Baltimore Transit Co. v. Young

• Decision Date: 17 December 1947
• Docket Number: 40.
• Citation: 56 A.2d 140,189 Md. 428
• Parties: BALTIMORE TRANSIT CO. v. YOUNG.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

56 A.2d 140

189 Md. 428

BALTIMORE TRANSIT CO. v. YOUNG.

No. 40.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 17, 1947

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Robert France, Judge.

Suit by Miss. Esther C. Young against the Baltimore Transit Company a body corporate, to recover for injuries and property damage sustained when plaintiff's automobile was struck by defendant's truck. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Judgment reversed without a new trial.

Philip S. Ball, of Baltimore (James J. Lindsay, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Webster C. Tall and J. Marshall Neel, both of Baltimore (Tall & Della, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

DELAPLAINE Judge.

This suit was instituted by Miss Esther C. Young, of near Relay to recover for personal injuries and property damage which she sustained when her Buick automobile was struck by a trouble truck owned by the Baltimore Transit Company. The jury in the Baltimore City Court rendered a verdict in her favor for the sum of $950, and the transit company appealed from the judgment entered upon the verdict.

The accident occurred about 9 o'clock on the night of Sunday June 30, 1946, at the intersection of Howard and Lexington Streets. Plaintiff's automobile was being driven by Sullivan Pitts, aged 69, who lived in the same house with plaintiff about ten miles from Baltimore. After supper at a hotel in Baltimore, Pitts drove to the post office and then, with plaintiff beside him, started for home by way of Lexington Street. When they reached Howard Street the traffic light was green, and they proceeded across the street intersection entirely oblivious of the northbound trouble truck. The driver of the truck, Philip Geoghegan, applied the brakes and swerved to the left, but was unable to avoid the collision. The truck crashed into the automobile near the middle of the street intersection, and spun it around upon the northwest sidewalk so that the rear wheels were but a few feet from the store window of Hochschild, Kohn & Company, and the front wheels were in the gutter. Pitts was thrown out of the automobile and knocked unconscious. Plaintiff sustained cuts on her head and blood clots on her body.

Defendants is a public service corporation operating an electric railway system in Baltimore. To minimize the hazards likely to result from accidents, the transit company keeps the trouble truck for emergency calls to make repairs and keep the car lines operating. Such emergency vehicles have been considered of such vital importance for the safety of the public that the Legislature of Maryland, in the Motor Vehicle Act of 1943, ch. 1007, which revised the motor vehicle laws of the State, classed them, when designated by the Commissioner or the Chief of Police of an incorporated city, as 'authorized emergency vehicles' along with vehicles of the fire department, police cars, ambulances and other emergency vehicles, which are exempted from speed restrictions and other traffic regulations and have the right of way over all other vehicles under certain circumstances. Code Supp.1943, art. 66 1/2, sec. 2(a)(1). The grant of such special privileges to an emergency vehicle is a proper exercise of the police power of the State. When human life may be at stake, or where there is immediate danger of serious loss of property, prompt performance of the duties imposed upon drivers of emergency vehicles is imperative. State v. Brown, 142 Md. 27, 119 A. 684. The Maryland Motor Vehicle Act accordingly provides: 'The prima facie speed limitations and provision relative to right-of-way stopping at through highways, rules of the road, traffic control devices and signals set forth in this Article shall not apply to authorized emergency vehicles when responding to emergency calls and the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell, siren, or exhaust whistle.' Code Supp.1943, art. 66 1/2, sec. 159. The Act further provides: 'Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, when the driver is giving audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right of way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer.' Code Supp.1943, art. 66 1/2, sec. 180(a).

Section 159 declares that the provision exempting authorized emergency vehicles from speed restrictions and other traffic regulations shall not relieve the driver of such a vehicle from the duty 'to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street,' and shall not protect him from the consequence of 'a reckless disregard of the safety of others.' Section 133(b) directs that the driver of any authorized emergency vehicle responding to an emergency call, upon approaching a red or stop signal or any stop sign, 'shall slow down as necessary for safety,' but 'may proceed cautiously past such red or stop signal or stop sign.' Thus, although the driver of an emergency vehicle is ordinarily not limited in speed, and is authorized to drive with caution past a red light, he may nevertheless be held liable for damages if, in the exercise of his special privileges, he fails to give audible warning of his approach and pays no attention whatever to traffic on an intersecting street. Evidence that the driver of such a vehicle drove at high speed past a red light at a busy street intersection, without giving due warning to traffic on the intersecting street, warrants a finding that the vehicle was being operated with 'a reckless disregard for the safety of others.' Mansfield v. City of Philadelphia, 352 Pa. 199, 42 A.2d 549, 550. On the other hand, the driver of such a vehicle cannot be expected to use the same care that the law requires of the ordinary motorist who has no emergency duty to perform. To stop at every slight indication of danger might often be a failure of duty on the part of the emergency driver. On many occasions his prompt and fearless action is imperatively necessary to prevent loss of property or loss of life, or both, or even widespread disaster. Magee v. West End Street Ry. Co., 151 Mass. 240, 23 N.E. 1102; Warren v. Mendenhall, 77 Minn. 145, 79 N.W. 661, 663.

In this case it is undisputed that the trouble truck, which is known as 'Big Bill,' is an authorized emergency vehicle. It is also undisputed that the truck was responding to an emergency call. Geoghegan, the driver, testified that, on receiving the call, John Ernest, the lineman on the truck started the flashing light and began to blow the siren. He estimated that the speed of the truck on Howard Street after passing Fayette was about 20 miles an hour, but on nearing Lexington he slowed down to about 16 miles an hour. He claimed that he looked to the right, because Lexington is a one-way street for westbound traffic, but believing the way was clear, he then increased his speed to over 20 miles an hour. Suddenly plaintiff's car...