Banks v. Cotter Corp.
| Decision Date | 22 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:20-CV-01227-JAR |
| Parties | TAMIA BANKS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COTTER CORPORATION (N.S.L.), et al., Defendants. COTTER CORPORATION (N.S.L.), Third-Party Plaintiff, v. MALLINCKRODT LLC, et al., Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Sever and Remand All Non-Third-Party Claims. (Doc. 47). Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Cotter Corporation (N.S.L.) ("Cotter") responded in opposition (Doc. 58),1 and Plaintiffs have replied. (Doc. 66). Other Defendants and Third-Party Defendants have joined Cotter's opposition either in whole or in part. (Docs. 56, 60, 61, 64-65). For the reasons discussed below, this Court will grant the instant motionand sever and remand all claims except for Cotter's claim for contribution against Defendant Mallinckroft LLC ("Mallinckrodt").
It's like déjà vu all over again. On April 2, 2018, Plaintiff Tamia Banks filed an amended class action petition in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri. See Banks v. Cotter Corp., No. 4:18-CV-624 JAR, 2019 WL 1426259, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2019). The relevant underlying facts, as previously described by this Court, are as follows:
From 1942 to 1957, uranium ore was processed in association with the Manhattan Project to develop nuclear weapons in a facility in downtown St. Louis City known as the St. Louis Downtown Site ("SLDS"). (First Amended Class Action Petition ("FAP")). In the late 1940's, the Manhattan Project acquired a tract of land near Lambert Airport known as the St. Louis Airport Site ("SLAPS") to store radioactive waste from the uranium processing operations at SLDS. In 1957, "approximately sixty truckloads of contaminated scrap metal, several contaminated vehicles, in addition to miscellaneous radioactive wastes were buried on the western portion of SLAPS adjacent to Coldwater Creek," a tributary of the Missouri River which runs throughout North St. Louis County. In the 1960's, some of the radioactive waste that had been stored at SLAPS was moved to a storage site on Latty Avenue in Hazelwood, Missouri (the "Latty Avenue Site"), a part of which later became the Hazelwood Interim Storage Site ("HISS"). In the late 1960's, Cotter purchased the radioactive waste stored at both SLAPS and the Latty Avenue Site. Between 1969 and 1973, Cotter stored, processed and transported radioactive waste at the SLAPS and Latty Avenue sites. In 1973, SLAPS was sold to the Airport Authority. The Latty Avenue Site was sold to Futura Coatings, n/k/a DJR. Id. (internal citations omitted).
Banks asserted numerous state law claims, generally alleging that "as a result of Defendants' collective conduct over several decades, radioactive wastes were released into the environment in and around Coldwater Creek, resulting in contamination of her home and property, as well as the property of other classes members." Id.
Defendants promptly removed the case to this Court claiming that the action arose out of the Price-Anderson Act ("PAA"), thereby establishing federal jurisdiction. Id. at *2. The PAA wasenacted as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and sought to "encourage private sector development of atomic energy" by, among other things, "channel[ing] public liability resulting from nuclear incidents to the federal government." Id. (citing El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999)). On March 29, 2019, this Court remanded on the grounds that "a license or indemnity agreement is a prerequisite for federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the PAA." Id. at *6; see also Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC, 389 F. Supp. 3d 600 (E.D. Mo. 2019), appeal filed (No. 19-2072); Strong v. Republic Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 759 (E.D. Mo. 2017).
Following remand, the case proceeded in state court and Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Petition ("SAP"). (Doc. 1-6). On June 30, 2020, Cotter filed a Third-Party Petition seeking contribution from the Third-Party Defendants, including Mallinckrodt. (Doc. 1-7). Cotter argues that any potential damages assessed against it "were caused, in whole or in part, by the conduct, fault, acts, carelessness, omissions, and negligence of Mallinckrodt, thereby barring any such recovery against Cotter." (Id. at ¶ 73). Mallinckrodt then filed a Notice of Removal claiming this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the PAA and because Mallinckrodt acted "under color of" or at the direction of a federal officer per 28 U.S.C. § 1442. (Doc. 1). On October 12, 2020, Mallinckrodt filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay in this case per 11 U.S.C. § 362. (Doc. 46). Plaintiffs filed the instant motion the next day. (Doc. 47).
The automatic stay further complicates this already convoluted posture. According to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), Mallinckrodt's voluntary bankruptcy petition stays "the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was . . . commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy petition]." The automatic stay is "fundamental to the reorganization process, and its scope is intended to be broad." Small Bus.Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165, 167 (8th Cir. 1989). In accordance with the automatic stay, Plaintiffs' motion "does not seek any relief as to Mallinckrodt" but instead requests that this Court sever and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims against Defendants. (Doc. 46 at ¶¶ 10-13).2 For purposes of this motion, Plaintiffs effectively presume that Mallinckrodt has properly invoked this Court's jurisdiction via its Notice of Removal without waiving their right to argue otherwise. (Doc. 48 at 2 n.1). Accordingly, a detailed inquiry into the presence of federal jurisdiction over Mallinckrodt is unnecessary at this moment.3 The key question on this motion is whether, assuming such jurisdiction exists, this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims.
"[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy underArticle III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In other words, the claims must "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." OnePoint Solutions, LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 350 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
This Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims because the contribution claim against Mallinckrodt clearly stems from the same underlying facts. Plaintiffs' entire claim, as well as Cotter's claim of contribution, stems from the processing and transporting of hazardous materials in association with the Manhattan Project. See, e.g., Harbison v. Rich Gullet and Sons, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-1138 SPM, 2014 WL 5483569, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 2014) (). The parties do not dispute whether this Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, only whether it should exercise such jurisdiction.
This Court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if, among other reasons not relevant here, "the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, or . . . in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2)-(4). If one of these statutory factors is present, the Court must weigh the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity to determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). These are frequently referred to as the Gibbs factors. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Court must also consider whether either party has attempted to "manipulate the forum." Cohill, 484 U.S. at 357. Ultimately, supplemental jurisdiction "is a doctrine of discretion." City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726). Districtcourts have "broad discretion" when determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 599 (8th Cir. 2002).
It is evident that Plaintiffs' state law claims substantially predominate over Mallinckrodt's PAA and federal contractor defenses, and Cotter does not argue otherwise. As Plaintiffs note, the SAP asserts 11 claims against Defendants, all of which are premised on Missouri law. (Doc. 48 at 3; Doc. 1-6). This Court has already held that Plaintiffs' claims alone do not establish federal jurisdiction. Banks v. Cotter Corp., No. 4:18-CV-624 JAR, 2019 WL 1426259 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2019). It is only Cotter's claim for contribution against Mallinckrodt, a Third-Party Defendant, that potentially provides federal jurisdiction via Mallinckrodt's alleged federal defense. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), a careful analysis of the Gibbs factors is warranted.
This Court does not believe that there are substantial issues of judicial economy at stake, though such considerations somewhat favor remand. "It is the law in this circuit that 'the substantial investment of judicial time and resources in the case . . justifies the exercise of jurisdiction over the state claim." Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Foundation Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1242 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting North...
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