Baril v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers
Decision Date | 28 October 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 3561.,3561. |
Citation | 352 S.C. 271,573 S.E.2d 830 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Marolyn L. BARIL, Appellant, v. AIKEN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTERS, Respondent. |
Herbert W. Louthian, Sr., and Deborah R.J. Shupe, both of Columbia, for appellant.
Richard J. Morgan and Reginald W. Belcher, both of Columbia, for respondent.
Marolyn L. Baril appeals the Circuit Court's order granting summary judgment to Aiken Regional Medical Centers (Hospital) on Baril's action for breach of employment contract. We reverse and remand.
Baril joined Hospital's nursing staff in 1986. She earned a master's degree in nursing administration from the University of South Carolina in 1990. The following year, Baril was named director of Hospital's emergency department. Baril resigned from that position for personal reasons in 1992, but continued as a staff nurse in the emergency department. Holly Martinez de Andino eventually succeeded Baril as director of Hospital's emergency department. John Arnold1 and Martinez de Andino indirectly supervised Baril.
In early 1993, Baril began teaching nursing classes on a part-time basis at the University of South Carolina's Aiken campus (USC Aiken). She joined the faculty on a full-time basis later that year.
Baril received an "Associate Handbook" from Hospital in May of 1997. She signed an acknowledgment form provided by Hospital, indicating she would familiarize herself with the handbook and that she understood the handbook "constitute[d] the personnel policies of [Hospital] and that [she was] governed by them." The handbook and acknowledgment form contained disclaimer language:
(Emphasis added). Additionally, the handbook's "Recruiting and Hiring" section included similar language:
However, the acknowledgment form states that "the information in [the] handbook is subject to change/revision" and "any change will be communicated through the usual channels."
The handbook incorporated a detailed, progressive disciplinary procedure. Two categories of offenses were specifically identified. The categories were bifurcated: (1) actions meriting immediate termination; and (2) actions warranting termination for continuous violations.
In July of 1998, Martinez de Andino disciplined Baril for allegedly slamming a door in Arnold's face and disagreeing with Hospital's management regarding a management issue.2 Baril was first suspended and later given a "final" written warning. Yet, the handbook's procedure mandated use of a "final" written warning only after two previous warnings. Baril had not previously been warned or disciplined.
Baril asked Hospital to change her work status from full-time to part-time in November 1998. She continued to teach full-time at USC Aiken.
Baril initiated a grievance pursuant to Hospital policy. Hospital's chief executive officer, Richard H. Satcher, investigated Baril's complaint and found sufficient cause to purge the disciplinary action from Baril's employment file. As a condition to purging her employment file, Satcher required Baril and Martinez de Andino to meet with Hospital's director of human resources, Richard Lowe, and director of nursing, Mary Ann Angle. The purpose of the meeting was to "clarify understandings and expectations" regarding Baril and Martinez de Andino's working relationship.
In January of 1999, Baril met with Martinez de Andino, Lowe, and Angle to discuss problems between Baril and Martinez de Andino. During the meeting, Baril expressed concern that Martinez de Andino had targeted Baril for termination which Martinez de Andino intended to accomplish using the disciplinary procedure. Lowe responded that Hospital had updated pertinent portions of its employee handbook to prevent the disciplinary procedure from being abused to eliminate employees and to ensure that it would only be used to positively impact its employees.
Lowe delivered a copy of the new policy to Baril. Regarding its purpose, the policy stated:
(Emphasis added). The new policy provided: "Discipline is an instrument for changing unacceptable performance or behavior, and for providing motivation and encouragement for disciplined associates."
The new policy described four general categories of disciplinary offenses, ranging in degree of seriousness from greatest (critical offenses) to least (minor offenses). The category of "critical offenses" included actions that constituted "serious violations of rules or associate misconduct which justify immediate termination without regard to the associate's length of service or prior conduct." The new policy contained various examples of critical offenses. It specified in section 2.2.2 of HR116 that actions of "[d]ishonesty, fraud, theft (regardless of the amount), [or] unauthorized removal of hospital property" were examples of critical offenses.
At the end of the meeting, Baril and Martinez de Andino signed a document identifying "expectations" concerning Baril's and Hospital's obligations to each other. The details of the document consisted of expectations related to performance and communications.
On July 6, 1999, Baril suffered injuries when a cabinet fell on her while at work. She immediately sought treatment for injuries involving muscle strain, subperiosteal hematoma, and an impinged nerve. Baril filed an accident report and claim for Workers' Compensation benefits at the time of the accident.
