Barbour v. State

• Decision Date: 07 October 1954
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 522
• Citation: 262 Ala. 297,78 So.2d 328
• Parties: John BARBOUR v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 328

78 So.2d 328

262 Ala. 297

John BARBOUR v. STATE.

6 Div. 522.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 7, 1954.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 1955.

Beddow & Jones, Roderick Beddow and Robt. W. Gwin, Birmingham, for appellant.

Si Garrett, Atty. Gen., and Robt. Straub, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the state. The oral charge is in part as follows:

'Now the second plea that the defendant interposed in this case is that of not guilty by reason of insanity. Upon that issue the inquiry is this:

'In every criminal trial where the defense of insanity is interposed, the inquiry is,

'First: Was the defendant at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, as matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of the mind, so as to be either idiotic, or otherwise insane?

'Second: If such be the case, did he know right from wrong as applied to the particular act in question? If he did not have such knowledge, he is not legally responsible.

'Third: If he did have such knowledge, he may nevertheless not be legally responsible if the two following conditions concur:

'First: If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time destroyed.

'Second: And if, at the time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product of it solely.

'Now, an irresistible impulse generated by wicked propensities will not excuse the violation of law. Depravity is not a disease. High temper, hot blood, and passion are not such mental ailments as will excuse the commission of crime. The so-called emotional insanity is not recognized as a defense in a criminal case.

'I charge you that insanity, to be a defense to a crime, must be the result of a disease of the mind and of such a nature as to dethrone his reason--in other words, he is crazy--to destroy his reason to such an extent that he cannot distinguish right from wrong, or if he can distinguish right from wrong, that the disease has such a compelling power over him that he is forced to commit a crime; that he cannot resist the impulse to commit this particular crime, because of the diseased condition of his mind, but it must be either one or other; that the disease has so destroyed his mental capacity that he cannot distinguish right from wrong and does not know that he is doing wrong, or that the disease of the mind must have so destroyed his reasoning--so undermined his mental capacity that he could not resist the impulse to do the wrongful act. The law of Alabama does not recognize temporary or emotional insanity or insane jealousy. Jealousy is no defense to crime in Alabama * * *. It must be such insanity that would destroy his reason or his mind so weakened that he cannot resist the doing of the particular act with which he is charged. And, as I said, it must be of a fixed or prolonged nature rather than momentary or fleeting; not temporary or effervescent in nature--sane one minute and insane another--more permanent than transient; more or less prolonged as distinguished from effervescent; it must be a disease of the mind in all cases and be of such nature as to destroy his reason; that he does not know right from wrong; or some mental hallucination, the result of the disease, this hallucination must be of such strong and compelling power that he can not resist the impulse to commit the particular crime with which he is now charged.

'That is the question that is submitted to you for your determination. Was this defendant, at the time of the commission of the act with which he is charged, insane as I have defined insanity to you? Was he suffering from a disease of the mind that had so dethroned his reason that he could not distinguish right from wrong, or had some mental hallucination so overpowered him--had such overwhelming power over him--that he could not resist the impulse to commit this particular crime? If so, that is a defense to crime--if either one of those conditions existed, and you are reasonably satisfied of that, he would be entitled to a verdict at your hands of not guilty by reason of insanity.

* * *

* * *

'Judge Greenleaf 'On Evidence' has said: 'In criminal cases, in order to absolve the party from guilt, a higher degree of insanity must be shown than would be sufficient to discharge him from the obligations of his contracts. In these cases, the rule of law is understood to be this: that a man is not to be excused from responsibility, if he has capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the particular act he is then doing; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject him to punishment. In order to be responsible, he must have sufficient power of memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others, and in which others stand to him; that the act he is doing is contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right, injurious to others, and a violation of the dictates of duty. On the contrary, although he may be laboring under partial insanity, if he still understands the nature and character of his act and its consequences, if he has a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and a mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment, such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him, from responsibility for criminal acts. If, then, it is proved to the satisfaction of the jury, that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be, whether the disease existed to so high a degree, that, for the time being, it overwhelmed the reason, conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner, in committing the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse; if so, then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body without the concurrence of a mind directing it.''

GOODWYN, Justice.

The appellant, John Barbour, was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder in the first degree for killing A. G. Parsons, Jr., and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant entered pleas of 'not guilty' and 'not guilty by reason of insanity.'

The evidence clearly shows that appellant shot deceased four times with a pistol, twice in the back and twice in front, thereby causing his death. Barbour did not deny firing the fatal shots.

The deceased's wife and two guests who witnessed the homicide testified that on August 23, 1952, at about 9:45 P.M., they, together with the deceased, were seated in the living room of deceased's home watching a television program. According to these witnesses, the appellant entered the house without knocking, fired two shots into the back of deceased at close range without warning, and fired two other shots as deceased arose from the chair and advanced toward appellant. As he turned to leave the house appellant said: 'My name is John Barbour. I am going to give myself up.'- The principal questions argued by counsel for appellant are, generally stated, as follows:

I. That it was error to admit evidence, over objection, concerning appellant's personal and family life for some 15 years prior to the homicide.

II. That it was error to admit in evidence, over objection, a signed statement of appellant's wife concerning matters inconsistent with her sworn testimony during the trial, that such statement was admissible only for the purpose of impeachment, but was admitted for whatever 'probative' value it might have; and that it was the duty of the court to affirmatively advise the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted.

III. That the trial court committed error in its refusal to receive evidence calculated to prove (1) the truthfulness of testimony of appellant's wife concerning her relations with deceased, after allowing the state to impeach her testimony by the admission of a prior inconsistent statement, and (2) the truthfulness of a stocking communication transmitted to appellant prior to the homicide, which it was contended was the cause of appellant's alleged insanity.

IV. That it was error to admit in evidence, over objection, articles of clothing worn by deceased at the time of the homicide.

V. That it was reversible error to charge the jury concerning the law of insanity as follows:

'And, as I said, it must be of a fixed or prolonged nature rather than momentary or fleeting; not temporary or effervescent in nature--sane one minute and insane another--more permanent than transient; more or less prolonged as distinguished from effervescent.'

I.

The evidence in support of appellant's plea of insanity appears to be based principally upon marital discord. It is insisted that he was driven to insanity because his wife was running around with the deceased and because he was not allowed to see his children. He is pictured in the testimony in his behalf as an individual who loved his wife and children very much and one who was deeply hurt by his wife's infidelity, and by his children being taken from him. The contention is that he was hurt to the point of insanity. His evidence of insanity included testimony tending to show that for several months prior to the homicide, he neglected his business, appeared to be very depressed and emotional, neglected his personal appearance and clothing, lost all interest in sports, was terribly upset about not getting to see his children, did not appear to look right, was nervous and upset, would talk about his children and start crying, was very irrational and abnormal, had lost his pride, was irritable and short spoken, was very upset over the fact that his children were not with him, talked only about his wife and children, and felt that he was always right and everybody else was wrong. These witnesses...