S. Kaywood Cmty. Ass'n v. Long

Decision Date26 November 2012
Docket NumberSept. Term, 2010.,No. 00691,00691
Citation56 A.3d 365,208 Md.App. 135
PartiesSOUTH KAYWOOD COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION v. Rodney M. LONG, et ux.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Karen F. Silverstrim, Salisbury, MD, for appellant.

Laura E. Hay (Thomas J. Maloney, Cockey, Brennan & Maloney, PC, on the brief) Salisbury, MD, for appellant.

Panel: WOODWARD, KEHOE and JAMES P. SALMON (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
JAMES P. SALMON (Retired, Specially Assigned), J.

This case concerns a restrictive covenant placed in the land records in 1961 that governs lots in the South Kaywood subdivision which is located in Salisbury, Maryland. The principal issue to be decided is whether a restrictive covenant that governs the subdivision and limits the use of lots to “single family residences” but does not define the word “family,”prohibits an owner of a lot in that subdivision from renting the property to persons who are not related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Although no Maryland appellate court has considered that issue, courts in our sister jurisdictions that decided cases near the time the covenant at issue was drafted, or earlier, have done so but have reached divergent results. See, for example, Marino v. Mayor & Council, 77 N.J.Super. 587, 187 A.2d 217, 220–21 (Law Div.1963) (an unrelated man and woman living together may be a “family”); Simons, et al. v. Work of God Corporation, 36 Ill.App.2d 199, 183 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1962) (Restrictive covenant limiting use of property to one housekeeping unit by a single family interpreted to mean that the property could be used only by persons related by blood or marriage (plus domestic servants)); Stafford v. Village of Sands Point, 200 Misc. 57, 102 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1951) (the “family” consists of those living together in one house, under the same management, with a common goal); G.M.G. Realty Co. v. Spring, 191 Misc. 334, 77 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (N.Y. City Mun.Ct.1948) (the “family” consists only of a blood related father, mother, and children); Liberty Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. Zimmerman, 333 Ill.App. 94, 77 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1947) (relying upon Webster's Dictionary, which defined family as “the collective body of persons who live in one house and under one head or manager”); Boston–Edison Protective Association v. The Paulist Fathers, Inc., 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847, 848 (1943) (court rejected the plaintiffs' invitation to define family as persons related by blood or marriage and went on to rule that a group of unrelated Roman Catholic Priests could reside in a neighborhood limited to single family dwelling houses without violating the restrictive covenant); Robbins v. Bangor Ry. & Elec. Co., 100 Me. 496, 62 A. 136, 140 (1905) (quoting definition of family found in Webster's Dictionary: “persons collectively who live together in a house or under one head or manager; a household including parents, children, and servants and as the case may be boarders”); Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520, 523 (1816) (Boarders and lodgers are a “family”). Cases decided since 1963 have also reached divergent results when considering the meaning of the term “single family.” See Anno. 71 A.L.R.3d 693, “What Constitutes a ‘Family’ Within Meaning of Zoning Regulations or Restrictive Covenant” by James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., (1976) (hereinafter Rigelhaupt). In the case sub judice, the Circuit Court for Wicomico County granted the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment and ruled, inter alia, that the term “single family” as used in a restrictive covenant, did not restrict use of the property to persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption. The appellant in this case, South Kaywood Community Association (hereinafter “the Association”), contends that the Circuit Court erred in its construction of the restrictive covenant. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court insofar as it declared that the “single family” restriction did not prevent the appellees from renting houses they owned to persons not related by blood, marriage, or adoption.

I.

The appellees, Rodney Long and his wife, Melinda B. Long, purchased two homes in the South Kaywood subdivision in Salisbury, Maryland in 2006. The houses are both located on South Kaywood Drive and as a consequence of purchasing these houses, the Longs became members of the Association. Presently, the property located at 1704 South Kaywood Drive is leased to a married couple with two children. But, the home located at 1602 South Kaywood Drive is leased to three female undergraduate students who attend Salisbury University. Those students are not related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption.

