Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company v. Jackson

Decision Date07 June 1956
Docket NumberNo. 13013.,13013.
PartiesThe BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. Daniel T. JACKSON, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Mr. Laidler B. Mackall, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. George B. Mickum, III, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Milford J. Meyer, Philadelphia, Pa., of the bar of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, with whom Mr. Irving L. Chasen, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Irving A. Levine, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee.

Before PRETTYMAN, DANAHER and BURGER, Circuit Judges.

BURGER, Circuit Judge.

A jury verdict was rendered in favor of appellee in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act1 for damages for personal injuries sustained in the course of his employment with The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.

Appellee was injured in the derailment of a four-wheel motor track car which was then towing a four-wheel push truck along railroad tracks. The push truck weighed about 800 pounds empty and with the tools it was then carrying weighed about 1,200 pounds. There was no brake or motive power on the push truck. The motor track car was slightly heavier than the empty push truck and was equipped with a hand brake. While passing through a railroad station, the car struck a large dog; the impact derailed the car and appellee was thrown into a ditch and injured.

Appellee brought suit against the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, supra, alleging two causes of action. The first cause of action was based on the negligence of appellant in directing appellee to operate a motor track car and push truck without sufficient braking power, and in requiring appellee to pull the push truck over wet, slippery rails when the truck was not equipped with brakes. The second cause of action alleged that appellee's injuries were proximately caused by appellant's violations of the Safety Appliance Act2 and the Boiler Inspection Act3 — specifically, in that (a) the motor car was not equipped with a power driving-wheel brake (air brake), (b) the push truck was not equipped with any brakes, and (c) appellant had directed appellee to operate a car and truck without sufficient braking power.

The court below ruled and charged the jury that the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act were applicable to the vehicles in question. The issues on both causes of action were submitted to the jury, which found in favor of the appellee on "the issues aforesaid." This appeal is directed only to that part of the judgment which was based on the second cause of action.4 Appellant contends: (1) the vehicles in question were not subject to the Safety Appliance Act and (2) appellee did not make a sufficient showing to go to the jury on the issue of whether the absence of the appliances allegedly required by the Safety Appliance Act was a proximate cause of the accident.

With respect to the first issue, appellant argues that the vehicles in question are exempt from the requirements of the Safety Appliance Act because of the proviso of § 6:5

"Provided, That nothing in sections 1-7 of this title shall apply to trains composed of four-wheel cars or to trains composed of eight-wheel standard logging cars where the height of such car from top of rail to center of coupling does not exceed twenty-five inches, or to locomotives used in hauling such trains when such cars or locomotives are exclusively used for the transportation of logs."

Both vehicles involved were four-wheel cars, one powered and braked, one with neither power nor brakes.

Appellee contends the exemption in § 6 refers only to logging cars, and in support of this argument cites the decisions in Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co. v. United States, 1916, 241 U.S. 344, 36 S. Ct. 668, 60 L.Ed. 1037; Hoffman v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 2 Cir., 1934, 74 F.2d 227, certiorari denied, 1935, 294 U.S. 715, 55 S.Ct. 513, 79 L.Ed. 1248; Martin v. Johnston, Fla., 79 So.2d 419, certiorari denied, 1955, 350 U.S. 835, 76 S.Ct. 71. Appellant, however, correctly points to the fact that the statute as originally enacted simply said "Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall apply to trains composed of four-wheel cars or to locomotives used in hauling such trains." 27 Stat. 532 (1893). The legislative history (discussed infra) shows that this provision was directed in its enactment specifically to exempt coal cars. 24 Cong.Rec. 1477 (1893). Subsequently, in 1896, the proviso was amended to include "eight-wheel standard logging cars." 29 Stat. 85 (1896). The legislative history indicates that the proviso was amended because standard logging cars were only eight-wheeled. H.R. Rep.No.727, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896).

The cases cited by appellee on this point are not helpful. In Hoffman v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra, the court merely stated, without elaboration or explanation, that the exceptions in § 6 are limited to logging trains. In Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co. v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court referred to the § 6 exemption, again without discussion, as if it covered only logging trains.6 In Martin v. Johnston, supra, the court made no reference whatsoever to the applicability of § 6.

