Bangs v. Town of Wells

Decision Date27 October 2000
Citation2000 ME 186,760 A.2d 632
PartiesNorman BANGS et al. v. TOWN OF WELLS et al.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Catherine R. Connors (orally), K. Douglas Erdmann, Portland, for plaintiffs.

Susan Bernstein Driscoll (orally), Christian L. Barner, Bergen & Parkinson, LLC, Kennebunk, for defendants.

Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

SAUFLEY, J.

[¶ 1] Norman Bangs and Blueberry Ridge Mobile Village, Inc., appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, Crowley, J.) denying their statutory and constitutional challenges to the Town of Wells Land Use Ordinance. Bangs and Blueberry Ridge argue that the Wells Ordinance impermissibly prohibits the expansion and development of mobile home parks in violation of (1) Maine's statute on Regulation of Manufactured Housing, 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358 and (2) their rights to equal protection under the Maine and U.S. Constitutions. Because we agree that the Wells Ordinance violates the mandates of 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358(3)(M), we vacate the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Norman Bangs owns two large parcels of land that abut a 43.8-acre piece of land owned by Blueberry Ridge Mobile Village, Inc. Blueberry Ridge, originally known as Wilson Mobile Home Park, is a Maine corporation formed by Bangs. Blueberry Ridge and Bangs are separate legal entities, but the parties agree that they are, for the purposes of this appeal, the same parties in interest.1 Both the Bangs and Blueberry Ridge parcels are located in the Rural District (R) Zone in the Town of Wells.

[¶ 3] Blueberry Ridge currently exists as a "mobile home park"2 with fifty-one mobile homes in its lots. Because the Rural District Zone does not now allow mobile home parks to develop or exist within its territory, Blueberry Ridge is a nonconforming, grandfathered property under the Wells Land Use Ordinance. Blueberry Ridge conformed to the then-existing Ordinance at the time of its creation in 1977 as a residential subdivision, and, thus, its continued use is permitted in the Rural District Zone.

[¶ 4] In 1998, Bangs sought approval to expand Blueberry Ridge's use by adding thirty-eight new mobile home lots in the Bangs parcels. In effect, Bangs's plan was to create a new amalgamated mobile home park with a total of eighty-nine mobile homes3 in the combined 132-acre Bangs and Blueberry Ridge parcels. Bangs relied on section 3.4 of the Ordinance, which allows "nonconforming development[s]" to expand "in any manner which does not increase the nonconforming aspect(s) of the development," for the approval of his request. Wells, Me., Code § 3.4 (May 11, 1997).

[¶ 5] The Wells Code Enforcement Officer denied Bangs's request, concluding that Blueberry Ridge is a mobile home park, which, by its nonconforming use, cannot expand in the Rural District Zone. The Wells Ordinance only allows expansion of a "nonconforming development," defined as "[a] use permitted within a district which does not conform to one or more of the standards within this ordinance regulating the use." Wells, Me., Code § 2 (emphasis added). Because Blueberry Ridge is a "mobile home park," a use that is not permitted within the Rural District Zone, the CEO reasoned that the Ordinance prohibited her from granting Bangs's request. In a letter denying Bangs's request, the Wells CEO concluded:

A mobile home park is a nonconforming use in the rural district and may not be expanded. This use is only permitted in the mobile home overlay district.

Letter from Wells Code Enforcement Officer to Allan Schwarte (Apr. 21, 1998).

[¶ 6] Bangs appealed the CEO's decision, and the Wells Zoning Board of Appeals denied the request based on the same reasoning. The Board concluded as follows:

DECISION

It is therefore decided, by a vote of 5 to 0, to uphold the decision of the Code Enforcement Officer in that Blueberry Ridge Mobile Village, Inc. is a mobile home park and as such is not a permitted use in the Rural (R) District and, as a nonconforming use, cannot be expanded.

Letter from Wells Zoning Board of Appeals to Blueberry Ridge Mobile Village, Inc. (June 11, 1998).

[¶ 7] Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 11001 and M.R. Civ. P. 80B, Bangs appealed that decision to the Superior Court in a complaint that included several independent claims challenging the Wells Ordinance. The Superior Court (Brennan, J.) denied Bangs's administrative appeal, agreeing with the Board's interpretation of the Ordinance. The court reasoned that Blueberry Ridge is a "nonconforming use," which, under the Ordinance, cannot expand beyond mere changes to existing structures.

