Rieger v. Schaible
Decision Date | 05 March 1908 |
Docket Number | 15,049 |
Citation | 115 N.W. 560,81 Neb. 33 |
Parties | AMELIA RIEGER, APPELLEE, v. CARRIE SCHAIBLE ET AL., APPELLANTS. [*] |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Richardson county: WILLIAM H KELLIGAR, JUDGE. Reversed.
REVERSED.
Reavis & Reavis, for appellants.
Clarence Gillespie and Edwin Falloon, contra.
This appeal involves the validity of an antenuptial contract entered into December 11, 1897, by and between Henry Rieger a widower, and Mrs. Amelia Lawler, a widow. The agreement was acknowledged, and its material portions follow:
Each party was the owner of real and personal property when the above contract was made, and each then had children living, the issue of a former marriage. The parties were married three months after the execution of the agreement, and lived together as husband and wife until the death of Henry Rieger on February 7, 1905. No children were born of their marriage. Henry Rieger left personal property worth $ 17,560.13, and six lots in Falls City, Nebraska, valued at $ 3,500, two of which were occupied by deceased and his wife as a homestead. During the settlement of his estate in the probate court his widow made application, in pursuance of the statute, for an allowance for her support and maintenance. The heirs objected on the ground that the antenuptial contract was a bar to the allowance claimed by Mrs. Rieger. The probate court adjudged the agreement void, and ordered payment of the allowance as prayed. The district court, on appeal, affirmed the order of the probate court, and the heirs bring the case here for review.
The widow (appellee) contends that the order allowing support from her husband's estate is not appealable, citing Estate of James' v. O'Neill, 70 Neb. 132, 97 N.W. 22. This case does not support appellee's contention that an order allowing a widow an allowance is not subject to review. It was there held that an appeal would not lie from the district court to the supreme court in such matters; the proper remedy being a writ of error, which was not issued in that case. The O'Neill case did not declare the law to be that an order allowing the widow support from her husband's estate was not subject to review in any manner. We have not heretofore determined the question whether an order granting a widow an allowance is subject to review in the appellate courts. We are not now dealing with a mere temporary or interlocutory order. The court below granted the application of the widow, set aside the antenuptial contract, and allowed the full sum prayed for in her petition. This much of the estate of the deceased was distributed. We think such an order is a final order, and is appealable by virtue of section 42, ch. 20, Comp. St. 1907, which provides: "In all matters of probate jurisdiction, appeals shall be allowed from any final order, judgment, or decree of the county court to the district court by any person against whom any such order, judgment, or decree may be made or who may be affected thereby." The general rule seems to be that an appeal lies from the judgment of the probate court granting or refusing an allowance to the widow out of the estate of her deceased husband. 18 Cyc. 402, note 86; Dame, Probate and Administration, sec. 425. See, also, Forwood v. Forwood, 86 Ky. 114, 5 S.W. 361.
Appellee contends that the agreement is void and not a bar to dower, and, being void for this reason, is void in toto, and does not affect the widow's right to support during the settlement of the estate. If the agreement in judgment here does not bar dower, it follows, as we view it, that it does not intercept the widow's allowance, and we shall therefore examine the question whether the agreement is sufficient to bar dower of the appellee in the lands of her deceased husband. At common law the right of dower could not be waived or lost by an antenuptial agreement. Gibson v. Gibson, 15 Mass. 106, 8 Am. Dec. 94; Hastings v. Dickinson, 7 Mass. 153, 5 Am. Dec. 34; Blackmon v. Blackmon, 16 Ala. 633; Gould v. Womack, 2 Ala. 83; Logan v. Phillips, 18 Mo. 22. Two reasons were assigned by the courts to support the common law rule: (1) The settlement being executed before marriage, the demand of dower had no existence, and no right can be barred before it accrues. (2) No right or title to a freehold estate can be barred by a collateral satisfaction. 14 Cyc. 939.
The antenuptial agreement being insufficient at common law to bar dower, the next inquiry is as to its validity under the following provisions of our decedent statute (Comp. St. 1897, ch. 23), in force at the time the agreement herein was made:
The agreement before us does not fall within the provisions of our statute. No jointure was settled upon the wife. She received no freehold estate in the lands of her intended husband by virtue of the antenuptial contract. The agreement was not intended to operate as a legal jointure, and, under the statute, she was not barred of her dower. If the statutory method of barring dower is exclusive, the antenuptial contract herein is void. Fellers v Fellers, 54 Neb. 694, 74 N.W. 1077. We are of opinion, however, that the true rule is that such agreements are regulated by statute, and are void unless executed in accordance with the written law, except in equity, or, as stated by this court in Fellers v. Fellers, "in the...
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