Bamont v. Pa. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
| Decision Date | 16 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-6205 |
| Parties | Marjorie Bamont v. Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Marjorie Bamont, Philadelphia, PA, pro se.
Daniel J. Divis, Kevin R. McNulty, Gerolamo McNulty Divis & Lewbart PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
KEARNEY
Pennsylvania's elected representatives recognize a public policy protecting our beloved pets from abusive pet owners by authorizing the Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to investigate, stop and, if necessary, obtain a warrant approved by a prosecutor and signed by a judge to seize the at-risk pets and charge the pet owner with animal cruelty.1 Involving state action, authorities must comply with citizens' constitutional protections against an unlawful search and seizure including conduct beyond the scope of the warrant signed by a judge.
We now address a pet owner's claims the authorities seized her pets after an allegedly brief investigation leading to a search and seizure warrant now challenged by her. The authorities allegedly leaked their upcoming seizure to the media who appeared at the pet owner's home for the seizure. They then kept two of her cats after a court ordered their return. We grant in part and deny in part the authorities' motion to dismiss in the accompanying Order because while many of the pro se pet owner's claims do not state constitutional or Pennsylvania state law claims, we find she plead prima facie claims for certain Fourth Amendment violations and common law claims of trespass, conversion and invasion of privacy.
On October 30, 2013, Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“PSPCA”) officer Greg Jordan entered Plaintiff Marjorie Bamont's home to talk about her care of her many pets.2 During the course of his visit, Jordan “moved two pet cages without plaintiff's consent,” which revealed a deceased cat.3 Bamont alleges the fourteen (14) other cats living with her had access to clean water and food, and Bamont told Jordan she recently purchased flea medication for the cats.4
On October 31, 2013, Jordan prepared an affidavit of probable cause to obtain a search warrant for Bamont's house.5 A Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney approved the search warrant and a judge signed it based on Jordan's affidavit. Defendants Officers Jordan and Leonard Knox, along with PSCPA director George Bengal then broke down her door when she was not home, searched her home and seized all fourteen (14) of Bamont's cats. Further, Jordan, Bengal, and Knox permitted the media onto some part of her property during the search.6 When Bamont arrived home, they seized her dog from her car.7 When Bamont asked why Defendants seized her pets, Jordan said “Because we're the Big Bad Wolf, and we can.”8
Bamont underwent an emergency involuntary mental health exam and spent several days in a hospital.9 Defendant officers charged her with animal cruelty as to nine (9) of Bamont's fifteen (15) animals, but seized all her pets and she alleges none of her animals have been returned as yet.10
On December 18, 2013, Bamont pled no contest to charges of Cruelty to Animals related to nine (9) of her fourteen (14) cats. The state court denied Bamont's later attempt to withdraw her no contest plea and the Pennsylvania Superior Court denied her appeal as untimely.
On April 10, 2014, the Court of Common Pleas ordered the PSPCA to return two of her cats.11 Defendants did not return her cats by September 1, 2014.12
Bamont then sued the PSPCA and the three officers: Defendant George Bengal (“Bengal”) is the PSPCA Director of Law Enforcement, defendants Greg Jordan (“Jordan”) and Leonard Knox (“Knox”) (collectively “the officers”) are PSPCA officers or Humane Society Police Officers authorized to enforce the animal cruelty law.
Bamont claims: Defendants violated her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
;13 the PSCPA failed to train and properly supervise its officers; negligence per se; trespass; conversion; and, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants move to dismiss her pro se complaint arguing: (1) the constitutional claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)
, because any attempt to show the October 31, 2013 search of her home is unreasonable implies her conviction is invalid; (2) the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the constitutional claims;14 (3) her state conviction collaterally estops her from alleging invalidity of the warrant for the purposes of her state law claims; and, (4) she fails to state a claim for negligence per se, trespass, conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress.15
Defendants move to dismiss Bamont's constitutional claims under the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck:
to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentences that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.16
We now consider whether “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ....”17 Heck
should not be treated as a categorical bar to subsequent civil rights actions.18 The Supreme Court in footnote seven (7) to its Heck opinion cited an example of an appropriate § 1983 claim: “a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiffs still-outstanding conviction.”19 This conclusion follows from the reasoning “doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error” make it less likely a § 1983 unreasonable search claim would necessarily imply that plaintiff's conviction was unlawful.20 As such, we question whether Bamont's constitutional claims necessarily imply the invalidity of her outstanding conviction based on her no contest plea. If so, the Supreme Court's Heck holding bars her § 1983 claims.21 Defendants argue we must broadly interpret Heck because Bamont's attack on the validity of the search warrant, if successful, would essentially “make her not guilty.”22 Defendants argue Bamont is contesting her conviction by pleading the search warrant contained deliberate misrepresentations and material omissions.23 Bamont disagrees by citing to footnote seven (7) in Heck.24
We find Heck
does not apply to bar Bamont's constitutional claims. Defendants simply recite the Heck rule. Critically, they fail to establish exactly which aspect of her conviction would necessarily be invalidated by her success on these claims. To be guilty of a charge of cruelty to animals, the accused must be found to have wantonly or cruelly abused an animal, or have neglected an animal to which the accused owed a duty of care.25 A jury finding the warrant is not supported by probable cause does not necessarily imply Bamont owed no duty to her animals, she did not abuse or neglect them, or she was not wanton or cruel in doing so. Bamont's claims of providing food and clean water on the day of Jordan's visit does not mean there was food or clean water on other days, or the animals were not malnourished. Evidence of Bamont's crime was available through other sources and could be independently confirmed. For example, Jordan's affidavit of probable cause details receiving a complaint of unsanitary conditions at Bamont's residence.26 Challenging the constitutionality of the search and seizure on October 31, 2013 does not necessarily imply she should not be guilty of animal cruelty.
Bamont's injuries also do not arise from her conviction but rather from being subject to involuntary mental health examination, hospitalization, embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress. Accordingly, Heck
does not bar Bamont's constitutional claims.
As humane society police officers, Bengal, Jordan, and Knox “have the same powers to initiate criminal proceedings provided for police officers by the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.”27 The question of whether humane society police officers are entitled to qualified immunity has not been answered definitively by our Court of Appeals. In Kauffman v. PSPCA,
our distinguished colleague Judge Dalzell determined humane society police officers are entitled to qualified immunity when working under “close official supervision” of the approving assistant district attorney and magistrate judge.28 “Close official supervision exists when a government actor directly inspects or directs a private individual's behavior.”29 We are persuaded by Judge Dalzell and find Bengal, Jordan, and Knox may assert a qualified immunity defense.
The availability of a qualified immunity defense does not equal entitlement to its protection. Defendants cite Kauffman
as granting them qualified immunity without providing any further analysis.30 Judge Dalzell's opinion in Kauffman did not grant humane society police officers blanket qualified immunity without first analyzing qualified immunity under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).31 Given the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis on “'the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in...
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