Although we do not believe the four-wheel car exemption in § 6 can be interpreted to apply solely to logging cars,7 we do feel the legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended the four-wheel car exemption to be restricted to coal cars. The four-wheel car exemption was enacted in 1893 as part of the original Safety Appliance Act. The exemption was offered as an amendment to the original bill (H.R. 9350). The Senator offering the amendment stated:

"Mr. Blodgett. I desire to offer an amendment. At the end of section 6 of the bill as reprinted I move to add the following proviso:
"Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall apply to trains composed of four-wheel cars or to locomotives used in hauling such trains.
"The Presiding Officer. The question is on agreeing to the amendment proposed by the Senator from New Jersey Mr. Blodgett to the amendment of the committee.
"Mr. Blodgett. Mr. President, I presume most Senators understand that coal from the mines is transported to the seaboard in four-wheel cars. The custom is to run such cars to the junction points of lateral roads and from those junction points to the mines where they are loaded. The four-wheel cars are used, because it would be practically impossible to run an eight-wheel car to the mines over the sharp grades and around the sharp curves necessary in reaching the mines. The coupling construction is a peculiar one, and is adapted to that peculiar work. A hook arrangement and link are used with considerable lost motion between the cars.
"It is necessary to use that appliance, as I said, in order to go around the sharp curves. I believe it would be practically impossible to place the train brake and automatic coupler upon cars such as are used in that traffic, and if the bill is not amended as I propose, it will compel a reshipment of coal at all the junction points on the lateral roads to the main stem. I do not know that the cars containing but four wheels are used in any other service in the country except the coal service. Hence, I think the amendment is a very proper one.
"Mr. Cullom. I have had some conversation with the Senator from New Jersey in reference to his amendment, and he being much more familiar with the general subject of running the four-wheel cars than I, I am inclined to think perhaps his amendment is correct. I shall make no opposition to it myself. I have no objection to its adoption.
"Mr. Stockbridge. Let the amendment be read.
"The Secretary read Mr. Blodgett\'s amendment to the amendment of the committee.
"Mr. Stockbridge. That is all right.
"The amendment to the amendment was agreed to. Italics supplied." (24 Cong.Rec. 1477 (1893).)

We do not believe we can ignore such a clear and compelling statement as to the intent of the proviso.8 To hold otherwise would require us to say that a railroad could run entire trains of four-wheel maintenance and supply cars drawn by a powered tractor, also having four wheels, and disregard the admitted fact (J. A. 69-70) that unbraked vehicles behind the powered tractor extend the distance required to stop the train, thus exposing employees to substantially increased hazards.

Our conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that if the four-wheel car exemption is interpreted to cover all four-wheel cars, this means a four-wheel motor track car like the one appellee was driving need not even be equipped with hand brakes as required by § 119 of the act, even though that car might be driven along a slippery railroad track at 20 m. p. h. We do not believe Congress intended such a result when it provided in § 11 that "all cars must be equipped with * * * efficient hand brakes." 36 Stat. 298 (1910), 45 U.S.C.A. § 11. The long-established command to interpret this act liberally to accomplish its declared objective, the safety of persons and trains,10 no doubt guided the trial court, and we think correctly so.

We are aware that when the logging-car exemption was added in 1896 the House Report11 stated, in referring to the original four-wheel exemption:

"In the original act of March 2, 1893, there is a provision at the end of section 6 which exempts trains composed of four-wheeled cars from the operations of the act. This was evidently intended to apply to logging trains, but it happens that the cars are of eight wheels and do not come within the exception."

Obviously, the draftsman of this 1896 report failed to read the 1893 legislative history for there is no support for the House Report's conclusion and we must view the statement in the 1896 House Report as one Congress' erroneous post...

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    • May 13, 1957
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    • November 13, 1957
    ...section and while at least some provisions of the Safety Appliance Act apply to other trackborne equipment, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Jackson, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 233 F.2d 660, we are referred to no case in which § 2 has been held to apply to railroad equipment not operable or operated on......

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