Bantuelle v. Williams

• Decision Date: 02 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 05-82-00781-CV,05-82-00781-CV
• Citation: 667 S.W.2d 810
• Parties: Charles F. BANTUELLE d/b/a Charles McEntire, Appellant, v. James D. and Josephine WILLIAMS, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 810

667 S.W.2d 810

Charles F. BANTUELLE d/b/a Charles McEntire, Appellant, v. James D. and Josephine WILLIAMS, Appellees.

No. 05-82-00781-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Dallas.

Dec. 2, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 11, 1984.

Charles Bantuelle, Dallas, pro se.

George Randle Earle, Biggers, Beasley, Amerine & Earle, Dallas, for appellees.

Before AKIN, VANCE and STEWART, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Charles Fred Bantuelle appeals from a judgment in which the trial court construed a deed as a mortgage and canceled it and also awarded forfeiture of consideration paid, $1,000 in usury penalty and $2,500 in attorney's fees to Mr. and Mrs. Williams. The basis for the judgment was incorporated into a fifteen-page memorandum decision which the trial judge subsequently designated as the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Bantuelle, in twelve points of error, attacks this memorandum decision as being without support in the evidence presented at trial and argues that a judgment in his favor should have been granted by the court. We hold that the court's memorandum contains sufficient findings and conclusions based on the evidence to support the judgment and accordingly overrule all of Bantuelle's points of error. The Williamses, at oral submission, requested this court to reform the judgment to award them $2,000 in usury penalty instead of $1,000. We overrule this request for reformation because this point was not properly presented to us by cross-point. TEX.R.CIV.P. 420.

The suit arose out of a transaction concerning the homestead of Mr. and Mrs. Williams. Bantuelle contends that he purchased the home in a conditional sales transaction after the Williamses became $1,342.52 in default to their mortgage company. Mr. and Mrs. Williams contend that they borrowed money from Bantuelle on a short term loan and used their home as security.

The events surrounding the transaction are greatly disputed but they culminated in the Williamses signing a warranty deed, a seller's affidavit, an assignment of escrow, and an option to repurchase. These papers gave Bantuelle title to the property and gave the Williamses an option to repurchase the property within sixty days for $2,342.52. The Williamses contend that they did not intend to sell their home, the papers were never explained to them, and Bantuelle represented to them that he was loaning them $1,342.52 for the past due mortgage payments and that they were supposed to pay him $2,342.52, which was the amount of the loan plus $1,000 interest. Prior to the expiration of the sixty days, Bantuelle wrote the Williamses demanding that they repay the money on a day certain or vacate the premises. They made inquiries and then brought suit to have the deed canceled. The court found in favor of the Williamses and from this judgment Bantuelle appeals.

Because Bantuelle's points are often multifarious and contain material better left to the argument section of the brief, we have carefully examined his argument under each point, as we are required to do, and have answered each point as we understand his argument to be.

Memorandum Decision

Bantuelle's first two points of error are that the trial judge committed fundamental error and abused his discretion by joining the suit as a party and injecting his own legal theories into the case and that the court erred in making findings of facts which were based on, related to, or inferred from TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp.1982-1983).

We first note that although Bantuelle alleges fundamental error by the trial court, in civil matters fundamental error occurs only in extremely limited circumstances, such as when the court does not have proper jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, we will assume that Bantuelle is alleging reversible error in his first point of error and we will address it accordingly.

The thrust of Bantuelle's complaint is that the trial court erroneously based its judgment on a finding that Bantuelle had violated article 3810, which deals with the statutory notice requirements for sales under deeds of trust, and that this theory had been neither pleaded nor proved in this case.

It is apparent from a reading of the memorandum decision that the trial judge made numerous references to article 3810, sometimes in analogizing it to the public policy of the state and sometimes specifically applying it to the facts of this case. We agree with Bantuelle that article 3810 was not an issue in this case, but we disagree with his contentions that its use by the trial judge was reversible error. If a judgment is correct on any theory of law applicable to the record, this court will affirm it regardless of whether the trial court gives correct legal reasons for its decision. Maher v. Gonzalez, 380 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1964, no writ); see also Trigg v. Blakemore, 387 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (on rehearing); Home Indemnity Co. v. Giles, 392 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1965, no writ). Despite the unnecessary references to article 3810, there are sufficient recitations in the memorandum decision, supported by the evidence, to support the judgment.

