Bank of Versailles v. Guthrey

• Decision Date: 05 March 1895
• Citation: 29 S.W. 1004,127 Mo. 189
• Parties: Bank of Versailles, Appellant, v. Guthrey et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

29 S.W. 1004

127 Mo. 189

Bank of Versailles, Appellant, v. Guthrey et al

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

March 5, 1895

Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court. -- Hon. D. W. Shackleford, Judge.

Affirmed.

A. L Ross for appellant.

(1) One can not transfer his property in consideration of an obligation for support for life, unless he retains so much as is necessary to satisfy existing debts. Wait on Fraudulent Conveyances and Creditor's Bills, [Ed. 1884] sec. 211, p 295; Stanley v. Robbins, 36 Vt. 432; Crane v Stickles, 15 Vt. 252; Woodward v. Wyman, 53 Vt. 647. (2) The deed of Guthrey to his codefendant, Ann E. Waller, is fraudulent and void as to existing creditors. This conveyance, by its terms, operates to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, and the intent is imputed to the parties. It is a fraud in law. It is apparent on the face of the deed. Wait on Fraudulent Conveyances and Creditors' Bills, secs. 9 and 10, pp. 14 and 15, and sec. 382, p. 506, and cases there cited; Lionburger v. Baker, 88 Mo. 447; Knight v. Adams, 46 Mo. 95. (3) Defendant James S. Guthrey was not the head of the family. Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Dict. [Ed. 1883], p. 596; see, also, Brown v. Brown, 68 Mo. 388; Schaffer v. Beldsmeier, 107 Mo. 314.

J. A. Blevins for respondent.

(1) The pleadings and evidence in this case show that plaintiff has no standing in a court of equity. Moore v. Wingate, 53 Mo. 398; Mullen v. Hewitt, 103 Mo. 631; Humphreys v. Co., 98 Mo. 548. (2) It is clearly shown by the evidence that defendant James S. Guthrey was the head of a family and a housekeeper, and that he was entitled to the premises in question as a homestead. Leake v. King, 85 Mo. 417; Brown v. Executor, 68 Mo. 338; Beckman v. Meyer, 75 Mo. 333; Holland v. Kreider, 86 Mo. 61; Thompson on Homestead, sec. 45. (3) Such being the case, he could convey the same to his codefendant, and such conveyance would be neither fraudulent nor void. The arrangements made by Guthrey were such as his necessities demanded, and were authorized by law. Holland v. Kreider, 86 Mo. 59; Muenks v. Bunch, 90 Mo. 500; Davis v. Bessehl, 88 Mo. 438; Kendall v. Powers, 96 Mo. 142; Hart v. Leete, 104 Mo. 337; Grimes v. Portman, 99 Mo. 229. (4) The conveyance was based upon a valuable consideration. But, even if the consideration should be deemed voluntary, the deed should stand, for Guthrey could give away his homestead without committing a fraud upon plaintiff. Cases supra. (5) If the court should set aside the deed to Mrs. Waller, Guthrey would still be entitled to claim the premises as his homestead. It could not be said that he abandoned the homestead, because he left it from necessity. He was old, blind, and sick, and had no one left with him to take care of him. Under these circumstances he was taken to his daughter's, where he could receive the attention which his age and infirmities required. Thompson on Homesteads, sec. 284; Moss v. Warner, 10 Cal. 296.

OPINION

Burgess, J.

This is an equitable proceeding to set aside a deed, made by the defendant Guthrey on the twenty-ninth day of December, 1891, to his daughter and codefendant Waller, to one hundred and eight acres of land in Morgan county.

Defendant Guthrey bought the land in May, 1885. Prior to its purchase he lived in Saline county, Missouri. His wife died in 1874. He bought the land for a homestead, and moved onto it, with his son, James B., then about twenty-nine years of age, and his daughter, Callie, somewhat older, they being the only members of his family. He continued to live on the land and farm it until his son and daughter both married and left home, and being then eighty years old, feeble and almost helpless, he conveyed the land to his daughter Waller upon the express condition, and in consideration that she would maintain and support him during his natural life, and then moved to her house, where he has since remained, being taken care of and provided for by her. The land was all of the property that James S. Guthrey had at the time he deeded it to his daughter. It was worth from $ 1,200 to $ 1,500.

The evidence was conflicting as to who was the head of the family while defendant and his son lived on the land -- whether it was defendant or his son.

In August, 1892, plaintiff obtained judgment in the circuit court of Morgan county, Missouri, against the defendant James S., and his son J. B., Guthrey, for the sum of $ 155.50, and being unable to make the judgment or any part of it, plaintiff instituted this suit to set aside the deed from defendant Guthrey to his daughter on the ground that it was fraudulent as to his creditors, and to subject the land therein described to the payment of its debt. The court rendered judgment for defendant and plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff's first contention is that, as the land in controversy was all the property that defendant Guthrey owned at the time of the execution of the deed therefor to his daughter Mrs. Waller, the only consideration agreed upon being the grantor's support during his lifetime, the deed was absolutely void as to his creditors, as the law will not allow one to transfer his property in consideration of an obligation for support for life, unless he retains a sufficient amount to pay his debts.

With respect to property which may be subjected to the payment of the debts of a debtor, we fully agree to the rule announced in Wait on Fraudulent Conveyances and Creditors' Bills [2 Ed.], sec. 211; Crane v. Stickles, 15 Vt. 252; Stanley v. Robbins, 36 Vt. 422; Woodward v. Wyman, 53 Vt. 645, that is, that he can not convey his property which is subject to the payment of his debts in consideration of an obligation for support for life, or any considerable length of time, unless he retain whatever is necessary to satisfy his creditors, as the law will not allow any person having means to make provision for himself and family during life at the expense of his creditors. To do so would be to encourage fraud, by permitting a debtor, possessed of an unlimited amount of property, to place it beyond the reach of his creditors by conveying it, for and in consideration of the support of himself and wife or any member of his family, for and during life of any one or all of them.

But the law as thus announced has no application to property which is exempt from seizure and sale under attachment and execution, such as a homestead. Creditors have no interest in such property, as it can not be subjected to the payment of their debts by proceeding in equity any more than it can be seized under attachment or execution. Kendall v. Powers, 96 Mo. 142, 8 S.W. 793; Holland v. Kreider, 86 Mo. 59. In Davis v. Land, 88 Mo. 436, it is said: "No fraud upon creditors can be perpetrated by any disposition the debtor may see proper to make of his homestead. It is beyond their reach, both at law and in equity, and there can be no fraudulent disposal of such property within the meaning of the attachment law."

Section 5435, Revised Statutes, 1889, provides that the homestead of every housekeeper or head of a family which is or shall be used by such housekeeper or head of a family as such homestead, shall be exempt from attachment and execution as therein provided. It will be observed that no restriction is placed upon the right of the housekeeper or head of a family, having the title in fee, to dispose of the homestead as he or she may think proper, but it is expressly provided by said section that nothing contained therein...