Barilla v. Clapshaw

Decision Date02 January 1976
Docket NumberNo. 45408,45408
Citation306 Minn. 437,237 N.W.2d 830
PartiesAnthony T. BARILLA, Appellant, v. Kenneth CLAPSHAW, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

When it appears from the affidavits and relevant documents before the court that pursuant to a settlement plaintiff released defendant from all liability for the claim he later brought suit for, and when it further appears that there is no genuine issue as to this fact, summary judgment for defendant is appropriate. Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure.

David W. Nord, Wozniak & Finley, and John T. Finley, St. Paul, for appellant.

Patrick F. Sullivan and Edward A. Towey, St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard before OTIS, PETERSON, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

PETERSON, Justice.

Plaintiff sustained personal injuries in an automobile collision on July 6, 1972, allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant. His lawyer negotiated a settlement with defendant on April 24, 1973, in the amount of $3,250. 1 As part of the settlement, plaintiff executed a release 'fully and foreover releas(ing) and discharg(ing)' defendant 'from all claims for all damages' sustained by plaintiff in that accident. 2 The release contained this additional language:

'I expressly intended and agree that this release applies to all of my claims arising from said accident, including, but not limited to, claims for known, unknown, latent, developed and undeveloped injuries; anticipated and unanticipated consequences, and known and unknown developments of any of such injuries; and claims as respects the nature, extent and permanency of any of such injuries.'

In February 1974 plaintiff commenced an action for injuries allegedly resulting from the July 6, 1972, collision, seeking damages in the sum of $80,000. Defendant, answering the complaint, pled the release and moved for summary judgment.

The district court judge granted summary judgment. Plaintiff, appealing from that judgment, acknowledges that parties may bargain to accept the risk of mistake as to unknown injuries, but he argues that whether they have done so presents a question of fact not determinable by summary judgment.

As provided in Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be rendered if the affidavits and the relevant papers before the court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. No such genuine issue of fact appeared in this case; the entry of summary judgment was appropriate.

The issue raised in this case was whether the parties contemplated in their release contract that the defendant was to be released from claims for unknown injuries as well as known injuries. What the parties to a contract have agreed upon is, of course, a question of fact which must be inferred from the available evidentiary facts. Thus, if there is no genuine dispute as to these evidentiary facts, and if reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether the agreement contemplated a release as to unknown injuries, then the first test of the summary judgment standard is satisfied.

The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The defendant bore his burden in this case by exhibiting the instrument of release together with an affidavit from his attorney showing that plaintiff was injured on July 6, 1972; that on April 24, 1973, for a valuable consideration, plaintiff executed the release which on its face included claims for unknown injuries; that the plaintiff first inquired into avoiding that release on August 26, 1973; that at all times both prior to and at the time of the release, plaintiff had the advice of a physician and legal counsel of his own choosing; that there was no allegation that plaintiff was at any time incompetent to execute the release; and that plaintiff's lawyer actively engaged in negotiating the consideration paid to him for the release.

Plaintiff's countering affidavit from his attending physician did nothing to demonstrate there was any genuine issue as to whether the release covered unknown injuries. Dr. James Bellomo, the physician, averred that he had treated plaintiff following the date of the collision. His last report, prior to the date of settlement, was on December 20, 1972, at which time he gave a diagnosis of 'acute lumbrosacral strain' and various other injuries. It was his opinion at that time that, despite some residual pain, plaintiff was gradually recovering and that no permanent disability was expected. As a result of a reexamination and consultation with other physicians in September 1973, Dr. Bellomo thereafter diagnosed plaintiff's condition as being an intervertebral disc problem at L4 with 25 percent partial disability. Dr. Bellomo concluded that this was an injury unknown at the time of settlement and that it was an independent injury, not merely a consequence of the lumbrosacral strain previously...

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11 cases
  • PJ Acquisition Corp. v. Skoglund, C3-88-1368
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • March 9, 1990
    ...showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn.1982); Barilla v. Clapshaw, 306 Minn. 437, 439, 237 N.W.2d 830, 831 (1976). Whether the past practice of the corporation in acquiring its own stock was done for corporate purposes, as app......
  • Coester v. HHB CO.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
    • March 20, 1978
    ...(8th Cir.1976). Here, defendant bore his burden by exhibiting the instrument of release together with affidavit. Barilla v. Clapshaw, 306 Minn. 437, 237 N.W.2d 830 (1976). The release is clear and unambiguous, and therefore permits no jury consideration of extrinsic evidence. Redel's Inc. v......
  • Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • April 8, 1982
    ...meeting of the minds, and are supported by valid consideration. See Olson v. Ruglowski, 277 N.W.2d 385 (Minn.1979); Barilla v. Clapshaw, 306 Minn. 437, 237 N.W.2d 830 (1976); Jeffries v. Gillitzer, 302 Minn. 402, 225 N.W.2d 17 (1975); Tupper v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 156 M......
  • Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Mygrant
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 25, 1982
    ...is relevant and material to the terms of the contract. Conversely, as the Minnesota Supreme Court observed in Barilla v. Clapshaw (1976), 306 Minn. 437, 237 N.W.2d 830, 832: "To say that a mistake as to the true extent of injuries will avoid a release of claims for unknown injuries is tanta......
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