Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co., Inc. v. Union Rendering Co.

• Decision Date: 03 January 1941
• Docket Number: 64.
• Parties: BALTIMORE BURCHERS ABATTOIR & LIVE STOCK CO., Inc., v. UNION RENDERING CO.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

17 A.2d 130

179 Md. 117

BALTIMORE BURCHERS ABATTOIR & LIVE STOCK CO., Inc., v. UNION RENDERING CO.

No. 64.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 3, 1941

Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Eugene O'Dunne Judge.

Suit in equity by the Union Rendering Company against the Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Company, Inc., for an injunction against cutting off steam from, and interfering with complainant's possession of, premises leased to it by defendant. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Joseph W. Starling and Theodore R. Dankmeyer, both of Baltimore (Niles, Barton, Morrow & Yost of Baltimore, on the brief) for appellant.

James Morfit Mullen and R. Contee Rose, both of Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and PARKE, SLOAN, MITCHELL JOHNSON, and DELAPLAINE, JJ.

DELAPLAINE Judge.

The object of this appeal is to construe a lease for the purpose of determining whether the Circuit Court of Baltimore City was justified in granting an injunction against the lessor.

On September 1, 1934, Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Company, appellant, leased two of its buildings on West Franklin Street in Baltimore to Union Rendering Company, appellee, for a period of five years, with the privilege of renewal for five additional years. The appellant agreed to furnish steam for heating the buildings and also for the rendering operations. The tenant covenanted that it would not use the premises for 'the purposes other than those of a rendering (fertilizer) factory and for the storage of hides.'

In 1936 the tenant began to experiment in the manufacture of a deed with the trade-name of Molasses Meal, but it was not successful; in 1938 it began the manufacture of a feed under the trade-name of Nokako. The landlord has been continuously supplying steam to the cookers operated by the tenant since the beginning of the tenancy under a prior lease in 1924. But in 1939, after a new president was elected for the appellant corporation, it requested the tenant to discontinue the manufacture of the feed, but the tenant refused. On February 22, 1940, it notified the tenant purportedly in pursuance of the forfeiture clause, that since the premises were being used for 'other than fertilizer operations' it would, after the expiration of five days, cut off the steam and re-enter and take possession of the premises. The tenant thereupon filed a bill for an injunction, and the Court ordered a preliminary injunction to be issued upon the filing of a bond in the penalty of $1,000. After a hearing the Court passed a final decree enjoining the landlord from cutting off the steam and from interfering with the tenant's possession of the premises, provided that the tenant made payments according to its agreement. The appeal is from that decree.

The solicitors for the appellant contended that the Court below had no jurisdiction in the case. But it has long been recognized in this State that, while a fugitive or temporary trespass does not constitute ground for an injunction, equity will grant relief to a party when an injury would be ruinous to an estate which he is entitled to enjoy, and where full and adequate relief could not be obtained in the ordinary course of law. Amelung v. Seekamp, 9 Gill. & J. 468; Georges Creek Coal & Iron Co. v. Detmold, 1 Md.Ch. 371, 372. Justice Story wrote in his Commentaries: 'Formerly, indeed, Courts of Equity were extremely reluctant to interfere at all, even in regard to cases of repeated trespasses. But, now, there is not the slightest hesitation, if the acts done, or threatened to be done, to the property, would be ruinous or irreparable, or would impair the just enjoyment of the property in future. If, indeed, Courts of Equity did not interfere in cases of this sort, there would * * * be a great failure of justice in the country.' 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, § 928.

The writ of injunction is now frequently used by American chancery courts to prevent breaches of covenants. When, for instance, a landlord threatened to evict a tenant in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the tenant should not be refused relief in equity on the ground that an injunction would cause the landlord a loss which would not be commensurate with the benefit to the tenant. Justice Holmes declared in the opinion of the Court: 'If * * * the defendant has been at some expense already on the plaintiff's premises, we see no reason to doubt that it has acted with knowledge of the plaintiff's rights. * * * The defendant's outlay does not better its case on the question of a prohibitory injunction, and we see no reason why it should not be required to restore the premises to their original condition.' Lynch v. Union Institution for Savings, 158 Mass. 394, 33 N.E. 603.

In Maryland it has been definitely decided that it is within the sphere of equity jurisdiction under appropriate circumstances to protect a lessee's interest by enjoining others from interfering with him in the enjoyment of the premises when an action at law would not afford him an adequate remedy, or when he would otherwise be required to resort to actions in ejectment and in tort to obtain redress for the wrongs committed. Chesapeake Brewing Co. v. Mt. Vernon Brewing Co., 107 Md. 528, 68 A. 1046. Likewise, we have held that a landlord should be allowed relief in equity by enjoining the tenant from converting leased premises to uses inconsistent with the terms of the lease. North Avenue Market v. Keys, 164 Md. 185, 164 A. 152. It has been held that an unauthorized act of a landlord may be both a breach of covenant, for which the tenant might seek injunctive relief, and also an injury for which he might bring an action in tort. If the tenant remains in possession he may seek relief against the landlord to restrain threatened continuous trespasses or other interference with him as a tenant because such acts are wrongful invasions of his rights; but if the lease should expire during the course of the proceedings, the tenant cannot then obtain an injunction, although he may still have a cause of action against the landlord for damages. Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass. 33, 164 N.E. 807, A.L.R. 895. In the case before us the lease has been duly renewed from September 1, 1939, to August, 31, 1944, and the tenant is still in possession of the premises. The appellant has threatened to cut off the steam and terminate the lease. If the landlord carried out this threat, the tenant declares it would suffer irreparable damage inasmuch as steam is necessary and vital for its business and there are no facilities for supplying steam at the plant.

The solicitors relied upon the familiar principle that equity, although willing to grant relief from a forfeiture as a result of failure to pay rent, will ordinarily refuse to prevent a forfeiture arising from breaches of covenants such as to make repairs, to insure against fire, and against subleasing without the consent of the lessor. 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,§ 454; South Penn. Oil Co. v. Edgell...