Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. N.A. v. Henderson, No. 15-5186

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
• Writing for the Court: Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge
• Citation: 862 F.3d 29
• Parties: The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST CO. N.A., As Successor in Interest to JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, As Successor In Interest to Bank One, National Association, As Trustee for ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HS1, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Appellee v. Perry M. HENDERSON, formerly known as Perry M. Bryant, Appellant United States of America, Appellee
• Docket Number: No. 15-5186
• Decision Date: 07 July 2017

862 F.3d 29

The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST CO. N.A., As Successor in Interest to JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, As Successor In Interest to Bank One, National Association, As Trustee for ACE Securities Corp. Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2003-HS1, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Appellee
v.
Perry M. HENDERSON, formerly known as Perry M. Bryant, Appellant

United States of America, Appellee

No. 15-5186

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued October 14, 2016
Decided July 7, 2017

Paul F. Enzinna, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefs as amicus curiae in support of appellant.

Perry M. Henderson, pro se, filed the briefs for appellant.

S. Mohsin Reza, Tysons Corner, VA, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee. David Chen entered an appearance.

Before: Tatel, Circuit Judge, and Edwards and Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judges.

862 F.3d 32

Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge:

Pro se defendant Perry Henderson appeals the district court's order granting plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Henderson's counterclaims in this judicial foreclosure action. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

In 2003, Henderson "encumbered [his house in Washington, D.C.] with a Deed of Trust securing a fixed rate balloon note ... in the original principal amount of $191,250.00." Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Henderson , 107 F.Supp.3d 41, 43 (D.D.C. 2015). The original lender was SouthStar Funding, LLC. Henderson defaulted on the Note in 2012. Id . In 2013 SouthStar assigned the Deed of Trust to the Bank. Henderson, however, claims the assignment is invalid.

The Bank initially sought to foreclose on the property in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, but the case was removed to federal court by the Internal Revenue Service. The district court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment on the ground that it was entitled to judicial foreclosure. The court also dismissed Henderson's counterclaims for (1) "declaratory and injunctive relief based on plaintiff's failure to follow the proper procedures to foreclose a deed of trust in the District of Columbia," (2) "violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," (3) quiet title, (4) "violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act," and (5) civil conspiracy. Id . at 43–44. Henderson appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Bank and the dismissal of his counterclaims. This court appointed Paul F. Enzinna as amicus curiae to present arguments in support of Henderson's position and we are grateful for his able, though unavailing, efforts.

II. Analysis

This case presents two questions: (1) whether the grant of summary judgment was proper given the dispute about the validity of the assignment to the Bank and (2) whether Henderson's counterclaims were properly dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm both the district court's grant of summary judgment and its dismissal of Henderson's counterclaims.

A. Summary Judgment

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Aref v. Lynch , 833 F.3d 242, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate when, "viewing the evidence and the inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the adverse party," Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C. , 486 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2007), "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

Henderson does not deny that he is in default on the Note, nor does he contest the validity of the Note or the Deed. The Bank attached a copy of the Note as Exhibit B of its verified complaint and further asserted that it is the rightful owner of the Note and the successor in interest to the original trustee listed in the allonge to the Note. Because Henderson provided no evidence to indicate the Bank is not the rightful holder of the Note, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the Bank holds the Note. See Neal v. Kelly , 963 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (verified complaint may be treated as the "functional equivalent of an affidavit" for purposes of summary judgment (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because D.C. law allows the holder of a note to enforce the deed of

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trust by judicial foreclosure, see Szego v. Kingsley Anyanwutaku , 651 A.2d 315, 317 (D.C. 1994), the district court properly entered summary judgment for judicial foreclosure.

B. Henderson's Counterclaims ...