Bandstra v. International Harvester Co.
| Decision Date | 26 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-403,84-403 |
| Citation | 367 N.W.2d 282 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 10,741 James H. BANDSTRA, Jayne B. Bandstra and Joshua J. Bandstra, A Minor Child, by James H. Bandstra, A Next Friend, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Hines-Westburg Implement Co.; Madison Silo Company, Inc.; Throckmorton Services, Inc.; John H. Throckmorton, Sr.; Gilbert Bandstra and Jerry Bandstra, Defendants. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Burns H. Davison II of Jones, Hoffman & Davison, Des Moines, for defendant-appellant.
Gerald R. Ralph, Des Moines, Robert J. Kromminga, Des Moines, and Clark L. Holmes and Joseph G. Bertogli of Piazza, Holmes & Berry, Des Moines, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Heard by OXBERGER, C.J., and DONIELSON and SNELL, JJ.
Defendant manufacturer appeals from judgment for the plaintiffs in a negligence action, asserting: (1) that its motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been allowed; (2) that evidence was insufficient to support submitting the case to the jury; (3) that the jury was improperly permitted to consider evidence of a post-occurrence change in design; (4) that the foundation was insufficient to permit testimony from plaintiffs' expert witness; and (5) that the size of the damage award was excessive. We affirm.
In 1977, James Bandstra was involved in a farming accident which is the basis for this action. Bandstra fell more than thirty feet from an unguarded silo ladder manufactured by Madison Silo Company and landed in the hopper opening of an International Harvester forage blower. He sustained severe injuries which resulted in partial amputation of both legs.
Plaintiff sued Madison Silo, International Harvester, and his father and brother, who employed him at the time of the accident. His ex-wife and minor child were also named as plaintiffs. He originally alleged both negligence and strict products liability; however, the strict products liability claim was withdrawn at the conclusion of the evidence.
The jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiffs' total damages were $3,400,000. Plaintiff's ex-wife was awarded $125,000 and their minor child received $25,000. The jury concluded that Madison Silo, International Harvester, and the plaintiff each were guilty of negligence and apportioned liability as follows: James's father and brother--zero; James--10 percent; Madison Silo--60 percent; and International Harvester--30 percent. International Harvester has appealed from this result.
The defendant's first claim is that the trial court erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As a separate argument, defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. These two arguments are essentially the same and we will consider them together for purposes of this appeal.
In considering the propriety of a motion for directed verdict, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(2). Generally, questions of negligence and proximate cause are for the jury; it is only in exceptional cases that they can be decided as a matter of law. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(10). Even when facts are undisputed, if reasonable minds might draw different inferences from them, a jury question is engendered. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(17).
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the case was properly submitted to the jury. Three theories of negligence were submitted to the jury concerning International Harvester's liability:
1. Failure to design and provide a guard over the auger;
2. Failure to design and provide an auger control lever which would disengage the auger when moved into a downward position and/or place the lever in such a way as to disengage the auger when struck by a falling object;
3. Failure to warn of the alleged condition of the forage blower.
With respect to each of these theories, defendant argues that plaintiff did not establish a breach of duty and that there is no evidence that the claimed defects proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.
A. Breach of Duty.
When a manufacturer is sued in connection with an alleged defect in a machine the negligence alleged must be reasonably foreseeable and must be in connection with such a part of the machine as pertains to its purpose.
Davis v. Coats Company, 255 Iowa 13, 119 N.W.2d 198, 201 (1963). A company is not required to safeguard against occurrences that cannot be reasonably expected or contemplated as likely to occur. Id.
The record contains evidence that it is reasonably foreseeable that a person would be climbing above the auger while it was operating. As such, International Harvester is required to take reasonable precautionary measures to guard against probable injury.
According to plaintiffs' expert witness, Ken Olson, one safety device which should have been used was shielding over the auger. Olson testified that such shielding was available and was the He also testified that the designer of the International Harvester forage blower was aware shielding was available in order to make the auger safer. In support of this statement, plaintiffs offered into evidence eight of the original patents for the forage blower, one of which called for shielding over the auger.
Defendant points to evidence in the record which would support a contrary conclusion. One of defendant's expert witnesses testified that shielding would not be able to withstand the impact of a 170-pound man falling from a height of 30 to 40 feet. Defendant also argues that none of the other forage blowers in evidence had the type of safety shield that Mr. Olson claimed was a state of the art. One expert witness testified that such guards could not be used since they would block the flow of cut silage into the hopper.
We need not consider the merits of defendant's factual claims. It is obvious that there is conflicting evidence in the record concerning the feasibility of a safety shield. This type of factual dispute should be submitted to a jury. It is not the type of question which could be determined as a matter of law. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we believe a jury question was engendered. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether International Harvester had a duty to put a safety shield over the auger.
We also believe evidence would support a conclusion that defendant had a duty to change the direction of the auger control lever so that it would disengage the auger when moved in a downward position. Ken Olson testified that ASAE safety standard 335.1 requires that the control lever be moved downward to disengage the auger. Evidence also reveals that such a change was feasible; several other forage blowers had control levers which conformed to the safety standards. Finally, testimony reveals that if the lever conformed to the safety standards, someone falling into the hopper would have disengaged the auger. Thus, while defendant may dispute the reliability of the evidence, the fact remains that there was evidence in the record to support plaintiffs' claim that a duty was breached.
There was also evidence to support the claim that defendant had a duty to warn the plaintiff of the potential danger of falling into the auger.
Iowa has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1956) which provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
The issue of whether a warning is required is determined by standards of reasonable care. Henkel v. R and S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 188 (Iowa 1982).
In the case before this court, the forage blower had two warning labels. One provided:
1. Keep all shields in place.
2. Stop machine to adjust and oil.
3. When mechanism becomes clogged, shut off engine before cleaning.
4. Keep hands, feet, clothing away from all moving parts.
5. Keep off implements unless seat or platform is provided for riding purposes. Keep others off.
The other label provided, "Keep hands and feet out of hopper when machine is connected to a power source." Mr. Olson testified that the warning labels did not adequately warn against the danger of climbing a ladder over the auger. While the operator's manual had such a warning, Olson stated that "the state of the art" required that such a warning appear on the actual machinery. He testified on direct examination that the danger was not open and obvious, and that International Harvester was clearly aware of the potential danger, having referred to it in the owner's manual.
Such evidence is sufficient to engender a jury question concerning the duty to warn. While defendant cites to conflicting evidence, we are required at this point to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. In doing so, we cannot say the trial court erred in submitting the question to the jury. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether there was a duty to warn.
B. Proximate Cause. Our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence
of negligence to submit to the jury disposes of only part of defendant's argument. The separate issue of proximate cause must also have substantial support in the...
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