Banks v. County of Allegheny
Decision Date | 30 June 2008 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 05-781. |
Citation | 568 F.Supp.2d 579 |
Parties | Frederick H. BANKS, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY; Allegheny Correctional Health Services, Inc.; Ramon Rustin; Calvin Lightfoot; Fred Rosemeyer; Bruce Dixon; Dan Onorato; and Dana Phillips, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Frederick H. Banks, Yazoo City, MS, pro se.
J. Deron Gabriel, Stanley A. Winikoff, Winikoff Associates, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.
The above-captioned prisoner civil rights action was received by the Clerk of Court on June 6, 2005, and was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Amy Reynolds Hay for pretrial proceedings in accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4 of the Local Rules for Magistrate Judges.
The Magistrate Judge's most recent Report and Recommendation, Dkt. [122], filed on June 2, 2008, recommended that the County Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt.[110]) be granted and that the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt.[102]) be dismissed as moot because the Court recommended that the complaint be dismissed as against the Medical Defendants pursuant to the screening provisions of the PLRA. Service was made on the Plaintiff at FCC Yazoo City, Unit 2AU, Yazoo City, MS 39194. Plaintiff was informed that in accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.1.4(B) of the Local Rules for Magistrate Judges, he had ten (10) days to file any objections. Plaintiff filed objections. Dkt. [123]. The Court finds that none of the objections are persuasive and only several of them bear any specific mention.
The report recommended dismissal of the complaint against the County Defendants on two grounds: (1) that this suit was frivolous because it was repetitive of another suit Plaintiff had earlier filed in' Banks v. Hull, No. 04-1771 ( )(hereinafter referred to as "the Hull case") or, in the alternative, (2) this suit was barred by res judicata or claim preclusion. In the Hull case, Plaintiff Banks filed an IFP request which was accompanied by a proposed civil rights complaint against several defendants, none of whom are named in the case at bar. However, on August 2, 2005, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the Hull case at docket number 24, wherein Plaintiff added defendants including the following defendants who are also named in the case at bar: Allegheny County, Ramon Rustin, Calvin Lightfoot, Fred Rosemeyer and Dan Onorato. In that amended complaint in the Hull case, Plaintiff complained of a whole host of problems at the ACJ, which are substantially duplicative of the. claims raised in the case at bar.
In his first objection, Plaintiff complains that
The instant suit was filed before the amended complaint in Banks v. Hull No. 04-1771 (W.D.Pa[.]). . . . Thus, res judicata cannot apply as a basis for dismissal because the Amended Complaint in Banks v. Hull was possibly dismissed against the County Defendants because the instant suit was already pending. A dismissal on this basis would violate the due process clause because both suits as to the County defendants would have been dismissed for the same reason.
Dkt. [123] at 1. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the timing of the two suits bars the application of res judicata simply because the suit at bar was filed before the amended complaint in the Hull case, Plaintiff is mistaken as to the law. The rule is:
For purposes of res judicata, the effective date of a final judgment is the date of its rendition, without regard to the date of commencement of the action in which it is rendered or the action in which it is to be given effect.
Comment:
a. General. In order that a final judgment shall be given res judicata effect in a pending action, it is not required that the judgment shall have been rendered before that action was commenced. Nor is a judgment, otherwise entitled to res judicata effect in a pending action, to be deprived of such effect by the fact that the action in which it was rendered was commenced later than the pending action. It is merely required that rendition of the final judgment shall antedate its application as res judicata in the pending action. Thus when two actions are pending which are based on the same claim, or which involve the same issue, it is the final judgment first rendered in one of the actions which becomes conclusive in the other action (assuming any further prerequisites are met), regardless of which action was first brought.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 14 (1982). Accord Matter of Hansler, 988 F.2d 35, 38 (5th Cir.1993)() ; Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall, 398 F.Supp.2d 400, 410 (W.D.Pa.2005)() , aff'd, 236 Fed.Appx. 760 (3d Cir.2007). Accordingly, this objection does not merit rejection of the report.1
To the extent that Plaintiff's argument complains that the case at bar and the Hull case may have been dismissed on the same grounds, Plaintiff is simply wrong factually. The Hull case was dismissed against the County Defendants on the following grounds:
The allegations of the complaint never specifically mention actions taken on the part of Onorato, Rustin, Lightfoot or Rosemeyer. This alone is sufficient to dismiss the complaint against them. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir.1974)("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed, even under the liberal construction to be given pro se complaints."); Amaya v. Milwaukee County, No. 04-C-1114, 2006 WL 335437, *3 (E.D.Wis. Feb.13, 2006) () (citing, Moyer v. Hultz, No. 05-3039, 2005 WL 2994328, at *2, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27440, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2005)) (which in turn cited Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir.1998)); Hernandez v. County of DuPage, No. 96 C 8030, 1997 WL 598132, *9-10 (N.D.Ill.) ( ). Moreover, further amendment of the complaint would be futile because it is clear that Plaintiffs allegations reveal liability against Defendants Onorato, Rustin, Lightfoot and Rosemeyer based merely on respondeat superior and hence fail to state a claim against them. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988) (). Banks v. Hull, No. 094-CV-1771 (W.D. Pa. Dkt.) 174 at 22-23(R & R) & Dkt. 179 (adopting R & R). Accordingly, this objection does not merit rejection of the Report.
Plaintiff's next objection is that in another case in another court, i.e., the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, a decision was rendered that is irreconcilable with the decision herein, i.e., inmates there were awarded money damages for exposure to MRSA, and this violates Plaintiff's equal protection rights. Plaintiff is mistaken. See, e.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554-55, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962)(in which the Supreme Court declared that "We have said time and again that the Fourteenth Amendment does not `assure uniformity of judicial decisions ... [or] immunity from judicial error....'"); Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. State of Wisconsin ex rel. City Of Milwaukee, 252 U.S. 100, 106, 40 S.Ct. 306, 64 L.Ed. 476 (1920)("the Fourteenth Amendment does not, in guaranteeing equal protection of the laws, assure uniformity of judicial decisions (Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 569, 18 S.Ct. 445, 42 L.Ed. 853 (1898)), any more than in guaranteeing due process it assures immunity from judicial error"); Velador-Rivera v. Gonzales, 203 Fed.Appx. 149, 150 (9th Cir.2006)("In addition, Velador-Rivera's argument that the First and Ninth Circuits' different rules with respect to the streamlining procedure violate equal protection is foreclosed by the long-settled Supreme Court doctrine that equal protection of the law does not guarantee uniformity of judicial decisions."); Valtsakis v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1986) (); United States v. Brown, 74 F.Supp.2d 648, 651 (N.D.W.Va.1998) (...
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