Barhite v. Town of Dewitt

• Decision Date: 18 November 2016
• Citation: 42 N.Y.S.3d 502,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07782,144 A.D.3d 1645
• Parties: In the Matter of Dale BARHITE, Peter Hooser, Salvatore Stassi, Dana Vinch and Patrick Tousley, Petitioners–Respondents, v. TOWN OF DEWITT, Town Board of Town of Dewitt, Police Commission of Town of Dewitt, Edward M. Michalenko, Town Supervisor of Town of Dewitt and James C. Hildmann, Chief of Police of Town of Dewitt, Respondents–Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

144 A.D.3d 1645
42 N.Y.S.3d 502
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 07782

In the Matter of Dale BARHITE, Peter Hooser, Salvatore Stassi, Dana Vinch and Patrick Tousley, Petitioners–Respondents,
v.
TOWN OF DEWITT, Town Board of Town of Dewitt, Police Commission of Town of Dewitt, Edward M. Michalenko, Town Supervisor of Town of Dewitt and James C. Hildmann, Chief of Police of Town of Dewitt, Respondents–Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Nov. 18, 2016.

42 N.Y.S.3d 503

Cerio Law Offices, Syracuse (David W. Herkala of Counsel), for Respondents–Appellants.

Marilyn D. Berson, Newburgh, for Petitioners–Respondents.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., LINDLEY, DeJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

144 A.D.3d 1646

Petitioners are police officers who were formerly employed by the Village of East Syracuse, which dissolved its police department. The Village entered into an amended intermunicipal contract with respondent Town of Dewitt, wherein the two municipalities agreed that the functions of the Village Police Department would be transferred to the Town, and that the Village would transfer five police officers from its police department to the Town police department “at the salary step and grade based upon their years of service with the Village.” The Town assigned each petitioner a salary step that was at a lower seniority level than warranted by that petitioner's length of service. The DeWitt Police Benevolent Association filed a grievance pursuant to the Town's collective bargaining agreement and demanded arbitration thereon. That grievance remained pending arbitration throughout this proceeding. Petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to compel respondents to place them in the seniority level that corresponds with their years of service, with credit for the time they were employed by the Village. Respondents appeal from a judgment, denominated a decision and order, in which Supreme Court granted the petition, concluded that respondents acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and directed them to award each petitioner seniority credit for each year of service as a Village police officer.

Contrary to the contention of respondents, the court properly concluded

42 N.Y.S.3d 504

that Civil Service Law § 70(2) requires respondents to award petitioners full seniority credit for the time that they served as police officers in the Village. Initially, we note that respondents have abandoned on appeal their contention that section 70 does not apply to the transfers herein (see Ciesinski v. Town of Aurora, 202 A.D.2d 984, 984, 609 N.Y.S.2d 745 ). They contend only that the statute does not require them to grant petitioners year-for-year credit for their prior service in the Village. We reject that contention. In pertinent part, the statute mandates that “[o]fficers and employees transferred to another governmental jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision shall be entitled to full seniority credit for all purposes for service rendered prior to such transfer in the governmental jurisdiction from which transfer is made” (§ 70[2] ). When interpreting a statute, the statute's “[w]ords ... are to be given their plain meaning without resort to forced or unnatural interpretations” (Castro v. United Container Mach. Group, 96 N.Y.2d 398, 401, 736 N.Y.S.2d 287, 761 N.E.2d 1014 ; see Matter of Orchard Glen Residences

144 A.D.3d 1647

& Carriage Homes v. Erie County Indus. Dev. Agency, 303 A.D.2d 49, 51, 755 N.Y.S.2d 159, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 511, 766 N.Y.S.2d 165, 798 N.E.2d 349 ) and, therefore, in general, “unambiguous language of a statute is alone determinative” (Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98 ; see Matter of Washington Post Co. v. New York State Ins. Dept., 61 N.Y.2d 557, 565, 475 N.Y.S.2d 263, 463 N.E.2d 604 ). In addition, in reviewing a related statute, the Court of Appeals has noted that the purpose of Town Law § 153 is “to place the transferee squarely in the shoes of the officer who has served all such time in the town to...