Baptiste v. Attorney Gen. of the United States
| Decision Date | 08 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 18-16826 (KM) |
| Parties | OSCAR BAPTISTE, Plaintiff, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
The plaintiff, Oscar Baptiste, is an immigration detainee currently held at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey. He is subject to a final order of removal. He has recently written the court stating that he physically resisted being placed on a plane to Panama, his country of origin, because he did not know whether the removal order was final, and because he had certain applications pending. (DE 9) That is not a basis for resisting lawful removal. Here, however, I write to deal with a pending motion for a stay and to clarify Mr. Baptiste's status.
This is an action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service ("USCIS") to adjudicate (i.e., grant) his N-400 application for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. On February 1, 2019, Mr. Baptiste filed a motion for stay of removal pending resolution of this action. (DE 6). The United States filed a response on February 19, 2019. (DE 8) For the reasons stated herein, the application for a stay is denied.1
The petitioner, a native and citizen of Panama, was declared a lawful permanent resident in 2003. On July 27, 2007, he submitted an N-400 application for naturalization. On May 24, 2008, he was arrested on a domestic violence charge, and an order of protection was entered. (See DE 1-5 at pp. 4-11) On July 31, 2008, USCIS denied the N-400 application. (DE 8-3; DE 1-5 at pp. 13-15) Mr. Baptiste did not appeal that ruling.
On March 14, 2011, after the domestic violence matter had concluded, Mr. Baptiste filed a new N-400 application. (See DE 1-5 at pp. 23-26.) On July 28, 2011, he was arrested on charges of importing cocaine. On March 15, 2013, he was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina of importing 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 & 960(b)(2)(B)(ii), and sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment. Upon his release from prison, he was placed in ICE custody.
Removal proceedings were instituted, based upon Mr. Baptiste's conviction of an aggravated felony and a controlled substance offense. (See DE 8-1) On January 23, 2018, Mr. Baptiste moved to terminate the removal proceedings, claiming derived citizenship and stating that the denial of his earlier N-400 application was erroneous. (See DE 1 at 1-10). Mr. Baptiste acknowledges that this was "the sole issue" he raised in opposition to removal. (DE 1-1 at p. 2) Ultimately, on June 8, 2018, the motion was denied, and an order of removal to Panama was entered. (DE 1-5 at pp. 37-39; see also DE 8-6at p. 3.) On November 2, 2018, the BIA denied Mr. Baptiste's appeal, rendering the order of removal final. (See DE 8-6 at p. 3; DE 1-1 at p. 2.)
Mr. Baptiste sought review of the BIA order in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Docket No. 18-3618). The Third Circuit issued a temporary stay, but on January 17, 2019, it vacated that stay, holding that "Petitioner has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his petition for review." (DE 8-5) In short, the order of removal is final and is not currently subject to any stay.
On February 14, 2019, USCIS issued a decision denying Plaintiff's N-400 application on the basis that he is statutorily ineligible for naturalization based on the fact he is subject to a final order of removal and is an aggravated felon. (DE 8-6) USCIS also denied Plaintiff's N-336 seeking to reopen or reconsider his 2007 USCIS application as untimely. Id.
On February 1, 2019, Mr. Baptiste filed the motion that is now before the Court. (DE 6) He seeks a stay of removal until the merits of this action, in the nature of a petition for a writ of mandamus, are adjudicated.
Mr. Baptiste is subject to a final order of removal. The relief sought on this motion is that this district court stay the execution of that order of removal while the merits of this mandamus petition are being adjudicated. The government responds that, under the REAL ID Act, this district court lacks jurisdiction to enter such an order. I agree.
As part of the REAL ID Act, Congress limited the courts' jurisdiction to hear challenges to the Government's exercise of its discretion to prosecute removal proceedings. Section 1252(g), as amended, provides as follows:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commenceproceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) ()
This motion is a cause or claim on behalf of an alien who seeks to restrain the Attorney General's exercise of discretion to "execute [a] removal order[]." The REAL ID jurisdictional exclusion appears on its face to apply, as I have held in parallel contexts. See, e.g., Nkansah v. Aviles, Civ. No. 15-2678 (KM), 2015 WL 4647988 ) ( ); Borodachev v. Rodriguez, No. CIV. 13-1999 (KM), 2013 WL 1949844, ("[M]y habeas jurisdiction would not extend to the review of discretionary decisions like the denial of a stay of an order of removal that has been reviewed and has become final"); Tasci v. Tsoukaris, No. CIV. 13-2438 (KM), 2013 WL 2146901, ().2
It is true that in one case I granted a short stay of removal where the petitioner, via coram nobis, challenged the validity of the criminal conviction on which his order of removal was based. Ragbir v. United States of America, Civ.No. 17-1256, 2018 WL 1446407 (D.N.J. March 23, 2018).3 There, however, the proceeding was a phase in a criminal case over which the court unquestionably had jurisdiction, dating from long before the immigration proceedings had even commenced. The stay sought by the petitioner in Ragbir, I wrote, was part of a criminal case, 2018 WL 1446407 at *1. In such a case, I wrote, the scope of the Section 1252(g) jurisdiction-stripping provision could be limited because it Id. at *1.4
No such considerations are present here. And more fundamentally, the merits of this mandamus petition are not, like the merits of the criminal case, independent of, or readily severable from, the removal proceedings. The N-400 citizenship application is the very matter that Mr. Baptiste raised in opposition to removal, and that contention was rejected in an order upheld by the BIA.
I conclude, therefore, that I lack jurisdiction to enter the stay that is sought here.
Nevertheless, to remove doubt, I consider the factors governing the grant of a stay. Assuming arguendo that I possessed jurisdiction over this application for a stay of removal, I would not grant such a stay.
A stay "is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result . . . ." Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)). A stay is an "exercise of judicial discretion" based on "the circumstances of the particular case." Id. at 433. "[T]he traditional stay factors contemplate individualized judgments in each case." Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 777 (1987); see, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). Thus a stay is discretionary, but that discretion "is to be guided by sound legal principles," which have been distilled to four familiar factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
Nken, 556 U.S. at 426 (citing Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005); Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776); see Didon v. Castillo, 838 F.3d 313, 319 n.12 (3d Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). The first two factors are the most critical. Nken, 556 U.S. at...
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