Bank of New York v. Ansonia Associates

• Decision Date: 19 February 1997
• Citation: 172 Misc.2d 70,656 N.Y.S.2d 813
• Parties: BANK OF NEW YORK, as Administrator of the Estate of Miriam R.T. D'Angeli, Also Known as Miriam Toigo-D'Angeli, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. ANSONIA ASSOCIATES et al., Defendants. Elena KUNIKOVA et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANSONIA ASSOCIATES et al., Defendants. (And Other Actions.)
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 813

656 N.Y.S.2d 813

172 Misc.2d 70

BANK OF NEW YORK, as Administrator of the Estate of Miriam

R.T. D'Angeli, Also Known as Miriam

Toigo-D'Angeli, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. ANSONIA ASSOCIATES et al., Defendants.

Elena KUNIKOVA et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANSONIA ASSOCIATES et al., Defendants. (And Other Actions.)

Supreme Court, New York County.

Feb. 19, 1997.

Torino & Singer, P.C., Mineola (Bruce Torino and Allison Singhal, of counsel), for Ansonia Associates, defendant.

Robert M. Blakeman & Associates (Robert M. Blakeman and Bradley A. Blakeman, of counsel), Valley Stream, for Bank of New York, plaintiff.

Leonard H. Moche (Marcella Green, of counsel), New York City, for Elena Kunikova and another, plaintiffs.

DAVID B. SAXE, Justice.

The Ansonia defendants move, after a liability determination against them, for the following relief: (a) an interlocutory judgment on the issue of liability as determined by the jury; (b) a stay of all further proceedings pending appeal; and (c) a protective order barring plaintiffs from discovery of the assets and financial status of individual Ansonia partners. By separate motion they seek an order setting aside the jury verdict.

The motions are denied in the discretion of the court.

INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND STAY

Recently, substantial emphasis has been placed on the importance of case management, best understood as an attempt to ensure the most expeditious, efficient and inexpensive means to bring lawsuits from start to conclusion. Its importance is reflected in the number of booklets and documents published recently, focused on speeding up the litigation process. "A Handbook on Case Management," issued by Hon. Stephen G. Crane, Administrative Judge of the Supreme Court, Civil Branch, New York County [October 1996] and distributed to all justices and court personnel, is devoted to suggesting and describing various mechanisms a court may adopt to arrive at case dispositions with maximum efficiency, minimum cost and limited expenditure of time. Similarly, the American Bar Association, Judicial Division, recently issued a booklet entitled "Litigation Control: The Trial Judge's Key to Avoiding Delay." These publications discuss ways to streamline litigation, including: monitoring compliance with discovery orders, requiring use of pre-trial orders to plan and streamline the trial, and supervising jury selection.

An extension of case management, "trial management," ensures that the trial process itself is as streamlined and expeditious as it can be, for the benefit of parties, jurors, and the court system itself.

Sometimes, in the interest of accelerating the trial process, a judge will elect to bifurcate the trial, that is, to first hear the issue of liability, and then, if appropriate, have the same jury or a new jury hear and decide the issue of damages (see, 22 NYCRR § 202.42[a] [bifurcation of personal injury trials encouraged "where it appears that bifurcation may assist in a clarification or simplification of issues and a fair and more expeditious resolution of the action"] ). For instance, the procedure is employed where there is a substantial likelihood that after a finding of liability, or an apportionment of fault among defendants, a settlement can be effectuated. It would be ironic indeed if such an attempt to speed and streamline a case were to result in unnecessary delays and prejudice to the ability of a prevailing party to enforce any ultimate money judgment.

Yet, case law supports defendants' suggestion that where a bifurcated trial is not a "continuous trial" heard by a single jury, the court must issue an interlocutory judgment on the liability portion and stay the damages trial, thereby permitting the defendants to appeal from the interlocutory judgment.

The cases draw a distinction between cases in which a single jury hears a "continuous trial", i.e. the damages portion immediately following the liability portion, and cases having "non-continuous" trials, where the jury is discharged after a liability trial, or where there is a break between the trial on liability and that on the issue of damages.