Four days after her accident, on July 10, 1999, Baril traveled to Tacoma, Washington, for a vacation. When Baril arrived, she received a telephone message indicating Hospital called her sister in an effort to contact Baril. In response, Baril called Hospital on its toll-free number and asked to speak to someone in her department. After a brief conversation with a coworker, Baril asked the coworker to transfer her call to her sister's home in Aiken. Baril informed her sister that she had arrived in Washington safely, and asked why Hospital wanted to talk to her. Baril's sister offered to call Hospital to ask why it had contacted her to try to reach Baril. However, Baril declined her sister's offer.
According to telephone company records, the call lasted thirty-two seconds. No evidence exists in the record concerning the cost of the call or whether Hospital sustained any economic loss as a result of the call.
Baril returned from vacation on July 17, 1999. When she reported to work the following day, Baril was told to meet with Arnold and Martinez de Andino. At the meeting, Baril learned that by using Hospital's toll-free number for personal use, she violated section 2.2.2 of Hospital Policy HR116, which cites "[d]ishonesty, fraud, theft (regardless of amount), unauthorized removal of hospital property," as "critical offenses" justifying immediate termination. Baril offered to pay for the telephone call, but Arnold refused to accept payment and informed her she was being terminated. Baril exited the premises a short time thereafter.
Baril filed this cause of action averring (1) Hospital created a contract of employment between Baril and itself through its written employee handbook, its amendments to the handbook, and its conduct regarding the handbook's policies, particularly the mandatory language of the disciplinary procedure in HR116 and verbal assurances provided by Lowe during the January 1999 meeting; (2) Hospital breached the contract between Baril and itself by wrongfully terminating her; and (3) Hospital violated S.C.Code Ann. § 41-1-80 (Supp.2001) by terminating Baril in retaliation for filing a Workers' Compensation claim. Baril sought $403,508 in actual damages, plus costs and other just and proper relief.
Hospital answered, generally denying Baril's allegations and claiming it "acted in good faith" when dealing with Baril's discipline and termination. Hospital specifically asserted that Baril was...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Schmidt v. Courtney
...in light most favorable to non-moving party). If triable issues exist, those issues must go to the jury. Baril v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., 352 S.C. 271, 573 S.E.2d 830 (Ct.App.2002); Young v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 333 S.C. 714, 511 S.E.2d 413 Summary judgment is appropriate wh......
-
Montgomery v. CSX Transp., Inc.
...330 S.C. 332, 499 S.E.2d 488 (Ct.App.1998). If triable issues exist, those issues must go to the jury. Baril v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., 352 S.C. 271, 573 S.E.2d 830 (Ct.App.2002); Young v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 333 S.C. 714, 511 S.E.2d 413 Summary judgment is not appropriate ......
-
Hughes v. Oconee Cnty.
...for breach of an employment contract, has striking similarity to the case at bar. In examining the appropriateness of summary judgment in Baril, this Court explained: A party injured by the acts of another is required to do those things a person of ordinary prudence would do under the circu......
- State v. Follin, 3559.
-
Chapter V Claims Arising Out of Contract or Quasi Contract
...201 S.E.2d 388 (1973)).[197] Shiftlet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 451 F.Supp.2d 763, 774 (D.S.C. 2006).[198] Baril v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., 352 S.C. 271, 285, 573 S.E.2d 830, 838 (Ct. App. 2002).[199] Id.[200] Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 317 S.C. 520, 536, 455 S.E.2d 183......
-
A. Damages Generally
...text.[94] Lyons v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co, 415 S.C. 115, 781 S.E.2d 126 (Ct. App. 2015); Baril v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., 352 S.C. 271, 285, 573 S.E.2d 830, 838 (Ct. App. 2002); see also Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 480, 90 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1955) ("It is the undoubted general rule th......
-
A. Duty and Breach of Duty
...462, 419 S.E.2d 215 (1992); Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 300 S.C. 481, 388 S.E.2d 808 (1990) [Small II]; Baril v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctr., 352 S.C. 271, 573 S.E.2d 830 (Ct. App. 2002) (jury issue as to whether plaintiff made reasonable efforts to mitigate). See infra Chapter 8, Section A, s......
-
V. Insurer's Limit of Liability and Measure of Damages
...228 S.C. 472, 480, 90 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1955); see also Moore, 360 S.C. at 262, 599 S.E.2d at 478.[55] Baril v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., 352 S.C. 271, 285, 573 S.E.2d 830, 838 (Ct. App. 2002).[56] Newman, 228 S.C. at 480, 90 S.E.2d at 653.[57] Hutson v. Cummins Carolinas, Inc., 280 S.C. 552, ......