Upon learning of the familial status of the three students, the appellant, an unincorporated community association, sent letters to the Longs in which it asserted that rental to unrelated occupants constituted a violation of the covenants that governed all lot owners in the South Kaywood subdivision.

The appellant relied upon the first paragraph [Item I] of a covenant that was filed in the Land Records of Wicomico County on February 24, 1961. Item (I) states:

That not more than one private dwelling house or residence and a garage solely for the use of the owner or occupier thereof shall be erected or placed upon any one of the lots conveyed herein, and such house or residence shall never be used or occupied for any purpose except for that of a private residence exclusively, nor shall any part or portion thereof ever be used or occupied except solely as a single family residence; nor shall any lot or any part thereof ever be used or occupied for trade, business or professional purposes of any kind whatsoever, nor shall any signs or other displays of any commercial nature be erected.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The Longs disagreed with the appellant's interpretation of the covenant and as a result, filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County asking the court to declare that Item I of the covenant did “not require all individuals residing on [their] property within the Kaywood subdivision to be related....” The Association filed a timely answer to the complaint for declaratory judgment in which it asked, insofar as here pertinent, that the court declare “that Item I of the covenants ... does mean that homes are to be used or occupied solely as single a family residents ....” [sic] 1 No counter-claim was filed by the Association.

Both sides filed motions for summary judgment in their favor, but the motions were not decided. Instead, an evidentiary hearing was held on April 22, 2010. Mr. Long was the sole witness called on behalf of the appellees at the hearing. The appellant called several witnesses who were all members of the Association.

II.

Summary of evidence produced at trial.

A. Testimony of Mr. Long.

In his testimony, Mr. Long admitted that the three college students who leased the property located at 1602 South Kaywood Drive were not related. The lease with the students was for one-year. Under the lease, each of the students were individually liable for damages that might be done to the property during the term of the lease and the leasees were also collectively responsible for cleaning and maintenance of the interior of the house. During cross-examination, Mr. Long summed up his testimony in regards to his tenants' living arrangements as follows:

They maintain the property. They share equal responsibility for the property. They share any damages equally in the property. They eat their meals together in this property.”

Mr. Long added that although the lease would expire in July, 2010, he believed that the students intended to renew their lease.

During direct and cross-examination, Mr. Long was questioned in regard to the zoning status of the property. He testified that the properties that he and his wife own on South Kaywood Drive are in the R–1 District, which is reserved for single family residences. The definition of “family” that governs property in the R–1 District in Wicomico County, is set forth in the Wicomico Zoning Code as follows:

FAMILY

Means either (a) one person, or two unrelated persons and the children of either of them, or (b) two or more persons related by blood or marriage, or (c) a group of not more than four persons not necessarily related by blood or marriage. In any case, the group must be living together as a single housekeeping unit. In all cases, foster children placed by an agency licensed to operate in Maryland housed on the premises are considered as members of the family.

Wicomico County Zoning Code, Section 225–25 B. (emphasis added).

As can be seen, three unrelated college students living together in a residence would not violate the provisions governing property in the R–1 District, so long as the students lived together as a “single housekeeping unit.” 2

Mr. Long was also cross-examined about provisions in Sections 225–46(c)(2) of the Wicomico County Zoning Code, which governs property located in an overlay district. Neither of the properties owned by the Longs were in the overlay district, but if they had been, a different definition of “family” would apply. Section 225–46(c)(2) reads: “for any use that includes the term' family,' the following definition should apply; one person or two or more persons related by blood or marriage, or a group of not more than two persons not necessarily related by blood or marriage, in any case, living together as a single housekeeping unit.” 3

B. Evidence Introduced by the Association.

The Association, although it steadfastly maintained in the trial court that the covenant in question was unambiguous, nevertheless, asked several of the witnesses it called to give their views as to what the covenant meant.

Barry Beauchamp had lived in the South Kaywood Community for five years and, at the time of the trial, was the President of the Association. He was asked what, in his view, constituted a “family” as that term...

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