The Williamses pleaded, as their first theory of recovery, that the transaction with Bantuelle was a loan secured by a deed to their home in violation of article XVI, section 50 of the Texas Constitution. Section 50 prohibits mortgages of the homestead except to secure the purchase money for, or improvements on, the homestead, and declares that all pretended sales are void. In order to support a judgment for the Williamses on their deed-as-mortgage theory, all the court was required to find was that the transaction was not intended as a sale. Sudderth v. Howard, 560 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The evidence showed that Mr. and Mrs. Williams' homestead was valued at approximately $25,000 to $30,000 and was subject to a mortgage of about $15,000. Instead of making the mortgage payments, Mrs. Williams had used the money to play bingo and had fallen behind in the payments. Norma McDowell, an acquaintance of Mrs. Williams, saw the house listed on the foreclosure list and told Mrs. Williams she knew people who would loan her money and gave her Bantuelle's card. Mrs. Williams called Bantuelle and they met to discuss the transaction. How many times they talked and exactly what they discussed was hotly contested. On the day before the house was to be sold at public auction, Bantuelle, Mrs. Williams, and Mr. Williams, who was unaware of the foreclosure proceedings, met in Norma McDowell's office. At this time Mr. Williams learned that foreclosure was imminent and, after a heated discussion, the documents were signed.

The Williamses testified that the transaction was never intended by them to be a sale, Bantuelle never represented it as a sale, they signed the documents because Bantuelle told them they had to in order to get the money, and the only money they received was a $1,342.52 cashier's check made out to the mortgage company.

Bantuelle testified that he bought the Williamses' house in a conditional sales transaction for $2,342.52, he gave them a cashier's check made out to the mortgage company, and he gave Mrs. Williams $1,000 in $100 bills without Mr. Williams' knowledge. The Williamses have remained in possession of the property at all times.

Construing the deed as a mortgage, the court found: the Williamses had fallen behind in their payments; they had sought out Bantuelle; they desired a loan; there was no independent evidence of a desire to sell; Bantuelle agreed to make a loan; Bantuelle gave the Williamses a check for $1,342.52 made out to Fort Worth Mortgage Company; $2,342.52 was to be repaid in sixty days; Bantuelle demanded and received a mortgage, pledge, or hypothecation of the borrowers' property; Bantuelle did not desire to exercise possessory rights until default; the transaction had no independent substance except as a mortgage; and the transaction was a loan transaction. These findings by the court, supported by the evidence, form a basis for judgment in favor of the Williamses that they secured a loan with a deed to their homestead in violation of article XVI of the Texas Constitution.

Bantuelle complains of six specific references made by the trial court to article 3810. Five of these concern findings by the court that the transaction was a subterfuge to circumvent the anti-forfeiture laws and one concerns a reference to public policy as expressed by article 3810. Bantuelle argues that without the "contamination" of article 3810, a judgment in his favor was fully justified. We disagree. It is apparent from a full reading of the memorandum decision that the court's judgment, though containing extraneous findings and legal theories, was based on a finding that the transaction entered into was a loan and not a sale. Because the trial court's references to article 3810 were immaterial to the judgment in favor of the Williamses, its use by the trial court was neither an abuse of discretion nor reversible error.

Deed-As-Mortgage

Bantuelle's third, sixth, and eleventh points of error all attack the trial court's classification of the transaction as a loan secured by a mortgage. He argues that the documents conclusively establish that the transaction was a conditional sale and the Williamses failed to prove otherwise. In this respect, he first contends that in order to construe a deed, absolute on its face, as a mortgage there must be some evidence that both parties intended the deed to be security for a loan. Barrera v. Gonzalez, 341 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rincon Investment Co. v. White, 54 S.W.2d 1052, 1053 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1932, writ dism'd). He argues that because the Williamses deny knowledge of signing a deed, they have failed, by their own admission, to show that they intended the deed to be...