Barboza v. Mercedes-Benz LLC
| Decision Date | 26 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-CV-0845 AWI CDB |
| Parties | CRYSTAL M. BARBOZA, Plaintiff v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, MERCEDES-BENZ OF BAKERSFIELD, and DOES 1-10 inclusive, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO 18)
This case arises out of the sale of an allegedly defective Mercedes-Benz automobile. Following an order that granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the active complaint is the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In the FAC Plaintiff Crystal M. Barboza brings three claims under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) (15 U.S.C. § 2300 et seq.), the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.), and the California Commercial Code. Currently before the Court is Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC's (“MBU”) Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, MBU's motion to dismiss will be granted, and the FAC will be dismissed without leave to amend.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See Yoshikawa v. Seguirant, 41 F.4th 1109 1114 (9th Cir. 2022). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all well- pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). However, complaints that offer no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1145. The Court is “not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Mollett, 795 F.3d at 1065. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs cannot “rely on anticipated discovery to satisfy Rules 8 and 12(b)(6); rather, pleadings must assert well-pleaded factual allegations to advance to discovery.” Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2021). If a motion to dismiss is granted, “[the] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made . . . .” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016). However, leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. Garmon v. County of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016).
From the FAC, on August 21, 2021, Barboza purchased a Mercedes Benz CLA 250 with a VIN ending in 464 (“the Vehicle”). The sales contract shows the Vehicle was a used 2020 model year sold by Mercedes-Benz of Bakersfield (“MBB”) with 13,392 miles on it. See Doc. No. 1-2.
On January 20, 2022, Barboza took the Vehicle to Sangera Automotive Group (“Sangera”), an authorized repair facility, due to receiving a message to stop the car because of coolant issues when driving above thirty (30) miles per hour. The vehicle had 18,767 miles.
Sangera verified the issue and found that it was caused by a faulty thermostat that was stuck closed, thereby causing an insufficient flow of coolant and overheating. Sangera replaced the thermostat and coolant reservoir and returned the Vehicle on January 24, 2022.
On April 18, 2022, Barboza took the Vehicle back to Sangera due to an odd noise and an inability to accelerate over 20 m.p.h. The Vehicle had 21,344 miles. Sangera found that the shift valve of the hollow shaft had a malfunction, which necessitated the replacement of the dual clutch. Sangera replaced the dual clutch and returned the Vehicle back to Barboza on May 12, 2022.
On September 16, 2022, Barboza took the Vehicle back to Sangera for an issue with the battery. The Vehicle had 24,794 miles. Sangera replaced the battery and returned the Vehicle back to Barboza on September 30, 2022.
Barboza was not charged for any of these repairs, which were covered by the manufacturer's warranty.
With respect to the MMWA claim, MBU argues that this claim should be dismissed because Barboza has failed to cure any of the deficiencies identified as part of the last motion to dismiss. The FAC provides no facts that demonstrate Barboza provided a reasonable opportunity to comply with warranty obligations. Further, there are no allegations that demonstrate a violation of state warranty law, and the allegations merely parrot the statutory language of the MMWA. There is no explanation of the terms of any written warranty how the problems experienced breached the terms of any warranty, or how Defendants may have breached their obligations under any warranty.
With respect to the UCL claims, MBU argues inter alia that none of the three possible UCL theories are plausibly alleged. First, there are no violations of other laws that would support “unlawful” conduct against MB U.Second, the FAC fails to meet Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraudulent claims. Third, there are no allegations that explain how any “unfair conduct” outweighs any benefits the conduct may bestow. Further, where the claimed unfair conduct has not been shown to be unlawful or required by law, there is no unfair conduct.
With respect to the third cause of action, the FAC alleges a violation of Cal. Comm. Code § 2725, but that section merely sets a statute of limitations. Moreover, the FAC contains no allegations that explain the relief sought, what violation may have occurred, or to which Defendant the claim is against. There are simply no details alleged, including the existence of a written warranty or a breach thereof. If anything, the FAC indicates that Barboza presented her car for repair on three occasions and the problem was fixed each time. To the extent that Barboza is attempting to allege a separate cause of action, such an attempt is unsuccessful because the California Commercial Code merely defines what statements create express warranties.
Finally, MBU argues that Barboza did not follow the Court's directives because she continued to incorporate all prior allegations by reference and did not differentiate between the acts and liability of MBU and co-Defendant Mercedes Benz of Bakersfield.
With respect to the MMWA claim, Barboza argues that the MMWA does not require state law warranty claims in any capacity. MBU is misreading cases regarding the nature and scope of the MMWA. The MMWA retains the scope of remedies of the underlying state law without adopting the substance of it. The mere fact that an MMWA claim has been pled without a California Song-Beverly Act claim does not result in the failure of the MMWA claim. Further, the FAC alleges pre-suit opportunities to cure. The fact that MBU was notified of the defects in the Vehicle each time it received a warranty claim from its service-dealership is self-evident. That is, MBU received notice when the Vehicle was taken to Sangera for repair.
With respect to the UCL cause of action, the Vehicle was purchased with the understanding that the warranty provided would result in repair and remedy of defects. However, the Vehicle was taken in three separate times for defects and was in the possession of the repair facility for 45 days. This conduct resulted in Defendants breaching the MMWA, thus satisfying the “unlawful” prong of the UCL. Also, for purposes of the “unfair” prong, Barboza argues that because it took 45 days to remedy three defects, she has shown a sufficient “gravity of harm” to shift the burden to MBU to demonstrate the utility of its conduct. There is also sufficient allegations that show that the repair orders did not give sufficient notice of their rights under the MMWA. Finally, there was fraudulent conduct involved because the warranties provided both give the impression that vehicle will be functional and that any warrantable repairs will be done without keeping the vehicle out of the buyer's hands for an unreasonable amount of time.
Finally, Barboza argues that she properly incorporated all prior paragraphs by reference because the unlawful prong of the UCL is satisfied by showing a violation of another law. Further, Barboza states that she cannot distinguish at this time whether one or both Defendants were the sole offenders of each cause of action, so she continues to allege joint responsibility.
The MMWA “provides a cause of action for express and implied warranty claims under state law.” Floyd v American Honda Motor Co., 966 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2020). Specifically, the MMWA permits “a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligations under [the MMWA], or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service...
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