Bar Ass'n of City of Boston v. Casey

• Decision Date: 07 January 1910
• Citation: 204 Mass. 331,90 N.E. 584
• Parties: BAR ASS'N OF CITY OF BOSTON v. CASEY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

204 Mass. 331

90 N.E. 584

BAR ASS'N OF CITY OF BOSTON v. CASEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 7, 1910

COUNSEL

Peter J. Casey, pro se.

Arthur D. Hill and Frank Sulloway, for respondent.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

This case first came before us upon a report of the justice of the superior court, made at the request of the respondent presenting all questions of law that entered into an order of disbarment of the respondent, and it was reported in 196 Mass. 100, 81 N.E. 892. After argument and due consideration a rescript was sent to the superior court, directing the entry: 'Order of disbarment affirmed.' Thereupon the respondent filed in the superior court a motion to vacate the order, and in arrest of judgment, and afterwards a motion for a new trial, and from time to time several other motions which were heard and passed upon in the superior court. The case now comes before us upon appeals, which, according to the respondent's brief, confirmed by the record, are seven in number, as follows: From the denial of motion in arrest of judgment, from the denial of motion for a new trial, from the denial of motion to amend the record, from the denial of the second motion to amend the record and the denial of the third motion to amend the record, from the disallowance of bill of exceptions, and from the allowance of motion to dismiss.

In reference to the first motion, let us look at the state of the record. On March 10, 1906, the judge filed a finding of facts, which ended in these words: 'It is ordered that the respondent, Peter J. Casey, be disbarred.' In accordance with this order, a formal order of disbarment was made on April 9, 1906. On the same day the respondent appealed. The judge in his report says he appealed from this order; but in a motion filed on August 7, 1906, the appeal is treated by the petitioner's counsel as having been taken from the order of March 10, 1906, contained in the memorandum of findings. This is not very material, as the order of each date was the same in substance. But we think we should treat the report of the judge as controlling in this particular. Certainly the order to which the report and our decision related, was the order of the later date. After this appeal, upon the request of the respondent, the judge reported the case to this court.

This order was not treated as the final entry of record, made under Rev. Laws, c. 177, § 1, which ends the jurisdiction of the court, so that an execution may be issued in ordinary cases, and leaves the court with no further jurisdiction except upon a petition to vacate the judgment, or upon a writ of review, unless the case is opened for further proceedings by action of this court on an appeal. It was an order of judgment, although it was also a judgment within the meaning of Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 96, which gives a right of appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court. Accordingly the judge rightly treated the case as still pending before him, and made a report of it to this court. In like manner, after a rescript had been received affirming the order, he treated the case as still pending in the superior court, by entertaining different motions from time to time and hearing and deciding them. The final entry of record, contemplated by Rev. Laws, c. 177, § 1, in proceedings which are ripe for judgment, seems never to have been made, and the case still awaits this entry, upon the disposition of the appeals now before us.

All the matters referred to in the motion in arrest of judgment are concluded by out former decision. The decision covered all questions of law that entered into the order and affected its validity,...