Barfield v. State
Decision Date | 19 September 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 61323,61323,1 |
Citation | 586 S.W.2d 538 |
Parties | Stanley Eugene BARFIELD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Curt Beckcom, Austin, on appeal only, for appellant.
Patricia A. Elliott, Dist. Atty. and Jorge A. Solis, Asst. Dist. Atty., Abilene, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ONION, P. J., and ODOM and DALLY, JJ.
This is an appeal from a conviction for driving while intoxicated wherein punishment was assessed at a $50.00 fine and thirty days in jail. Appellant's sole ground of error is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the complaint and information against him in accordance with the provisions of Article 32A.02 V.A.C.C.P., known as the Speedy Trial Act.
On March 27, 1978, a complaint and information were filed accusing appellant of driving while intoxicated. On November 15, 1978, appellant filed a motion to set aside the complaint and information because of failure to comply with Art. 32A.02, supra. The court held a hearing on the motion and overruled it, noting that the reason the case had not been called sooner was the overcrowded condition of its docket. The district attorney stated that he was ready for trial at that time and had been ready for trial since March 27. He stated this was the first time he had been able to announce ready because this was the first time the case had been called for trial. Upon having his motion to dismiss overruled, appellant pled nolo contendere to the charge and had his punishment assessed.
Article 32A.02, supra, stated in pertinent part:
This Court in Wade v. State, 572 S.W.2d 533 held that the time periods provided for in the Speedy Trial Act will run from the Act's effective date, July 1, 1978, for cases pending on that date. The instant case was pending on July 1, 1978 and was called for trial well beyond the applicable 90 day period. If this delay was caused because "the state (was) not ready for trial" then, under the terms of the Act, the case should have been dismissed. Appellant maintains that the word "state" includes the trial court and that the complaint and information should have been dismissed when the court was not ready to try the case within 90 days.
The right of an individual to prompt adjudication of any criminal charges against him has long been an ideal and goal of our legal system and is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. For most of the nation's history this right to a speedy trial has been enforced through judicial interpretation of those constitutional principles. See, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In recent years, however, there has been a trend toward enactment of specific time limitations within which action must be taken on criminal matters. The federal experiment in this field has been the most visible. As early as 1971 the federal courts of the Second Circuit were operating under a court-promulgated plan to expedite criminal trials. United States v. Salzmann, 417 F.Supp. 1139 (D.C.1976). In 1972, an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required each district court to prepare a plan for the prompt disposition of criminal cases. Rule 50(b), F.R.Cr.P. In 1974 Congress enacted a federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.A., Secs. 3161, et seq., which was to be phased in over a number of years by means of still more separate and distinct "Interim" and "Transitional" Plans and to take full effect on July 1, 1979. These speedy trial schemes, while all directed toward the expedition of criminal trials, represented different approaches to the problem.
Courts in the Fifth Circuit adopted a plan which required that:
"(t)rial of a defendant held in custody solely because he is awaiting trial Shall commence within 90 days following the beginning of continuous custody." (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Methven, 547 F.2d 896, 897 (5th Cir. 1977). This rule did not lead to wholesale dismissal of cases due to a provision which stated the trial court may grant continuances for "any period of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances." United States v. Rodriguez, 497 F.2d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1974). A delay caused by an exceptionally congested court docket was held to be just such a circumstance. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
United States v. Rodriguez, 497 F.2d at 176.
This holding was reaffirmed in Methven, supra. Thus, even this strictly worded speedy trial requirement could be thwarted by an overly crowded court docket.
The Second Circuit plan addressed itself not to the whole trial process by declaring that the trial itself shall commence within a certain period, but instead was aimed at the "government" and required it to "be ready for trial" within a six month period. United States v. Salzmann, 417 F.Supp. at 1152.
United States v. LaCruz, 441 F.Supp. 1261, 1267 (S.D.N.Y.1977).
This plan did not attempt to include the courts at all.
The federal Speedy Trial Act puts mandatory limits on all stages of the criminal trial process including filing of the indictment or information and arraignment. The federal act also uses the trial "shall commence" standard seen in the Fifth Circuit plan. It addresses the question of crowded court dockets by specifically commanding that no continuance shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar. 18 U.S.C.A., Sec. 3161(h)(8) (C).
There were, then, at least these three speedy trial schemes from the federal sector available for examination when the Texas Speedy Trial Act was formulated and enacted. The Texas Speedy Trial Act states that the court shall set aside an indictment information, or complaint "if the state is not ready for trial" within certain time limits. It thus appears that the Texas act is of the type of speedy trial scheme that addresses itself to prosecutorial delay rather than the judicial process as a whole. This is particularly true given that we would expect the drafters of the act to have been familiar with the scheme used in the Fifth Circuit which was directed at the whole judicial process and with the federal act which was even more sweeping. The draftsmen could easily have used language which would have included the courts in its terms, but instead chose to declare that dismissal would ensue if "the state" was not ready for trial.
There is further evidence in the act itself that indicates the Legislature was addressing itself to prosecutorial delay rather than delay resulting from the judicial process itself. As Judge Clinton pointed out in his concurring opinion in Ordunez v. Bean, Tex.Cr.App., 579 S.W.2d 911, 916-17:
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