Barcroft v. State

• Citation: 111 N.E.3d 997
• Decision Date: 03 December 2018
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-135
• Parties: Lori BARCROFT, Appellant (Defendant) v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff)
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

111 N.E.3d 997

Lori BARCROFT, Appellant (Defendant)

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff)

Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-135

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: April 24, 2018

Decided: December 3, 2018

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Valerie K. Boots, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Stephen R. Creason, Larry D. Allen, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05-1704-CR-844

Massa, Justice.

The jurisprudence of the insanity defense in Indiana—spanning nearly two centuries—is deeply rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition, marked by periodic policy changes to the standards for evaluating criminal responsibility. Throughout this evolution, one principle stands the test of time: Whether the defendant meets the standards of insanity is a question for the trier of fact, that "sole sentinel in the protection of both the rights of the accused and the welfare of society." Hill v. State , 252 Ind. 601, 616–17, 251 N.E.2d 429, 438 (1969). And in rendering its judgment, the factfinder—whether judge or jury—may consider all evidence relevant to the defendant's mental state. Id.

In this case, all three mental-health experts concluded that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions. No lay witnesses offered opinion testimony. The trial court rejected the insanity defense and relied on evidence of the defendant's demeanor in rendering its verdict of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). Because the factfinder may discredit expert testimony and rely instead on other probative evidence from which to infer the defendant's sanity, we affirm the trial court's GBMI conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

Born in 1965, Lori Barcroft grew up as an only child. The product of a generally stable family environment, she described her formative years as "great" and free of any physical or emotional abuse. Court's Ex. A, p. 4. She advanced through public school as an average student and, upon graduation, attended college where she studied nursing and psychology. Although she soon withdrew from her full-time studies to marry and raise a family, she continued with her coursework for the next twenty years, balancing several jobs along the way.

By the early 2000s, Barcroft's marriage had failed, leaving her in a state of depression. She sought counseling and underwent periodic mental-health evaluations on an outpatient basis. But other than ADHD, medical records indicate no formal diagnoses of a psychiatric disorder. Still, her cognitive faculties continued to wane. And, in 2007, Barcroft—living then with her son, Jordan Asbury, and his wife Tamia—began to exhibit increasingly odd behavior. According to Asbury, his mother described seeing messages on the refrigerator, she became obsessed with the color of cars, and she often rambled nonsensical codes. This behavior progressively worsened after her father died in 2010.

Concerned with his mother's deteriorating mental health, and fearful for Tamia's life, Asbury confided in Jaman Iseminger, a pastor at the family's church. Pastor Jaman believed Barcroft needed prayers and hospitalization. And he urged Asbury to have his mother leave the home. Indeed, Barcroft moved out sometime in early 2012 to live with her mother.

Two or three months later, on the morning of May 19, 2012, Pastor Jaman was working in his church office. He had arrived early, having arranged to meet Jeff Harris, a church volunteer planning to lead a workshop that day. Just before 7:00 a.m., as Harris was preparing coffee in the church kitchen, he noticed someone walking alongside the building outside, dressed in black clothing and carrying a backpack.

Harris went outside to find this person—later identified as Barcroft—peering into a window of the church basement. When he approached her, Barcroft asked if Pastor Jaman was there. Harris reentered the church to find the pastor in his basement office, unaware that Barcroft had followed him into the building. With the pastor in tow, Harris then led the way back to where he had left the visitor. As they ascended the basement stairs, Barcroft stood waiting above at the landing. Harris walked past her, unsuspecting and without comment. Suddenly, a single gunshot shattered the early-morning silence. Harris turned to find Barcroft pointing a gun in his direction, commanding him to "Go. Go." Tr. Vol. II, p. 119.

Harris fled to safety as two more gunshots rang out. From the parking lot, he saw Barcroft run, "crouched down" along the building, and then disappear between two houses across the street. Tr. Vol. II, p. 123. Lisa Walden, another church volunteer, also witnessed Barcroft flee while covering her head with the hood of her black sweatshirt. Moments later, Pastor Jaman emerged from the church, gasping for help as he staggered and then collapsed to the ground. By the time Harris and Walden reached him, Pastor Jaman had lost consciousness. The twenty-nine-year-old clergyman died soon after, having suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the chest.

