Banek Inc. v. Yogurt Ventures U.S.A., Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93-1107,93-1107
• Citation: 6 F.3d 357
• Parties: BANEK INCORPORATED, a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YOGURT VENTURES U.S.A., INC., a Georgia corporation; Richard Stern and John W. Stern, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 357

6 F.3d 357

BANEK INCORPORATED, a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YOGURT VENTURES U.S.A., INC., a Georgia corporation;

Richard Stern and John W. Stern, jointly and

severally, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-1107.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 29, 1993.

Decided June 8, 1993 ^*.

Adam J. Baker (argued and briefed), Joseph A. Starr, Weisman, Trogan, Young and Schloss, Martin C. Weisman, Birmingham, MI, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jeffrey A. Sadowski, John A. Sinclair, Jeffrey L. Portis, Sally L. Foley (argued and briefed), Harness, Dickey & Pierce, Troy, MI, for defendants-appellees.

Timothy M. Guerriero, Brady & Hathaway, Detroit, MI, Reva S. Bauch, Chicago, IL (briefed), for Cherry Investments, Inc. amicus curiae.

Robert C. Ward, Jr., Atty. Gen., of Michigan, Lansing, MI (briefed), for State of Mich. amicus curiae.

Before: GUY and NELSON, Circuit Judges; and BECKWITH, District Judge. ^**

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal, plaintiff, Banek Inc., appeals the district court's ruling that a choice of law provision contained in the parties' franchise agreement was valid and enforceable. Upon review of the record and consideration of the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the district court's decision was correct and affirm.

I.

Plaintiff, Banek Inc., owned by Mr. and Mrs. Banek, entered into negotiations with defendant Yogurt Ventures U.S.A., Inc., a Georgia corporation owned by defendants John and Richard Stern, for the purchase of a Freshens Yogurt franchise to be located in Monroe, Michigan. After negotiating several changes in the agreement, the parties signed a "Franchise and Development Agreement" in February 1990. Sales at the Monroe location were not as expected, and Banek closed its Freshens franchise in March 1992. In October 1991, prior to shutting down, Banek filed suit in state court against Yogurt Ventures. The suit alleged breach of contract, various violations of the Michigan Franchise Investment Law (MFIL), violations of the Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rules, common law fraud and misrepresentation, and negligence. In May 1992, after closing the Monroe site, Banek filed a separate action against John and Richard Stern. These two cases were then consolidated. Following removal to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, defendants moved for dismissal of all counts on various theories.

The district court granted defendants' motion in part and denied it in part. The court ruled that the choice of law provision in the parties' agreement, providing that Georgia law is to govern the rights and obligations of the parties, was valid and enforceable under Michigan law and thus dismissed plaintiff's claim alleging violations of the MFIL. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim under the Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rules, holding that there is no private right of action under those rules. The district court also dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim. Only the ruling concerning the choice of law provision is before this court on interlocutory appeal.

In a separate case, another judge in the same district ruled that the same choice of law provision in a different Freshens Yogurt franchise agreement required that the breach of contract claim be governed by Georgia law, while the plaintiff's other claims--fraud and misrepresentation--were to be governed by Michigan law. Cherry Invs., Inc. v. Yogurt Ventures U.S.A., Inc., No. 92-CV-72428-DT (E.D.Mich. July 27, 1992). We granted Cherry Investments' motion for leave to file an amicus brief. ¹ We also granted the State of Michigan's motion for leave to file an amicus brief.

II.

The franchise agreement between these parties provides:

This Agreement was made and entered into in the State [of] Georgia and all rights and obligations of the parties hereto shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Georgia.

We see the issue in this appeal as involving three separate, sequential questions. First, is this a valid choice of law clause or is it a waiver of rights which is prohibited under the MFIL? Second, if the clause is valid, is this choice of law provision enforceable under Michigan choice of law rules? Third, if this provision is valid and enforceable, does Georgia law govern all claims between the parties or only contract claims?

