Bardascini v. Reedy

• Decision Date: 18 March 1976
• Citation: 51 A.D.2d 271,381 N.Y.S.2d 151
• Parties: John J. BARDASCINI, Appellant, v. James H. REEDY, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 151

381 N.Y.S.2d 151

51 A.D.2d 271

John J. BARDASCINI, Appellant, v. James H. REEDY, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 18, 1976.

Richard A. Insogna, Amsterdam, for appellant.

Simon, Trieble & Werner, Ballston Spa (Robert S. Trieble, Ballston Spa, of counsel), for respondent.

Before KOREMAN, P.J., and SWEENEY, KANE, MAHONEY and LARKIN, JJ.

OPINION FOR AFFIRMANCE

KANE, Justice.

The defendant is a Town Justice of the Town of Galway, Saratoga County, and the action against him is one for damages for false arrest and imprisonment. It appears that on May 16, 1972 plaintiff became the subject of a complaint of trespass and harassment lodged against him by a neighbor. The appropriate accusatory instruments were prepared by a Deputy Sheriff, with the complainant's assistance, in the office area of defendant's home designated for the conduct of judicial business. Plaintiff voluntarily arrived there at about the same time, but the sequence of what occurred thereafter is somewhat cloudy and is largely disputed by the parties. It is clear, however, that while in this office area plaintiff was summarily held in contempt of court by the defendant and was committed to the county jail for a period of five days. He secured his release therefrom on the following day by means of a writ of habeas corpus and thereafter commenced the instant action upon which Special Term has granted summary judgment in defendant's favor dismissing the complaint.

At issue on this appeal is whether the rules of judicial immunity preclude plaintiff's action. It is well-settled that a judge is immune from civil liability for acts done in the exercise of his judicial function and that this immunity extends to judges of courts of limited jurisdiction (Austin v. Vrooman, 128 N.Y. 229, 28 N.E. 477; Lange v. Benedict, 73 N.Y. 12; Seneca v. Colvin, 176 App.Div. 273, 162 N.Y.S. 834; 32 N.Y. Jur., Judges, § 38). It is plain that defendant here purported to act as a judge and not in any private capacity. The question remains, however, whether his commitment of the defendant was done in the exercise of his judicial function.

Plaintiff appeared in a criminal action which had been commenced against him in a Town Court and there is no dispute that defendant, as a judge of that court, was authorized to conduct further proceedings in relation thereto (CPL 1.20, subds. 16, 17, 18). Although not a court of record (cf. Judiciary Law, § 750), a justice of a Town Court does have subject matter jurisdiction to summarily punish criminal contempts according to article 19 of the Judiciary Law (UJCA, §§ 210, 212, 2005). The error contained in the warrant of commitment which specified conviction of criminal contempt under section 215.50 of the Penal Law as a reason for detention, although it supplied grounds for plaintiff's release from custody in the habeas corpus proceeding, is as immaterial to the present inquiry as the dispute over whether plaintiff's conduct amounted to acts constituting...