Barfield v. Stevens Mercantile Co.
| Decision Date | 10 March 1910 |
| Parties | BARFIELD v. STEVENS MERCANTILE CO. et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Kershaw County; Ernest Gary, Judge.
Action by Sidney Barfield against Stevens Mercantile Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.
E. D Blakeney and T. J. Kirkland, for appellants. McLaughton & Tatum, for respondent.
Plaintiff claims to be a public cotton weigher at Bethune in Kershaw county, S. C., under Act Feb. 2, 1906 (25 St. at Large, p 137), entitled "An act to provide for the election of a cotton weigher at Pickens courthouse and at Bethune, S. C and to prescribe their duties and fix their compensation," and seek to enjoin defendants, who are merchants and cotton buyers, from interfering with plaintiff in the discharge of his duties as such public cotton weigher, and from weighing any cotton marketed at Bethune, S.C. It is not claimed that defendants interfere with plaintiff as cotton weigher in any way, except that in the conduct of their business as merchants and cotton buyers they weigh the cotton purchased by them without presenting it to be weighed by the plaintiff, thereby depriving him of the emoluments of his office. Appellants contend, first, that the act mentioned is void as special legislation, in conflict with article 3, § 34, subd. 11, of the Constitution, forbidding the enactment of a special law where a general law can be made applicable. It is contended that this does not present a judicial question; that it is wholly within the discretion of the Legislature to determine whether a general law can be made applicable. This court has not as yet finally determined the question, as will appear by reference to Buist v. City Council, 77 S.C. 273, 57 S.E. 862, and Township Commissioner v. Buckley, 82 S.C. 357, 64 S.E. 163. My views have been fully expressed in Burnett v. Israel, 61 S.C. 215, 39 S.E. 967, and State v. Hammond, 66 S.C. 219, 44 S.E. 797. In this last-named case the court was unanimous in affirming a judgment of the circuit court quashing a prosecution under a statute, on the ground that it was special legislation. If the act was not subject to judicial review, there should have been a reversal. It seems very clear to me that whether a statute violates a mandatory provision of the Constitution is essentially a judicial question. That a general statute can be made applicable is demonstrated by the fact that sections 1552-1555, Civ. Code 1902, as amended by Act Feb. 24, 1906 (25 St. at Large, p. 140), are attempted to be made applicable throughout the state. We think the act of February 2, 1906 (25 St. at Large, p. 137), cannot be construed as a special provision in a general law or as amending a general law, as there was no general law on the subject covering Kershaw county at the time of its enactment. The act of February 2, 1906, upon which plaintiff plants his right is in terms and effect a special and local statute, upon a matter as to which a general law clearly can be made applicable, and is therefore void. Nor can plaintiff maintain his case by referring his right to be public weigher in Kershaw county to the statutes (section 1552 et seq.) sought to be made general by act of February 24, 1906, as it appears he was not elected public weigher as required by such statutes.
The contention that the statute unduly abridges the constitutional right of the citizen in the conduct of his private business to sell...
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