Bank of Nevada v. United States, 15541.

Decision Date07 February 1958
Docket NumberNo. 15541.,15541.
Citation251 F.2d 820
PartiesBANK OF NEVADA, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Milton W. Keefer, B. Mahlon Brown, Las Vegas, Nev., for appellant.

Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Charles B. E. Freeman, A. F. Prescott, Sheldon I. Fink, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Franklin P. R. Rittenhouse, U. S. Atty., Las Vegas, Nev., for appellee.

Before STEPHENS, Chief Judge, and LEMMON and HAMLEY, Circuit Judges.

LEMMON, Circuit Judge.

While the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 "contains a variety of important changes in the estate and gift tax areas",1 it has left untouched the well established principle that the amount of an unpaid tax "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property"2 of the delinquent taxpayer.

No government worthy of the name will permit itself to be rendered incapable of collecting the public fisc.

At any rate, in this respect at least, the United States Government has not been left impotent.

1. Statement of Facts

The facts as found by the Court below were entirely stipulated. They may be summarized as follows — with especial regard to the chronology, since time-sequence is important here:

On November 15, 1954, certain Withholding and Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes for the calendar year 1954 in the amount of $804.50 were assessed against J. D. Bentley of Las Vegas, Nevada, hereinafter referred to as the taxpayer. On the following day, the taxpayer was notified of this assessment and demand was made upon him to pay it, but he has refused to do so.

On January 12, 1955, a notice of tax lien pertaining to this assessment was filed with the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.

On February 28, 1955, and on August 31, 1954, the taxpayer submitted financial statements to the appellant. Each statement read in part as follows:

"The undersigned, for the purpose of procuring and establishing credit from time to time with you and to induce you to permit the undersigned to become indebted to you on notes, endorsements, guarantees, overdrafts or otherwise, furnishes the following as being a true and correct statement of the financial condition of the undersigned on the above date, and agrees to notify you immediately of the extent and character of any material change in said financial condition, and also agrees that if the undersigned, or any endorser or guarantor of any of the obligations of the undersigned, at any time fails in business or becomes insolvent, or commits an act of bankruptcy, or if any deposit account of the undersigned with you, or any other property of the undersigned held by you, be attempted to be obtained or held by writ of execution, garnishment, attachment or other legal process, or if any of the representations made below prove to be untrue, or if the undersigned fails to notify you of any material change as above agreed, then and in such case, at your option, all of the obligations of the undersigned to you, or held by you, shall immediately become due and payable, without demand or notice. This statement shall be construed by you to be a continuing statement of the condition of the undersigned, and a new and original statement of all assets and liabilities upon each and every transaction in and by which the undersigned hereafter becomes indebted to you, until the undersigned advises in writing to the contrary." Emphasis supplied.

On March 1, 1955, certain Federal excise taxes for the calendar year 1954 amounting to $187.51 were assessed against the taxpayer, and on that same date the taxpayer was notified of this assessment. Demand was made upon him to pay it, but he has refused to do so.

On April 16, 1955, the taxpayer and his wife, Doris L. Bentley, borrowed $2,000 from the appellant and executed a promissory note in favor of the appellant for that amount.

On May 31, 1955, the taxpayer submitted to the appellant another financial statement, containing the same provision relating to the appellant's right of set-off that has been quoted supra.

On June 10, 1955, the taxpayer had on deposit in an account with the appellant "the sum of not less than $878.16". At 1:45 p. m. on that day, the appellee, through one of its collection officers, served a "Notice of Levy" upon the appellant by delivering it to E. K. Phillips, the assistant cashier. This Notice of Levy covered both of the assessments referred to above.

On that same day, A. M. Smith, vice president and manager of the appellant's First and Fremont Branch, wrote to the appellee's collection officer as follows:

"This will acknowledge receipt of your Notice of Levy against J. D. Bentley, which was served on our Mr. Phillips at 1:45 p. m. today.
"I would like to take this opportunity to inform you that we have exercised our right to setoff and applied the funds in this account to an unsecured indebtedness held at this bank; consequently, there are no funds available under your levy."

The "unsecured indebtedness" referred to in the above letter was the balance of the note for $2,000, referred to above, which balance, at the time of the levy, amounted to approximately $1,500. The appellant exercised its "claimed" right of setoff subsequently to 1:45 p. m. on June 10, 1955, the precise time at which the appellee's collection officer delivered the Notice of Levy to the appellant's assistant cashier. The appellant concedes that it exercised its right of setoff "thereafter".

On June 13, 1955, a notice of Federal tax lien pertaining to the assessment of Federal excise taxes was filed in the office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.

On June 14, 1955, the appellee's collection officer served a final demand upon the appellant's vice president and manager of its First and Fremont Branch.

On September 28, 1955, the appellee filed suit in the Court below to recover from the appellant the sum of $878.16, with interest and costs. As we have seen, that sum represented the amount which the taxpayer had on deposit with the appellant on June 10, 1955.

The case was submitted upon a stipulation of facts, together with attached exhibits.

The District Court held that the appellee's "tax liens are paramount and valid liens", and that the appellee was entitled to judgment as prayed for.

On March 29, 1957, the District Court handed down a judgment accordingly.

On April 5, 1957, the Notice of Appeal was filed.

2. The Appellant's Contentions

The appellant's argument may be summarized as follows:

The trial court erred in "ignoring the established principle that the bank has a general lien or right of setoff against the deposits of the depositor for the indebtedness of the depositor to the bank".

The Court erred in finding that the promissory note was not a demand note and due immediately upon delivery.

There was no property of the depositor-taxpayer in the possession of the appellant subject to the tax lien.

The right of set-off in the appellant was paramount to the appellee's tax lien.

3. The Applicable Statute

The pertinent sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are the following:

"§ 6321. Lien for taxes
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.
"§ 6322. Period of Lien
"Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
"§ 6323. Validity against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors
"(a) Invalidity of lien without notice.
"Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate — * * *
"§ 6331. Levy and distraint
"(a) Authority of Secretary or delegate.
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary or his delegate to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. * * *
"§ 6332. Surrender of property subject to levy
"(a) Requirement. — Any person in possession of (or obligated with respect to) property or rights to property subject to levy upon which a levy has been made shall, upon demand of the Secretary or his delegate, surrender such property or rights (or discharge such obligation) to the Secretary or his delegate, except such part of the property or rights as is, at the time of such demand, subject to an attachment or execution under any judicial process."
4. Liens for Federal Taxes and the Provisions for Their Collection Are Strictly Federal and Strictly Statutory

At the outset, what appears to be a basic misconception of the appellant should be cleared up. In its main brief, the appellant cites a number of state decisions to the effect, inter alia, that a party in the appellant's position "has a general lien or right of set off against the deposits of the depositor for the indebtedness of the depositor to the bank"; and that there is a right to set off enjoyed by a bank "by virtue of a specific agreement with its depositor", and that only the sum left, "after deducting the debits...

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