Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 24 February 1890
• Citation: 100 Mo. 22,13 S.W. 98
• Parties: BARBER ASPHALT PAVING CO. v. HUNT.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

13 S.W. 98

100 Mo. 22

BARBER ASPHALT PAVING CO. v. HUNT.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February 24, 1890.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — ORDINANCES — CONTRACTS.

1. The St. Louis city charter, art. 3, § 22, (Rev. St. Mo. 1879, p. 1584,) which prescribes that, "before the presiding officer shall affix his signature to any bill he shall suspend all other business, declare that the bill will now be read, and that, if no objection be made, he will sign the same," is merely directory; and where the journal shows that the signature of the officer was affixed in open session, and that no objection was made, the ordinance will not be declared invalid because the journal fails to show that the other formalities were observed.

2. Where both houses adjourn on the day a bill is presented to the mayor, and the bill is signed by the mayor, and filed in the city register's office, it becomes a valid ordinance, though it is not returned to the house in which it originated, as required by article 3, § 23, of the charter; as there is no provision in the charter which prescribes that no bill shall become an ordinance which shall not be returned to the house in which it originated.

3. Article 6, § 27, of the charter of St. Louis, provides that the board of public improvements shall let out work by contract to the lowest responsible bidder, subject to the approval of the council. Held, that the council is not prohibited from letting a contract for paving a street because the work prescribed by the ordinance is covered by letters patent, under which the contractor holds the exclusive right.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court.

Action by the Barber Asphalt Paving Company against Mary C. Hunt. The cause was tried without the intervention of a jury, and resulted in a judgment for plaintiffs, enforcing the lien of certain tax-bills, and from this judgment defendant appeals.

Chas. M. Napton, for appellant. Hitchcock, Madill & Finkelnburg, for respondent.

SHERWOOD, J.

The grounds upon which the defendant resists the payment of the tax-bills in suit are two: First, that the ordinances in question were not passed and approved as required by the charter; and, second, that the work provided for in the ordinances was not let as provided in section 27, art. 6, of the charter. The charter provisions in respect to passing ordinances (article 3, § 22) are as follows: "No bill shall become an ordinance until the same shall have been signed by the presiding officer of each of the two houses, in open session; and, before such officer shall affix his signature to any bill, he shall suspend all other business, declare that such bill will now be read, and that, if no objections be made, he will sign the same, to the end that it may become an ordinance. The bill shall then be read at length, and, if no objection be made, he shall, in the presence of the house, in open session, and before any other business is entertained, affix his signature, which fact shall be noted on the journal, and the bill immediately sent to the other house." 2 Rev. St. 1879, p. 1584. Defendant put in evidence the journal of the house of delegates for March 20, 1883, which, after giving in full the report of the proper committee that these two bills were truly enrolled, proceeds as follows: "The bills, as above, were read at length. No objection being made, Mr. Speaker Marriot, in the presence of the house, in open session, affixed his signature thereto, as required by the charter." Upon this fact being thus shown by the journal, the defendant contends that the charter provisions marked above in italics were not complied with, and therefore the ordinance passed is null. These provisions of the charter are copied from section 37, art. 4, of our state constitution; and upon that section it has been ruled that a bill passed by the legislature became a law where the same was signed...