Baltimore & O.S.W. Ry. Co. v. Ragsdale
| Decision Date | 19 February 1896 |
| Citation | 14 Ind.App. 406,42 N.E. 1106 |
| Parties | BALTIMORE & O. S. W. RY. CO. v. RAGSDALE. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Lawrence county; R. W. Miers, Judge.
Action by William Ragsdale against the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railway Company. From an order sustaining a demurrer to part of the answer, and from a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals Affirmed.
Gardiner & Gardiner and R. N. Palmer, for appellant. C. C. Watson and Watson & Giles, for appellee.
The appellee shipped three horses over the appellant's railway, extending from Lawrence to Osgood, within the state of Indiana. One of the horses was injured in transit. This action was brought to recover the damages sustained. The first paragraph of complaint avers that the defendant undertook to carry certain horses belonging to the plaintiff, of the value of $5,000; that the plaintiff agreed to deliver the horses at Osgood in good and safe condition; but that, in shipping the horses, the defendant, by its agents and servants, carelessly and negligently ran an engine and train of cars against the car in which the horses were being shipped, with such force and violence that one of the horses was thrown upon the floor of the car, thereby wounding and forever disabling such horse, to the plaintiff's damage in the sum of $1,500. The second paragraph alleges that the plaintiff shipped the horses over defendant's road, and agreed to and did pay a freight charge therefor, in consideration of which the defendant undertook to safely carry the horses from Bedford to Osgood; but that the defendant did not safely carry said horses, but permitted one of them to become crippled and disabled while in transit, all without the fault of the plaintiff, and to his damage in $1,500.
The appellant insists that the first paragraph is bad because it does not aver that the particular horse injured was of any value. and that the second is bad because it does not aver that any of the horses were of any value. Each paragraph, however, does aver that a horse was injured, and that the plaintiff sustained damages on account thereof in the sum of $1,500. The word “damages,” as here used, imports a pecuniary loss. To say that damages flow from an injury done to specific property implies that the property injured is valuable. The objections are not well taken.
The appellant filed an answer in two paragraphs. The first was the general denial. The second averred, in substance, that the horses were shipped in pursuance of a special written contract or bill of lading duly executed between the plaintiff and defendant, in which it was stipulated, among other things, “that said company shall in no case be liable to answer for damages on account of accident, delay, loss, or injuries to said stock, unless such accident, delay, loss, or injuries shall have been caused by the gross and wanton negligence of said company's agents or servants”; and that, in consideration of certain risks, duties, and liabilities assumed by the shipper, the defendant would ship the stock at greatly reduced rates, of which the plaintiff elected to avail himself. And it was further stipulated It is further averred that no claim in writing was made within 10 days, nor at any time. The pleading concludes by asking that the plaintiff take nothing, and the defendant recover his costs. A demurrer for want of facts was sustained to this paragraph, and this is one of the errors assigned.
It is the law in this state that a common carrier cannot, by contract, screen himself from liability growing out of his own negligent or tortious conduct, or that of his agents or servants. Such contracts are against public policy, for, if permitted, they might put an end to all liability, and encourage carelessness. Railway Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471; Wood, R. R. 1885. Nor can the carrier in such cases limit the amount of the recovery (Railroad Co. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. 330, 14 S. W. 311), although he may agree with the shipper beforehand upon the value of the property, which value shall be conclusive as to the carrier's liability in case the goods are lost (Hart v. Railroad Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. 151). There are also cases which hold that if the bill of lading contains a provision fairly entered into, limiting the carrier's liability at a given sum for each of several animals, and such limitation is based upon a reduction in the charge made for the transportation, such limitation is valid, although the actual value of each animal is much larger and the loss is the result of the carrier's negligence. Railway Co. v. Weakly, 50 Ark. 397, 8 S. W. 134;Squire v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 239; Railroad Co. v. Payne, 86 Va. 481, 10 S. E. 749. Whether or not this rule prevails in this state, it is unnecessary for us to determine in the decision of this case. The carrier may also lawfully stipulate that any claim for damages growing out of the carrier's negligence shall be made within a reasonable time, and 10 days has been held to be a reasonable time. Case v. Railway Co., 11 Ind. App. 517, 39 N. E. 426. The paragraph of answer under consideration states a good defense in so far as it pleads a special contract in bar of the implied or common-law liability declared on in the complaint; and this rule applies to each stipulation and its breach. It is also good in so far as it pleads that no claim in writing was made within 10 days. But in so far as it attempts to plead a limitation upon the liability of $100 it is insufficient, for it purports to answer the whole complaint, and to defeat a recovery entirely. It is not averred that the horse injured was of no value. A full defense founded upon this clause of the contract cannot be good, unless it avers that the property injured was of no value, for it admits a partial liability.
Conceding that the paragraph was sufficient, was it reversible error to sustain a demurrer to it? The complaint declares upon the common-law liability. It did not declare upon the special contract,-the bill of lading. It seems to be settled by the decisions in this state that if the shipper declares upon an implied contract or the common-law liability, and it appears that the shipment was made in pursuance of a special contract or bill of lading, he must fail. The moment it appears that the contract is a special one, and not an implied one, there is a fatal variance, and it would be the duty of the court to instruct or find for the defendant. Railway Co. v. Forsythe, 4 Ind. App. 326, 29 N. E. 1138;Hall v. Pennsylvania Co., 90 Ind. 459. The defendant may show under the general denial that it is not liable upon an implied contract, but that the obligation arose out of a special contract. It was so expressly ruled by this court in Crum v. Yundt (Ind. App.) 40 N. E. 79.
The action was not on the special contract. Was it therefore necessary to answer this breach specially? If so, then it was reversible error to sustain the demurrer. But, as we have seen, a special contract of itself defeatsthe action, without more. The 10-days limitation is a special contract; the release from liability is a special contract. The moment it was made to appear that there was a special contract the plaintiff would have been defeated, without reference as to whether he had complied with these stipulations. It was not necessary, therefore, to specially plead these stipulations, and their breach in order that the defendant might avail itself of this defense. It could be given under the general denial. The second paragraph did not contain anything but what might have been given under the general denial. It was not reversible error to sustain the demurrer to it. The appellant was not harmed thereby, for it could have made the same proof under another paragraph. The record does not contain the evidence in full; only the brief notes made by the presiding judge are embodied in it. It does not appear from this evidence that any special contract or bill of lading was given in evidence. There being a failure to show a special contract, the recovery must be presumed to have been upon the common-law liability.
Several objections are made to the special findings of the court, but the findings are sufficient to support a judgment upon the common-law liability. We find no reversible error in the record. Judgment affirmed.
The appellee, in his complaint, seeks to recover damages from the appellant for a breach of its common-law duty, as a common carrier for hire, in the transportation of a horse.
The appellant, in addition to an answer of general denial, filed a special answer, as follows:
“The defendant, further answering, and each paragraph thereof, says: That on the 27th day of July, 1894, the plaintiff did ship by the defendant's road three certain horses, from the station at Bedford, Indiana, to Osgood, Indiana, a station on defendant's line in Ripley county, Indiana. That the plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract at the time the said three horses were shipped from Bedford, Indiana, to Osgood, Indiana, whereby the terms...
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