Barker-Chadsey Co. v. W.C. Fuller Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1983
• Docket Number: BARKER-CHADSEY
• Parties: COMPANY v. W.C. FULLER CO., INC. et al. 1
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 1283

448 N.E.2d 1283

16 Mass.App.Ct. 1

BARKER-CHADSEY COMPANY v. W.C. FULLER CO., INC. et al. ¹

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,

Bristol.

Argued March 11, 1983.

Decided May 13, 1983.

Robert S. Mangiaratti, Mansfield, for plaintiff.

Paul M. Rockett, Attleboro, for Claire Quintin et al.

Before GRANT, KAPLAN and DREBEN, JJ.

KAPLAN, Justice.

The defendant W.C. Fuller Co., Inc. (Fuller), a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the retail hardware business in the town of Mansfield, had for some years purchased merchandise at wholesale from the plaintiff Barker-Chadsey Company (Barker), a Rhode Island corporation. Claire Quintin and Girard Quintin (added as defendants, as will appear) were the sole officers, directors, and shareholders of Fuller and conducted the business. On May 9, 1975, Fuller owed Barker $37,721 ($25,817 principal, $11,904 interest) for goods bought. On that date Fuller, by Claire Quintin, as treasurer, executed a promissory note in that amount in favor of Barker, and at the same time executed a security agreement covering the Fuller inventory. In February, 1977, the note being in default, Barker brought an action against Fuller in the Superior Court to foreclose on the security and recover on the note. The inventory was yielded up voluntarily and at that point Fuller's active business ceased. ² Barker realized $9,639 by private sale.

Barker learned, perhaps after the sale, that, because of Fuller's failure to file annual reports or to pay franchise taxes, it had been dissolved on September 11, 1969, by judgment under G.L. c. 156B, § 101 (as then in effect), upon the application of the State Secretary. Accordingly Barker amended its complaint in May, 1979, to add a claim against Claire Quintin, personally, on the note, and an alternative claim against Claire Quintin and her husband Girard Quintin, both personally, for goods sold. The Quintins answered with denials and the case was referred to a master for report, "facts final."

In his report, the master, after hearing, found certain of the main facts as recounted above, and other facts as follows. There was an indebtedness of Fuller to Barker of only $798 on September 11, 1969. When Claire Quintin executed the note as treasurer on May 9, 1975, ³ she did not know that Fuller had been dissolved; she believed the corporation was ongoing, and she did not intend to make the note as an individual. She stated her belief at the hearing before the master that the annual "corporate certificate of condition" (apparently referring to the annual report required by G.L. c. 156B, § 109) had been filed but she did not know for which years. The master found that the last corporate tax return filed for Fuller was for the fiscal year ended on June 30, 1975, but it was not filed until some time in 1978. ⁴ Fuller has not been "revived" under G.L. c. 156B, § 108 (set out in note 9, infra ).

As to Barker, the master found that when it took the note it did not know of the dissolution of Fuller in 1969. In extending credit to Fuller, and later in taking the note, Barker was relying on Fuller and not on the Quintins individually; for security it was looking to the corporate assets of Fuller and not to the individuals.

The master concluded that the Quintins were not liable, but that Fuller was liable for the balance of the note plus interest, costs, and expenses of collection including counsel fees (as provided in the note).

On cross-applications to adopt and to modify the master's report, the judge adopted its conclusion in substance that the Quintins were not liable personally, but he did charge them as trustees in Barker's favor to the extent of any property they might hold or control and to which Fuller would be entitled if revived. ⁵ From the judgment, Barker appeals.

Barker, as appellant, looks into the well of history to find a theory for holding the Quintins personally. Barker argues that when Claire Quintin signed the note as treasurer of Fuller, there was no such corporation; hence she had no principal which she could represent as agent, and it followed that she must be personally responsible. The claim that Girard Quintin is liable finds explanation along the same line.

