Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 241 N.C. 397,85 S.E.2d 305
• Decision Date: 14 January 1955
• Docket Number: No. 744,744
• Parties: W. C. BARKER v. IOWA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Page 305

85 S.E.2d 305

241 N.C. 397

W. C. BARKER v. IOWA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 744

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 14, 1955

Worth B. Folger, Sparta, for defendant-appellant.

R. F. Crouse, Sparta, for plaintiff-appellee.

HIGGINS, Justice.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. The policy covered the contents of the dwelling occupied by the insured and the members of his family, including his wife, his dependent son, Bill Barker, 19, and the son's wife, 18, who constituted the members of the household. At the time the policy was issued all the property later lost by fire was in use by the members of the family in the dwelling in Sparta.

Subsequently, the insured rented an apartment in Raleigh for the use of his son and the son's wife while the son attended classes at State College. The furnishings lost when the Raleigh apartment burned were moved from the Sparta home by the insured, who paid the rent on the apartment. The maximum recovery permitted by the ten per cent clause in the policy was $650. It is admitted that the loss sustained by reason of the fire was $1,937.75. The recovery is made to depend upon the interpretation of the following provision in the policy:

'The insured may apply up to ten per cent (10%) of the amount specified for the household and personal property item to cover property described therein and insured thereby (except rowboats, canoes, animals and pets) belonging to the insured or any member of the family of and residing with, the insured, while elsewhere than on the described premises but within the limits of that part of Continental North America included within the United States of America, Alaska, the Dominion of Canada and Newfoundland; however, it is warranted by the insured that such extension of this insurance shall in no wise inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any carrier or other bailee.'

Since no duration of time is fixed in which the property may be elsewhere, we may assume the only limitation is the life of the policy. Somewhat more troublesome is the requirement 'belonging to the insured or any member of the family of and residing with, the insured, while elsewhere than on the described premises. ' The expression in the policy, 'residing with,' is equivalent to and means having his residence with. It, therefore, becomes pertinent to inquire where the minor son had his residence at the time of the loss. Residence has been variously defined by this Court. The definitions vary according to the purposes of the several statutes referring to residence and the objects to be accomplished by them. Definitions include 'a place of abode for more than a temporary period of time;' in other cases the word residence is construed to mean 'domicile,' signifying a permanent and established home. The definitions of residence range all the way between these extremes. Chitty v. Chitty, 118 N.C. 647, 24 S.E. 517, 32 L.R.A. 394; Carden v. Carden, 107 N.C. 214, 12 S.E. 197; Sheffield v. Walker, 231 N.C. 556, 58 S.E. 356; Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572; Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 N.C. 412, 99 S.E. 240, 5 A.L.R. 284; Watson v. North Carolina R.R., 152 N.C. 215, 67 S.E. 502.

Does a minor and dependent son who moves to an apartment maintained by his father for the purpose of attending college classes become a resident of the college community, or does he retain his residence with his father? G.S. § 116-143 provides that State institutions of higher learning, including State College, are empowered to fix tuition fees. G.S. § 116-144 provides higher fees from nonresidents may be charged. 'The provisions...