Barker v. Lawrence Mfg. Co.
Decision Date | 18 May 1900 |
Citation | 57 N.E. 366,176 Mass. 203 |
Parties | BARKER v. LAWRENCE MFG. CO. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Jerome F. Manning, for plaintiff.
Geo. F Richardson, for defendant.
There are five exceptions to the introduction of evidence. The first was to a ruling that a written paper signed before the time of the trial by a person called as a witness by the plaintiff, and under cross-examination, might be put in evidence to show that the witness had made statements different from his testimony. The third and fourth were to the admission of evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had said soon after the accident that he knew that the hole into which he fell was there, he having testified that he did not know that the floor was taken up at that place. In each instance the evidence was competent as a contradiction of evidence put in by the plaintiff. Irrespective of any contradiction, the evidence of the plaintiff's own statements was competent, as his admission of his knowledge of the existence of the opening into which he fell; that knowledge being itself material upon the question whether he was careful or negligent. The fifth exception was to evidence that there was no more steam in the room at the time of the accident than when the view was taken by the jury. It is proper to allow evidence to show, if such a matter is in dispute, how far, if at all, the conditions due to temporary causes at the time of the view differed from those which existed at the time of the accident; otherwise, the view might be misleading. Besides this, the evidence was competent to show how much steam was in the room at the time of the accident.
The second exception is to the evidence of the defendant's witness, who had been in charge of the room for some years as to whether there would have been steam enough in the room at the time of the accident to obstruct the view of a man of ordinary eyesight. The witness was in the room shortly before and shortly after the accident, but not when it occurred. The bill of exceptions does not disclose enough to show that the matter was not one upon which the opinion of a qualified expert was admissible, nor make it clear that the witness was not so qualified. Upon both these matters much must be left to the judge who controls the trial.
There was objection on the part of the plaintiff to the use of a plan by the defendant. No exception to the course of the presiding judge with respect to the plan is...
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