All this is reminiscent of Fay v. Noble, 7 Cush. 188 (1851). There it was assumed that the organizers (shareholders) of the West Boston Iron Company had failed to comply with the requisites of law in attempting to form that corporation, and one of the questions put was whether they might be considered as partners regarding a transaction that had been carried out by the chief shareholder acting as "general agent." The court by Justice Bigelow thought that, in the absence of a fraudulent intent, it would be unfair to fasten on the organizers a responsibility as partners not contemplated or assented to by them. Instead the court was prepared to hold that the individual who had been active in the particular business was the only one responsible--this on the theory that he was an agent without a principal and so must himself be regarded as the principal. ⁶

The approach of the Fay court was formal. On a functional analysis it might be seen that, if it was unfair to cast unanticipated liabilities on the organizers who were not active in the transaction, then it would be also unfair to charge with like liability an agent who was acting for them. There would be reason to inquire whether the party who had dealt with the agent had done so on the understanding, shared with the agent, that liability was corporate without recourse against any of the organizers. If that was the mutual understanding, without misrepresentation or any other such reprehensible element, the party could not complain when in the end he fared no worse than he would have done, had the corporation been properly formed. The result thus indicated, however, would be impeached if there was some provision of law evincing a policy that required firm compliance with those conditions for lawful incorporation which had been neglected or flouted. That should be most important. The approach to the problem just outlined would, we think, be natural today. ⁷

The present case involves not a fractured corporation, but one that has been dissolved. The approach should be similar. It counts in favor of the Quintins that there was originally, and through the episode of the note, a shared understanding of the parties that liability was corporate, not individual, and there is no indication of any manipulative purpose on either side. To find whether there is a countervailing policy, we go to the statutes dealing with the dissolution and revival of corporations.

Upon dissolution of a corporation--as in Fuller's case, for failure to file reports or to pay taxes--"some dormant germ of life" ⁸ is continued for three years for the purpose of permitting the windup of the affairs of the corporation and its final liquidation, "but" (so says G.L. c. 156B, § 102, as appearing in St.1965, c. 685, § 44) "not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established," save, perhaps, as far as may be needed for orderly rather than precipitous liquidation. For one reason or other, however, active business in fact may have been carried on after a judgment of dissolution: in the present case, the corporate officer was simply ignorant of the fact of dissolution. In such situations the officers (among other interested parties) may apply to the State Secretary for "revival" of the corporation.

The revival statute says that reinstatement may be allowed on terms: it may be on the condition, and no doubt this is the usual one, that back taxes be paid. The effect of revival is stated in § 108 to be that "all acts and proceedings of its [corporation's] officers, directors and stockholders, acting or purporting to act as such, which would have been legal and valid but for such dissolution, shall, except as aforesaid [apparently referring to revival on terms], stand ratified and confirmed." ⁹ See Massachusetts Lubricant Corp. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 305 Mass. 269, 25 N.E.2d 719 (1940). Application for revival may be made without limit of time. ¹⁰

Revival under § 108 has the usual effect of confirming, as corporate acts, the acts of corporate officers in the interim before revival, and correspondingly, of relieving the officers of personal liability. ¹¹ Just so, in Frederic G. Krapf & Son v. Gorson, 243 A.2d 713 (Del.1968), the defendant Gorson, president of a "one-man corporation," had inadvertently failed to have the annual reports filed and franchise taxes paid, and unknown to him the corporate charter was forfeited. As president, Gorson thereafter entered into a contract with the plaintiff, both parties intending the obligation to be that of the corporation. Suit was brought against Gorson personally. The Supreme Court of Delaware held, applying a statute similar to our § 108, ¹² that Gorson was relieved of personal liability by reason of the revival of the corporation. The policy of statutes of the Massachusetts and Delaware type is highlighted and emphasized by the existence of some statutes elsewhere which take a different tack and declare, in effect, that corporate revival shall not affect the personal liability of officers for acts following dissolution. See Moore v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn., 591 F.2d 991, 995 (4th Cir.1979) (Virginia statutes); Futch v. Southern Stores, Inc., 380 So.2d 444 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thoss, 385 So.2d 726 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Panax of Florida, Inc. v. Publishers Serv. Corp., 472 F.Supp. 444 (S.D.Fla.1979). ¹³

It can be argued with reason that, to take the benefit of the lenient approach of § 108, the Quintins should have gone through the revival procedure at an earlier stage, that the limit of tolerance for the Quintins was reached not later than a reasonable time after they got notice through Barker's amended complaint that Fuller had been dissolved. Yet §...