Banks v. Board of Educ. of Letcher County

Decision Date15 April 1983
Citation648 S.W.2d 542
Parties10 Ed. Law Rep. 877 Billy K. BANKS, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LETCHER COUNTY, Kentucky; and Jack M. Burkich, Individually and as Superintendent of the Letcher County Schools, Appellees.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

Arthur L. Brooks, Lexington, for appellant.

Forrest E. Cook, Whitesburg, for appellees.

Before COOPER, HOWERTON and LESTER, JJ.

COOPER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court upholding a demotion by the appellees, the Superintendent and Board of Education of Letcher County, Kentucky, of the appellant from an administrative position as Director of Pupil Personnel to a lower paying position within the Letcher County school system. On appeal, the issues are whether the trial court erred in: (1) determining that the appellant was given the statutory notice of his demotion prior to May 15, 1981, KRS 161.760(2); (2) determining that the grounds for such demotion were specific and complete as required by KRS 161.765(2)(b)(1); and (3) determining that the appellant's demotion and transfer were not the results of arbitrary action on the part of the appellees. Reviewing the record below, we reverse and remand.

In June of 1981, the appellant, Billy K. Banks, filed this action pursuant to KRS 161.765(2)(f) and KRS 161.790(6). Specifically, he alleged that the appellees acted arbitrarily and contrary to the provisions of KRS 161.760(2) and KRS 161.765(2)(b)(1) in demoting him from an administrative position as Director of Pupil Personnel for the Letcher County Schools to a lower paying position in that school system. At the end of the 1980-81 school year, the appellant had been Director of Pupil Personnel for five (5) consecutive years, and as such was an administrator within the meaning of KRS 161.720(8) and KRS 161.765(2). Furthermore, he was a tenured teacher within the meaning of the Teachers' Tenure Act. KRS 161.720-810. The appellees answered, denying the appellant's allegations.

In November of 1981, the circuit court, sitting without a jury, heard proof presented by all parties in addition to that presented to the Board. Thereafter, it issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment, ruling that the appellant failed to prove that the appellees did not comply with the Fair Demotion of Administrators Act, and failed to sustain his burden of proof with respect to showing that the Board was not justified in its actions of demoting him. As such, it dismissed his complaint. It is from such judgment that the appellant now appeals.

Although the appellant raises three arguments in his appeal, the principal issue is whether the circuit court erred in ruling that the appellees complied with KRS 161.760(2). Specifically, the question is whether the appellant received notice of his demotion prior to May 15, 1981. Reviewing the record below, we find that such notice was lacking, and the circuit court therefore erred in ruling that the appellees complied with the statute.

The relevant facts concerning the appellant's demotion--as found by the circuit court--are as follows:

(1) During the 1980-81 school year, the appellant had been Director of Pupil Personnel for the Letcher County School Board for five (5) consecutive years. He was employed as an administrator and paid on the basis of twelve months employment.

(2) On April 24, 1981, the Board, acting through its chairman and secretary, informed the appellant that pursuant to KRS 161.765, the superintendent had recommended that he would be reassigned to classroom duty for the 1981-82 school year. Such letter indicated that although the Board noted the recommendation of the superintendent, they had taken no action on it at that time.

(3) Within ten (10) days of the receipt of the letter of April 24, 1981, the appellant responded in writing to the Board, advising it of his intention to contest the recommendation of the superintendent with respect to his demotion for the 1981-82 school year.

(4) By letter dated May 11, 1981, the appellant was advised by the Superintendent and the Chairman of the Letcher County Board of Education of the basis and grounds for his demotion. Specifically, that letter stated that there would not be available funding in the 1981-82 year for an additional Director of Pupil Personnel, barring the availability of state funds. Additionally, such letter notified the appellant that a formal hearing on his proposed demotion would be held on June 2, 1981.

(5) On June 2, the appellant, together with his counsel, appeared before the Board for a hearing on the proposed demotion. Subsequent to the presentation of proof by both the appellant and counsel for the Board, the Board went into closed session voting to demote the appellant from Director of Pupil Personnel to a classroom teacher for the 1981-82 school year and to reduce his salary accordingly.

(6) On June 12, 1981, the appellant appealed from the Board's action by filing this action in the Letcher Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 161.790(6).

(7) In August of 1981, the appellant was placed as the Principal of the Kingdom Come Elementary School for the 1981-82 school year. In this position, he received approximately $1,500 less than he would have received as Director of Pupil Personnel.

(8) In November of 1981, the circuit court, sitting without a jury, heard proof with respect to the appellant's allegations. Much of such proof centered around appellant's allegations that the Board's action was politically motivated and that the appellant had openly opposed one of the members of the Board in his bid for re-election in the fall of 1980.

Here, the appellant argues that as the Board had failed to complete action on his demotion prior to May 15, and as he was not given written notice of such demotion prior to that time, any attempted reduction in pay was void and of no effect. KRS 161.760(2), then in effect, stated as follows:

(2) Upon recommendation of the superintendent and approval of the board of education reduction of responsibility for a teacher may be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in salary; provided that written notification setting forth the specific reason or reasons for such reduction shall be furnished the teacher not later than May 15.

The appellant argues that although the superintendent made his recommendation before May 15, the Board did not act on that recommendation until June 2. Furthermore, he...

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5 cases
  • Wicker v. Board of Educ. of Knott County, Ky.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • August 14, 1987
    ...neither explicitly nor logically part of a determination of legal cause under Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 160.350. See Banks v. Board of Educ. of Letcher County, 648 S.W.2d 542 (Ky.App.1983), in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals declined to reach a claim of arbitrary action because it concluded the......
  • Banks v. Burkich, 85-5210
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • April 18, 1986
    ...the trial court and held that the defendant Board failed to provide a statutorily required notice. Banks v. Board of Education of Letcher County, 648 S.W.2d 542 (Ky.Ct.App.1983). However, the court declined to reach the merits of plaintiff's claim that the transfer was in retribution for pl......
  • Commonwealth v. Halcomb, No. 2002-CA-001308-MR (KY 5/7/2004)
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • May 7, 2004
    ...S.W.2d 828 (1977); Stafford v. Board of Education of Casey County, Ky.App., 642 S.W.2d 596 (1982); and Banks v. Board of Education of Letcher County, Ky.App., 648 S.W.2d 542 (1983)(superceded by statute, see KRS 160.390 and KRS ...
  • Estreicher v. Board of Educ. of Kenton County, Ky., 96-SC-394-DG
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • September 4, 1997
    ...the demotion prior to May 15, as Appellant claimed was required under KRS 161.760(3), KRS 161.765(1) and Banks v. Board of Educ. of Letcher County, Ky.App., 648 S.W.2d 542 (1983). Appellant also sought dismissal based on the alleged failure of the Board to state specific charges or to set a......
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