Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Johnson-Battle Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1928
• Docket Number: 18167.
• Citation: 141 S.E. 678,37 Ga.App. 729
• Parties: BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. v. JOHNSON-BATTLE LUMBER CO.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

141 S.E. 678

37 Ga.App. 729

BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. v. JOHNSON-BATTLE LUMBER CO.

No. 18167.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

February 18, 1928

Syllabus by the Court.

A person who has obtained a diversion of a shipment of goods during transportation by a carrier is not liable for a resulting additional freight charge, where, in ordering the diversion, he was acting as agent for another, and the carrier must have known of this fact.

Error from Superior Court, Colquitt County; W. E. Thomas, Judge.

Suit by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company against the Johnson-Battle Lumber Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company sued Johnson-Battle Lumber Company for a balance of freight alleged to be due on a shipment of lumber which originated at Dublin, Ga., and which, after certain diversions, was delivered at Langdon, D. C. The trial upon an agreed statement of facts before the judge without a jury resulted in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was overruled, and the movant excepted. The agreed statement was as follows:

"On June 15, 1923, Grogg Lumber Company, of Dublin, Ga shipped from Dublin over the Wrightsville & Tennille Railroad to Bethesda, Mo. [said by counsel for the plaintiff to have been intended to read 'Bethesda Md.'], a car of lumber, described as dressed pine, in car C., B. & Q. No. 97568, prepaying the freight thereon in the amount of $225.30, which was the correct charge therefor. Thereafter, on June 21, 1923, said shipment was diverted to Johnson Battle Lumber Company at Cape Charles Va., by Grogg Lumber Company, said Johnson-Battle Lumber Company agreeing to act as agent for Grogg Lumber Company in the sale of the lumber on commission. Thereafter, on July 2, 1923, Johnson-Battle Lumber Company reconsigned said car of lumber to J. L. Knopp, at Langdon, D. C., the said J. L. Knopp having bought said car of lumber, and the carrier duly delivered said car to the said Knopp. The said Knopp did not pay any additional freight on said car. The principal amount of freight due on said shipment is $167.90. Section 7 of the original bill of lading in said shipment provides, inter alia: 'The owner or consignee shall pay the freight and overage, if any, and all other lawful charges accruing on said property; but except in those instances where it may be lawfully authorized to do so, no carrier by railroad shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of the property covered by this bill of lading until all tariff rates and charges have been paid. The consignor shall be liable for the freight and all other charges, except that if the consignor stipulates, by signature in the space provided for that purpose on the face of the bill of lading, that the carrier shall not make delivery without requesting payment of such charges and the carrier, contrary to said stipulations, shall make delivery without requiring such payment, the consignor shall not be liable for such charges."'

Waldo De Loache, of Moultrie, and Otey B. Mitchell, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

P. Q. Bryan, of Moultrie, for defendant in error.

BELL J.

Counsel on each side have submitted a number of authorities as supporting their respective contentions. No case, however, has been brought to our attention which seems to be directly in point, and we will decide the case before us upon its own particular facts, in the light of what we deem to be general and unquestioned principles of law.

The right to divert a shipment of goods which are being transported by a common carrier is in the true owner, whether he be the consignor or the consignee, and the right may be exercised although the goods have passed into the hands of a connecting carrier.

While it is true that in the absence of knowledge, either actual or constructive, to the contrary, the consignee may be presumed to be the owner, the ownership may be in the consignor, and where this fact appears he is the proper person to direct the shipment. Saunders Bros. v. Payne, 29 Ga.App. 615 (5), 116 S.E. 349; 10 C.J. p. 82.

The facts of this case show that Grogg Lumber Company, the consignor, was the owner and was treated as such by the carrier; otherwise it would not have diverted the shipment in the first instance from the original destination and consignee on the order of that company. If the right to divert the shipment was not in the Bethesda Lumber Company the original consignee, presumably it was not in Johnson-Battle Lumber Company after the diversion by the shipper to that company. Title to property in a person, once proved or admitted, is presumed to continue until the contrary appears. Haas & Howell v. Godby, 33 Ga.App. 218, 125 S.E. 897. If the title did not pass from the consignor to the consignee at the origin of the shipment, presumptively it was not conveyed to a third person to whom the shipment was diverted, merely in virtue of such diversion. Then, so far as appeared, Johnson-Battle Lumber Company occupied the same status as did Bethesda Lumber Company, having no right within itself to divert the shipment. It was neither a nominal consignor nor a nominal consignee, and the carrier would not have diverted the shipment on the order of a stranger. While the record discloses that this company, in making the...