Payne v. State
| Decision Date | 18 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-313 |
| Citation | 144 N.E.3d 706 |
| Parties | Jesse L. PAYNE, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 18A-CR-1359
Our criminal legal system rests on the basic assumption that humans are rational agents of free will with the ability to exercise conscious choice in their everyday actions. So, when an individual possesses "sufficient mental capacity to fully comprehend the character and consequences of a criminal act," the law holds him responsible accordingly. Goodwin v. State , 96 Ind. 550, 563 (1883). The corollary to this maxim holds that "mental unsoundness does not merely mitigate the offence but excuses it." Id. at 576. That is, a person is not responsible for his conduct "if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense." Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a) (2019).
The defendant here has long suffered from acute mental illness, having spent most of his life under psychiatric care for chronic paranoid schizophrenia
and delusional disorder. After confessing to burning down two bridges (and attempting to burn another), he spent the next eleven years undergoing competency restoration before standing trial, only to be found guilty but mentally ill (GBMI)1 by a jury and sentenced to the maximum aggregate term of ninety years in prison—all despite expert consensus that he was legally insane.
Because the State presented insufficient demeanor evidence with which to rebut both the unanimous expert opinion and Payne's well-documented history of mental illness, we reverse the GBMI conviction to find him not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). On remand, we instruct the trial court, upon the State's petition, to hold a hearing for Payne's involuntary commitment under Indiana Code section 35-36-2-4.
In 2005, the State charged then thirty-five-year-old Jesse Payne with two counts of arson, accusing him of burning down two of Parke County's historic landmarks: the Bridgeton Covered Bridge in 2005 and the Jeffries Ford Covered Bridge in 2002. Payne also stood accused of the attempted 2005 arson of the Mansfield Covered Bridge. The State supplemented these charges with a habitual-offender enhancement. The trial court found him incompetent to stand trial until 2016. At his jury trial two years later, Payne asserted the insanity defense. Three court-appointed mental-health experts—two psychiatrists and a psychologist—unanimously concluded that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia
and delusional disorder, rendering him unable to distinguish right from wrong. Despite this expert unanimity, the jury rejected the insanity defense, finding Payne GBMI on all counts.
The trial court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Payne to the Department of Correction for the maximum allowed by statute: twenty years for each count with a thirty-year enhancement for his habitual-offender status—each sentence to be served consecutively for an aggregate term of ninety years.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the demeanor evidence of Payne's deliberate, premediated conduct was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that he was sane at the time of his offenses, despite expert opinion to the contrary.2
On review of a GBMI verdict, this Court will affirm the trial court's decision "unless ‘the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.’ " Barcroft v. State , 111 N.E.3d 997, 1002 (Ind. 2018) (citation omitted). We do "not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment." Thompson v. State , 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). And while the factfinder's determination "that ‘a defendant was not insane at the time of the offense warrants substantial deference,’ " Barcroft , 111 N.E.3d at 1002 (citation omitted), the inferences drawn by the factfinder from the evidence at trial must be "reasonable and logical," Thompson , 804 N.E.2d at 1149.
In Barcroft , this Court affirmed the defendant's GBMI conviction for the murder of her family pastor, citing her "deliberate, premeditated conduct in the weeks and days leading up to the crime," along with her efforts to avoid detection of her criminal conduct during and after the crime. 111 N.E.3d at 1005. This "evidence of Barcroft's demeanor—taken together with the flaws in the expert opinion testimony and the absence of a well-documented history of mental illness—was sufficient to support an inference of sanity." Id. at 1008.
In distinguishing this case from Barcroft , Payne argues that evidence of his insanity "is overwhelming," a finding confirmed by each of the court-appointed experts. Appellant's Br. at 27. And "in light of his chronic schizophrenia
and fixed delusion," he insists, evidence of his demeanor is simply "not probative of sanity." Id. at 20. To affirm the GBMI verdict, he contends, would conflict with the holding in Barcroft , effectively creating an "impossible standard of review." Pet. to Trans. at 17.
