (3d Cir.1982); Durham v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 727 F.Supp. 179, 182-83 (E.D.Pa.1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 521 (3d Cir.1990); Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 375 Pa.Super....
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