Barker v. Barker

• Decision Date: 05 June 1900
• Citation: 28 So. 587,126 Ala. 503
• Parties: BARKER ET AL. v. BARKER.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

28 So. 587

126 Ala. 503

BARKER ET AL. v. BARKER.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 5, 1900

Appeal from chancery court, Pike county; W. L. Parks, Chancellor.

Action by R. C. Barker and others against Clara A. M. Barker. From a decree of the chancellor sustaining the sufficiency of the defendant's plea, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

E. R Brannen and Watts, Troy & Coffey, for appellants.

Foster Samford & Carroll, for appellee.

DOWDELL J.

The appeal in this case is prosecuted from the decree of the chancellor sustaining the sufficiency of respondent's plea to that part of the complainants' bill seeking the specific performance of an antenuptial contract made by respondent with the father of complainants. This contract is made an exhibit to the bill, and by its terms the respondent in consideration of $500 to be paid her by G. W. Barker, the other contracting party, whom she had promised to marry (the preamble to said contract reciting "that, whereas, a marriage is contemplated and intended to be had between said parties," etc.), consented and agreed to waive and relinquish each and all of her rights in and to any of the property, real or personal, of her intended husband, the said G. W. Barker, which she might otherwise have as his said wife during his life, and as his said widow after his death. The bill avers that the contemplated and intended marriage was consummated, and that after the marriage the $500 was paid by the said Barker to the respondent. The said marriage took place on the day of the date of said contract now sought to be enforced, to wit, January 4, 1897, and the said Barker died on the 1st day of April, 1899, about two years after said marriage. Letters of administration were issued to the respondent by the probate court of Pike county upon the estate of said Barker, and proceedings were commenced in said court to set apart a homestead and exemptions under the statute to the respondent, as the widow of said deceased, and thereupon the present bill was filed.

The plea of the respondent admits the execution of the contract by the respondent, but denies that the contract is fair and just in its terms, or that it is such a contract as should be specifically enforced by a court of equity. Among other things, it is averred in the plea that the contract was handled to her to be signed just a few minutes before the marriage ceremony; that she did not know its contents, and did not think it necessary to read it over, having full confidence in her intended husband, and believing that it was a contract made by him (he having signed first) securing to her a gift of $500 which he had several times promised to make her after their marriage, if she would marry him; that he had never in any of their conversations concerning their proposed marriage, and when the matter of his intended gift to her of $500 was mentioned, suggested or intimated any such thing as a waiver or relinquishment by her of any of her marital rights in his estate during his life or after his death. By reason of her confidence in her intended husband, and his repeated representations of his intended gift to her of the $500, and the time and circumstances under which she signed the said contract, it is averred that undue advantage was thereby taken of her. It is also averred in the plea that her said husband at the time of their marriage was seised and possessed of an estate worth $10,000, consisting of lands worth $6,000, and $4,000 worth of personal property, and that he died seised and possessed of this same property, and that it was of the same value (viz. $10,000) at the time of his death. It also appears both from the bill and the plea that said Barker at the date of the marriage was 87 years old, and the respondent a widow 60 years of age; and it is also averred in the plea that the respondent had no estate of her own at the time of the marriage and at the death of her said husband, G. W. Barker.

On the foregoing statement of facts, the vital question in the case and presented at the very threshold, is, is this contract, which these complainants, as the heirs at law of G. W. Barker, deceased, now ask to have specifically performed, perfectly fair, just, and equal in its terms and circumstances? 3 Pom. Eq. § 1405. The contract and the situation of the parties must be such that the remedy of...