Bank Repossessions v. Mobile America Corp.

Decision Date08 June 1977
Docket NumberNo. 20449,20449
Citation268 S.C. 622,235 S.E.2d 709
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesBANK REPOSSESSIONS, Respondent, v. MOBILE AMERICA CORPORATION, Appellant. MGIC INDEMNITY CORPORATION, Respondent, v. The COUNTY OF LEXINGTON and Esquire Mobile Homes, Inc., Third-Party Respondents.

Grimball, Merry & Draffin, Columbia, for appellant.

McKay, Sherrill, Walker & Townsend, Columbia, for Bank Repossessions.

Donald E. Rothwell, Columbia, for MGIC Indemnity Corp.

J. Donald Scott, Columbia, for Esquire Mobile Homes, Inc.

Archie L. Harman, Lexington, for County of Lexington.

NESS, Justice:

The appellant, Mobile America Corporation was the owner of nine mobile homes which were attached on May 19, 1975 by the Sheriff of Lexington County under a writ of attachment. The mobile homes were stored at a commercial mobile home dealership lot operated by Esquire Mobile Homes, Inc. because Lexington County does not have county owned facilities for storage of attached automobiles, trucks and mobile homes.

The record reveals that Esquire Mobile Homes accepted attached property from the Sheriff with the understanding that the charges for storage, care and insurance would be at the rate of $3.50 per unit per day.

Within approximately three days after attachment, representatives or agents of Mobile America Corporation were notified of the attachment and of the storage charges.

On September 26, 1975, the respondent, Bank Repossessions, moved for a sale of the nine mobile homes pursuant to Section 10-928, South Carolina Code of Laws (1962) due to the continuing accrual of storage expense on the mobile home units. Prior to such motion no effort was made by Mobile America Corporation to move the mobile homes, satisfy the claim of the respondent, request the Sheriff to make other storage arrangements, or protest the storage rate charged by Esquire.

On November 28, 1975, Mobile America filed the required surety bond.

The sole issue involved is the reasonability and necessity of storage charges of these mobile homes attendant to an attachment.

The storage charges totaled $6,457.50. The special referee and the circuit court concluded that the sum was reasonable and necessary. We agree.

The first two exceptions call for the interpretation of Section 27-414(e) of the S.C.Code of Laws (1962) which provides in part:

"The fees of the Sheriff of Lexington County shall be as prescribed in this Section, except that if the fee for any service is not herein prescribed, such fee shall be as is prescribed in the general law. * * * (c) for claim and delivery, attachments, writs of assistance, distress warrants, sale of property and other pleadings and orders of seizure, the fee shall be twenty-five dollars. * * * (e) All additional expenses incurred as a necessary part of the service set forth in paragraphs (a) (b) (c) and (d) above including, but not limited to, towing fees, wrecker service, storage fees and fees for publication shall be charged at actual costs in addition to the fees set forth above."

(Emphasis added).

Appellant first asserts error in that the charges for storage greatly exceed the actual overhead attendant to this storage. It is uncontradicted that the storage was necessary and that Lexington County does not have any facilities to store mobile homes. Additionally, since Lexington County has no interest in the fee being charged, it is apparent that the actual costs to Lexington County is the amount involved in this appeal.

"As it is the duty of an officer, under a writ of attachment, to take and retain possession of the property levied on at his peril, he is entitled to reimbursement of actually necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by him in the performance of this duty."

7 C.J.S. Attachment § 293.

It is undisputed that the Sheriff's Office made several calls in an attempt to find a suitable storage place; in fact, the price agreed upon was bargained.

Attachment is purely a statutory remedy. Brewer v. Graydon,233 S.C. 124, 103 S.E.2d 767 (1958). Although attachment proceedings are generally regarded as at law, there is South Carolina authority which authorizes attachments in suits in equity. See 7 C.J.S. Attachment §§ 2(4) and 8b; Ross v. Eddins, 187 S.C. 29, 196 S.E. 375 (1938); Carolina Agency Co. v. Garlington, 85 S.C. 114, 67 S.E. 225 (1910). In any event, under the second or fourth scope...

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1 cases
  • Maynard v. Phifer, 22334
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 22, 1985
    ...This action followed. Attachment is a purely statutory remedy. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-19-10 et seq. (1976); Bank Repossessions v. Mobile America Corp., 268 S.C. 622, 235 S.E.2d 709 (1977). The statutory provisions must be strictly construed. Brewer v. Graydon, 233 S.C. 124, 103 S.E.2d 767 (1958......

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