We agree.
I. Absent conflict in expert opinion, Payne's long and well-documented history of mental illness clearly supports a finding of insanity.
A defendant pleading insanity bears the burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, of proving that affirmative defense. I.C. § 35-41-4-1(b) (2017). And the factfinder, whether judge or jury, may consider all relevant evidence in reaching a verdict. Barcroft , 111 N.E.3d at 1002–03. This evidence may include testimony from expert witnesses, proof of the defendant's demeanor at the time of the offense, and the defendant's history of mental illness. Id. at 1003, 1008.
Here, the evidence leads only to the conclusion that Payne was insane at the time he committed the offenses.
Mental-health experts, whether retained by the parties or appointed by the court, offer their opinions on a defendant's mental condition to assist the factfinder in deciding whether the defendant was insane at the time of the offense. Id. at 1003. Expert opinion is "purely advisory" and a factfinder may discredit their testimony, or disregard it completely, in lieu of other probative evidence. Id. Still, experts are "central to a determination of insanity." Id. And their opinion that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense offers "a strong justification for raising the insanity defense" to begin with. Id. (citation omitted).
Here, all three court-appointed experts—two psychiatrists and a psychologist—unanimously opined that Payne suffered from paranoid schizophrenia
and delusional disorder. Dr. Ashan Mahmood testified that "the records have been quite consistent" in showing Payne's "long term mental illness," an illness accompanied by a "pattern of delusions, hallucinations, non-adherence to medications," and psychiatric treatment. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 74–75. Payne's schizophrenia
and delusional disorder, Dr. Mahmood opined, ultimately precluded him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offenses. The other two experts, Dr. Rebecca Mueller and Dr. Jeffrey Huttinger, likewise concluded that Payne was legally insane when he committed the offenses. And Dr. Huttinger further explained that Payne's demeanor, though superficially normal to a casual observer, was not necessarily inconsistent with schizophrenia when his actions were "driven by some type of delusion." Id. at 112–18.
In Barcroft , as in this case, all three mental-health experts testified that the defendant was legally insane, unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions at the time of the crime. 111 N.E.3d at 999–1000. The Court, however, found several "flaws" and "inconsistencies" in the experts' opinions. Id. at 1008. Conflicting diagnoses, inadequate document review, deficient psychiatric evaluations, and other issues, the Court concluded, "support[ed] the trial court's rejection of Barcroft's insanity defense." Id. at 1006–08.
The record here, by contrast, reveals no discrepancies in diagnosis, no deficiency in evaluations, and no other substantive issues with the experts' opinion. To be sure, Dr. Mahmood testified that he "d[id] not have a very strong opinion" of whether Payne "appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct" at the time of the 2005 arson. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 92–93. But this uncertainty arose in part from the comparatively stronger symptoms of psychosis
Payne demonstrated at the time of the 2002 arson. Regardless, while conflicting expert testimony may create a presumption of sanity, a "conflict does not exist " when "one or several experts testify that the defendant was insane" and "another expert testifies that he or she is unable to give [such] an opinion" or, as here, a "strong" opinion. See
Galloway v. State , 938 N.E.2d 699, 710 (Ind. 2010) (emphasis added). See also
Lawson v. State , 966 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (same), trans. denied .
In short, this unanimous expert opinion laid a solid foundation for establishing Payne's insanity. And the lack of "flaws" or "inconsistencies" in this expert opinion lends strong support to this conclusion. Cf. Barcroft , 111 N.E.3d at 1006–08.
When, as here, there is no conflict in expert opinion, there must be other probative evidence from which to infer the defendant's sanity. Id. at 1003. This may include evidence of the defendant's demeanor at the time of the offense. Id. This evidence, which centers on the defendant's actions and statements, may sufficiently prove the defendant's sanity, even...
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