We begin with answering the first question in the affirmative. Plaintiff and amicus, Cherry Investments, argue that the choice of law provision in the agreement operates as a waiver of the rights and protections under the MFIL and thus is void under Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 445.1527. That section provides:

Each of the following provisions is void and unenforceable if contained in any documents relating to a franchise:

....

(b) A requirement that a franchisee assent to a release, assignment, novation, waiver, or estoppel which deprives a franchisee of rights and protections provided in this act. This shall not preclude a franchisee, after entering into a franchise agreement, from settling any and all claims.

....

(f) A provision requiring that arbitration or litigation be conducted outside this state. This shall not preclude the franchisee from entering into an agreement, at the time of arbitration, to conduct arbitration at a location outside this state.

Plaintiff argues that the choice of law provision making Georgia law applicable acts as a waiver of "rights and protections" provided under the MFIL. We disagree.

The Michigan legislature was specific enough to include forum selection provisions in the list of void provisions, but did not specify choice of law provisions. Seemingly, the Michigan legislature understood that the burdens of being forced to arbitrate a claim in a foreign forum are significant, as subsection (f) makes arbitration or litigation forum selection clauses void. However, litigating in Michigan does not require that Michigan law must govern the dispute. The statute does not expressly void choice of law provisions, and we decline to imply such a prohibition. The Michigan legislature may have purposefully omitted choice of law provisions from those clauses prohibited because it may have realized that other states' laws might provide more protection to franchisees; thus, if a franchisee and franchisor want to choose a different state's law to govern any disputes, the parties may so contract. Providing that waivers and releases are void is not equivalent to voiding choice of law provisions. See Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distrib. Co., 814 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (6th Cir.1987) (Ohio law voiding any waiver of the Ohio Business Opportunity Plans Act did not void choice of law provision).

The cases cited by plaintiff and amici are inapposite. As noted in Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 134 (7th Cir.1990), "[t]he strength of nonwaiver provisions among states varies." In Wright-Moore, the Indiana statute made it unlawful to enter into an agreement "[l]imiting litigation brought for breach of the agreement in any manner whatsoever," Ind.Code Sec. 23-2-2.7-1(10), and thus the court held that the choice of law provision in the contract at issue was void. Other states expressly include choice of law provisions in the list of void and unenforceable provisions. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. Sec. 80C.21. The Michigan statute is not so strongly worded, perhaps for the reason expressed above. Alternatively or additionally, the Michigan legislature may have recognized that requiring all franchises located in Michigan be governed by Michigan law, regardless of any agreement to the contrary, would make Michigan a less desirable target state for franchisors, making franchises in Michigan more expensive to own. This would be largely because of a national franchisor's need for uniformity in its business affairs. Having to comply with differing laws for each of the states in which it does business increases expenses. In any event, Michigan has not indicated a desire to bar choice of law provisions either expressly or implicitly.

In Solman Distributors, Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 888 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.1989), the court was faced with a Maine distributor who had an agreement with a California corporation to be the exclusive distributor of its products in northern Maine. The corporation sought to terminate the contract, giving a 30-day notice as required under the contract. The distributor contended that Maine law did not allow for termination of a contract without good cause and the corporation had none. The corporation argued it was allowed to terminate without good cause under California law and that California law applied because of an express choice of law provision in the contract. In holding that the anti-waiver provision of the Maine statute voided the choice of law provision, the court found that allowing the corporation to cancel the contract without good cause would be contrary to the local public policy requiring good cause. Id. at 172. Plaintiff in the present case, unlike Solman Distributors, has not shown how the application of Georgia law would violate any specific public policy of Michigan.

That brings us to the second question: Should the valid choice of law provision be enforced under Michigan's choice of law rules? It is a well-accepted principle that a federal court in a diversity case must apply the conflict of law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 490, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1020-21, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Worsham, 705 F.2d 821, 825 (6th Cir.1983). Therefore, this court must look to Michigan conflict of law principles to determine whether Michigan or Georgia law governs this dispute.

Michigan has adopted the approach articulated in 1 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Sec. 187 (1971). Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Indus. Servs., Inc., 199 Mich.App. 366, ...