Barker v. Fox, 13988

Decision Date01 November 1977
Docket NumberNo. 13988,13988
Citation238 S.E.2d 235,160 W.Va. 749
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesCarl Edwin BARKER v. Hon. Fred L. FOX, II, Judge Circuit Court, Marion County, et al.

Syllabus by the Court

Except for willful, intentional fraud the law of this State does not permit the court to go behind an indictment to inquire into the evidence considered by the grand jury, either to determine its legality or its sufficiency.

George R. Higinbotham, Higinbotham, Jones & Higinbotham, Fairmont, for relator.

Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., Richard E. Hardison, Deputy Atty.Gen., Pamela Dawn Tarr, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for respondents.

NEELY, Justice:

Relator Carl Edwin Barker was indicted by the grand jury of Marion County during the March 1977 term of court for the crimes of breaking and entering and entering without breaking. Mr. Barker moved to quash these indictments in the Circuit Court of Marion County, arguing that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally insufficient to support the indictments, because it consisted exclusively of hearsay testimony. For the purpose of this opinion we may assume that characterization to be accurate. The Circuit Court overruled the motion to quash. Mr. Barker then applied to this Court for a writ of prohibition which would prevent the respondents from prosecuting him under the challenged indictments. We find no grounds for relief.

This case presents a very important question of criminal procedure. Courts in West Virginia are continually urged to recognize objections to indictments based upon the nature of the evidence presented to the grand jury, even though the rule in West Virginia prevents courts from considering such objections or undertaking an inquiry into the nature of the evidence laid before the grand jury. This rule is stated succinctly in the case of State v. Dailey, 72 W.Va. 520, 79 S.E. 668 (1913):

The law of this state does not permit the court to go behind an indictment to inquire into the evidence considered by the grand jury, either to determine its legality or its sufficiency. [72 W.Va. at 520, 79 S.E. at 668.]

Over the years this rule has withstood many challenges and was still basically intact as recently as 1975, when the Court in State v. Slie, W.Va., 213 S.E.2d 109 (1975) reaffirmed and adopted for its first syllabus point the following language from State v. Riley, 151 W.Va. 364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1966):

A motion or prayer to quash an indictment contained in a plea in abatement with an allegation that no legal evidence was introduced before the grand jury is not good grounds for quashing an indictment.

Since the opinions in the recent cases, Slie and Riley, contain almost no discussion of the rule, it may reasonably be inferred that the Court considered the rule well-settled. It is necessary, therefore, to look to the earlier cases for a detailed explanation of the rule's underlying rationale. State v. Dailey, 72 W.Va. 520, 79 S.E. 668 (1913) contains a particularly good explanation:

[The grand jury] is the body entrusted with the power to say when a crime has been committed, and when a prosecution should be begun against the person whom the evidence before them leads them to believe is probably the guilty party. According to our judicial system they are the tribunal representing the people, for the purpose of charging crime and designating the criminal. The evidence that satisfies them that probable cause exists for the prosecution of a certain person for a designated crime, might not be enough to satisfy the court or a petit jury; and, to permit the court to inquire into the legality, or sufficiency, of the evidence on which the grand jury acted, would be to substitute, in a measure, the opinion of the court for that of the grand jury, and would ultimately lead to the destruction of the grand jury system. Such proceeding would also furnish opportunity for...

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33 cases
  • Dawson v. Kendrick
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
    • August 10, 1981
  • State v. Layton
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • July 23, 1993
    ...into the evidence considered by the grand jury, either to determine its legality or its sufficiency." Syllabus, Barker v. Fox, 160 W.Va. 749, 238 S.E.2d 235 (1977). 7. "Sentences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some unpermissible factor, are not su......
  • State v. Spinks
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2017
    ...into the evidence considered by the grand jury, either to determine its legality or its sufficiency." Syllabus, Barker v. Fox , 160 W.Va. 749, 238 S.E.2d 235 (1977). In State ex rel. Pinson v. Maynard , 181 W. Va. 662, 383 S.E.2d 844 (1989), we observed that:Criminal defendants have frequen......
  • State v. Grimes
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 16, 2009
    ...to inquire into the evidence considered by the grand jury, either to determine its legality or its sufficiency." Syl., Barker v. Fox, 160 W.Va. 749, 238 S.E.2d 235 (1977). 4. "Other criminal act evidence admissible as part of the res gestae or same transaction introduced for the purpose of ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The grand jury legal advisor: resurrecting the grand jury's shield.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 98 No. 4, June 2008
    • June 22, 2008
    ...were right in voting for a true bill after the fact and tried to do other inappropriate actions off the record."). (92) Barker v. Fox, 238 S.E.2d 235, 236 (W. Va. 1977) ("[Y]he grand jury serves as the voice of the community in calling forth suspected criminals to answer for their alleged m......

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