When police arrived, a K-9 unit led them to a nearby area overgrown with vegetation. Barcroft, fully hidden under the brush, lay motionless despite an officer's order for her to surrender. On the second command, when police threatened to shoot, she finally emerged from her hiding spot. Quiet, calm, and cooperative with the officers, Barcroft relinquished her weapon and submitted to arrest. "I'm the one you're looking for," she told police. Tr. Vol. II, p. 142.

With Barcroft in custody, the lead detective informed her of the investigation and advised her of her Miranda rights. When asked if she understood these rights, Barcroft responded that she did. She then gave her statement, without prompting or questioning from the detective. The long, often unintelligible monologue that followed described a world in which Pastor Jaman—as part of a larger conspiracy involving drug smuggling and human trafficking by officials from the highest levels of the federal government—had plotted to kill her and her family. The pastor, she insisted, was an agent of the Mexican mafia who intended to "pick off" her family members "one by one," leaving her no choice but to kill him. Defendant's Ex. A1, p. 9. Still, Barcroft swore that she was "not some sort of murderer," noting that she had "actually planned on not getting caught." Defendant's Ex. A at 9:05:28–31, 9:05:36–37.

The State charged Barcroft with murder and sought a sentencing enhancement for the use of a firearm. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2012) (murder); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11 (2012) (sentencing enhancement). Barcroft invoked the insanity defense and waived her right to a trial by jury.¹

Three mental-health experts testified at Barcroft's bench trial: court-appointed psychiatrist Dr. George Parker, court-appointed psychologist Dr. Don Olive, and defense psychologist Dr. Stephanie Callaway. All three experts concluded that Barcroft was legally insane at the time of the offense and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions. No expert found evidence of feigning or malingering.

Several eyewitnesses also testified at trial: the responding officers, the lead detective, and Harris and Walden. These witnesses—none of whom knew Barcroft prior to the day of the crime—testified only to the defendant's demeanor before, during, and just after the shooting.

The trial court judge found Barcroft GBMI,² sentencing her to fifty-five years with five years suspended to mental-health probation. While acknowledging Barcroft's "complex delusions," the court ultimately concluded that she understood the gravity of her crime. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 104, 107. In reaching this decision, the court relied on evidence of Barcroft's demeanor: her sophisticated plan to commit the crime, her self-restraint in waiting for Pastor Jaman at the church, her decision to spare the life of an eyewitness to the shooting, her later escape and attempt to hide, her cooperation with police, and her stated intent of avoiding arrest. The court also found that Barcroft had a "separate and conflicting motivation" for the crime, a motivation to avoid scrutiny of—and possible detention for—her mental illness because of Pastor Jaman's advice to her son.³ Id. at 104.

A divided Court of Appeals reversed. Barcroft v. State , 89 N.E.3d 448, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), vacated . The majority, relying on this Court's decision in Galloway v. State , 938 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 2010), concluded that—absent evidence of malingering and because of Barcroft's history of mental illness and the unanimous expert opinion—"the demeanor evidence relied on by the trial court simply had no probative value." 89 N.E.3d at 457. The dissent, however, would have affirmed in deference to the factfinder, concluding that Barcroft's "demeanor, behavior, and statements before, during, and immediately after the crime," supported "a reasonable inference of sanity." Id. at 458.

We granted the State's petition to transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). Additional facts follow in our discussion below.

Standard of Review

A factfinder's determination that "a defendant was not insane at the time of the offense warrants substantial deference from" an appellate court. Galloway , 938 N.E.2d at 709. On review, we do not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, or disturb the factfinder's reasonable inferences. Myers v. State , 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1074 (Ind. 2015). We will instead affirm the trial court's conviction unless "the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed." Thompson v. State , 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004).

Discussion and Decision

To convict a criminal defendant, the State must prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Ind. Code §...