[¶ 8] The remaining independent claims were tried in the York County Superior Court (Crowley, J.) in a four-day, jury-waived trial. The court entered judgment in favor of the Town on all counts. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 9] Bangs raises two questions of law for our review. We review questions of law de novo. City of Saco v. Pulsifer, 2000 ME 74, ¶ 5, 749 A.2d 153, 154. Bangs argues that the Wells Land Use Ordinance is invalid because the Ordinance (i) violates Maine's statute on Regulation of Manufactured Housing, 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358 (1996 & Supp.1999), and (ii) discriminates against mobile home parks in violation of the equal protection rights of the Maine and U .S. Constitutions.4 On de novo review, we examine the entire record before us for errors of law. Kimball v. Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 2000 ME 20, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d 387, 392.

A. Maine's Statute on Regulation of Mobile Homes

[¶ 10] We address Bangs's statutory claim first.5 Maine's statute on Regulation of Manufactured Homes, as it now stands, is comprised of two distinct subsections that separately address municipalities' regulation of manufactured homes and mobile home parks. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358. Since its enactment in 1983, the Legislature has amended the statute substantively at least four separate times. In order to provide a better understanding of the statute's current scheme, we review the statute's legislative history. See Kimball, 2000 ME 20, ¶ 9,

745 A.2d at 390.

1. Subsection 2, "Location of Manufactured Housing"

[¶ 11] The provisions contained in section 4358(2) were first enacted in 1983 when the Legislature passed "An Act to Permit the Location of Manufactured Housing on Individual House Lots." P.L. 1983, ch. 424 (now codified as 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358(2)). With this Act, the Legislature sought to ensure the placement of manufactured homes on individual lots "in most locations where there is a mixture of housing types and opportunities." L.D. 1441, Statement of Fact (111th Legis.1983).6 The Act mandated municipalities to allow manufactured homes in "a number of locations" but gave them the discretion to exclude manufactured homes from certain areas in which they would not be compatible with the architecture of existing structures. Id. Since its enactment, we have invalidated zoning ordinances that have had the effect of prohibiting the placement of manufactured homes anywhere in town. See, e.g., Paladac v. City of Rockland, 558 A.2d 372, 376 (Me.1989)

.

[¶ 12] In 1993 and 1995, the Legislature amended the Act and strengthened its original inclusionary intent. L.D. 397 (116th Legis.1993); L.D. 285 (117th Legis.1995). With the "Act to Ensure Equitable Treatment of Manufactured Home Owners" and the "Act Concerning Placement of Modular Homes," the Legislature added new provisions requiring municipalities to allow individual manufactured homes "in all zones where other single-family homes are allowed." 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358(2)(E) (emphasis added).7 Contrary to the discretionary language of the 1983 Act, the 1993 and 1995 Acts provided municipalities with a simpler mandate: municipalities may no longer designate areas that are either uniquely appropriate or inappropriate for the placement of manufactured homes on individual lots; where single-family housing is permitted, single-family manufactured housing must also be permitted.

2. Subsection 3, "Regulation of Mobile Home Parks"

[¶ 13] In 1988 and 1989, the Legislature added to the original Act a new subsection regarding municipalities' regulation of "mobile home parks." 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358(3). In 1988, citing both the shortage of spaces for mobile homes and a rapid increase in land and housing costs, the Legislature passed an "Act to Provide Greater Protection to Owners of Mobile Homes and Mobile Home Parks." L.D. 2147 (113th Legis.1988). In response to an apparent shortage of affordable housing, the 1988 Act added two directives to municipalities regarding mobile home parks. Id. Municipalities must permit the expansion and development of new mobile home parks "in a number of environmentally suitable locations." 30 M.R.S.A. § 4965(3)(A) (1988) (repealed and recodified as 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358(3)(M)). Municipalities must also give "reasonable consideration" to permitting existing mobile home parks to expand in their existing locations. Id.8

[¶ 14] In the subsequent year, the Legislature again addressed the needs of mobile home parks by passing "An Act Regarding Minimum Lot Sizes and Other Municipal Regulations Concerning Mobile Home Parks." L.D. 1205 (114th Legis.1989). The 1989 Act repeated some of the same concerns of the 1988 Act, but this time the Legislature limited the municipalities' power to regulate the internal density and overall area requirements of mobile home parks. 30-A M.R.S.A. §§ 4358(3)(A)-4358(3)(K). Together, the 1988 and 1989 Acts provided a legislative scheme that required municipalities to permit the development and expansion of mobile home parks, while limiting the municipalities' power to regulate their density and overall area requirements. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4358(3).

[¶ 15] Thus, in its current form, Maine's statute on Regulation of Manufactured Housing provides municipalities with three general mandates. Municipalities must (i) allow the placement of...

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