The seminal case on the issue, Hacker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 35, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194 [1st Dept 1966], addressed the question of whether, in a bifurcated action, a defendant was entitled to appeal from an unfavorable liability determination prior to the damages trial. The use of this "split trial" procedure was at that time new and novel in personal injury actions, and the Court initially addressed itself to approving the use of the bifurcation process in personal injury actions. The Court went on to approve the use of interlocutory appeals after a liability verdict:

Pragmatically, such an appeal, though unusual, stemming as it does from a comparatively recent and sparingly used procedure in a personal injury litigation, appears to have much the same justification as an appeal from an order granting summary judgment and directing an assessment of damages

(Hacker, supra at 37, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194 [emphasis supplied] ). The Court emphasized the distinction between a case where the issue of liability is tried separately, in advance of the damages trial, as was the case there, and cases where "the issues of liability and damages proceed to determination together, or in which the issue of liability is first determined by triers who promptly go on to hear the issue of damages" (Hacker, supra at 37, 266 N.Y.S.2d 194).

Not addressed in so many words in Hacker was the question of whether the defendant in a bifurcated action has an absolute right to the entry of an interlocutory judgment or order from which an appeal can be taken following completion of the liability phase of the trial.

In Fortgang v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 29 A.D.2d 41, 285 N.Y.S.2d 110 [2d Dept 1967] the Second Department reconsidered its previous position that an order after a liability trial finding in favor of the plaintiff was non-appealable (see, Bliss v. Londner, 20 A.D.2d 640, 246 N.Y.S.2d 296 [2d Dept 1964] ), particularly in view of the decision to the contrary by the First Department in Hacker, supra.

The trial court in Fortgang had issued an interlocutory judgment from which the defendant sought to appeal. The Appellate Division held, in a ruling more wide-ranging and definitive than that of the Hacker case, that

Where a court orders a trial of the issues of liability prior to a trial of the issue of damages and there is a finding in favor of the plaintiff on the issues of liability, this court will entertain an appeal from such determination; and

(a) Such appeal shall lie as of right whether the split trial determination was by the court or a jury; and

(b) Such appeal shall lie as of right whether the appeal is from an order or an interlocutory judgment entered on the determination.

(Fortgang, supra at 43, 285 N.Y.S.2d 110).

The distinction between continuous and non-continuous trials was refined in Matter of Jack Parker Construction Corp. v. Williams, 35 A.D.2d 839, 317 N.Y.S.2d 911 [2d Dept 1970]. In that matter, the issue of liability only was initially tried before a jury. When the jury held for the plaintiff, the trial court directed the damages portion of the trial to proceed immediately before the same jury. The defendant then brought a mandamus petition against the trial judge, seeking to compel him to sign and enter an interlocutory judgment. The Appellate Division held that the right of appeal as set forth in the Fortgang decision "was not meant to apply to those cases where liability and damages would be tried immediately and successively before the same jury, because in such cases it was recognized that the final judgment would promptly ensue and the defendant could appeal from the entire judgment without any undue prejudice" (Matter of Jack Parker Construction v. Williams, supra at 839, 317 N.Y.S.2d 911 [emphasis supplied] ). It therefore dismissed the mandamus proceeding.

In contrast, a mandamus petition was granted in Matter of Abel v. Monteleone, 39 A.D.2d 741, 332 N.Y.S.2d 859 [2d Dept 1972], where, after a verdict on liability in favor of the plaintiff, the court discharged the jury. The Appellate Division directed the trial judge to sign the interlocutory judgment, and the damages trial was stayed pending appeal. The decision gives no additional information as to the circumstances in terms of whether the damages trial was ready to proceed.

So, the general rule is clearly in the defendants' favor on this question. Yet, even controlling principles of law should not be rotely applied without consideration of whether application of those principles would work an injustice in the circumstances presented.

On May 12, 1990, the ceiling collapsed in the croissant shop located in the Ansonia Apartments, a West Side landmark building. One patron, Miriam Rosa Toigo D'Angeli, was killed, and a number of others were injured; thirteen plaintiffs in all have commenced suit. There were about forty named defendants, although they could be divided into two nominal groupings: the "Ansonia" defendants, consisting of owners of the premises and general partners of the partnerships with ownership interests in the premises, and the "non-Ansonia" defendants, consisting of, for example, architects, contractors, builders and others not connected...