Barker v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 3,774.

• Decision Date: 02 February 1895
• Docket Number: 3,774.
• Citation: 65 F. 460
• Parties: BARKER v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

65 F. 460

BARKER v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO.

No. 3,774.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

February 2, 1895

Charles E. Gibson, for complainant.

Campbell & Ryan, for defendant.

PRIEST District Judge.

Plaintiff who was injured in the derailment of one of the respondent's passenger trains on the early morning of January 15, 1892, and who on January 26th, following, made a settlement of her damages for the sum of $500, and for that consideration, which she retains, executed a release, now seeks to set aside the release, upon the grounds-- First that it was procured from her by fraud and artifice, at a time when she was not master of her mental faculties; and second, that it does not express the true agreement, she having only settled for the loss of her personal effects while the release embraces her personal injuries as well.

I find, as a fact, no artifice or fraud was practiced upon her, and at the time she made the adjustment, and executed the release, she was in a condition of perfect mental self-possession, capable of comprehending, and actually comprehending, each successive step in the progress of the settlement. Whether the settlement was a wise one, is a question upon which a court is not at liberty to enter, after it has ascertained that she had ample understanding to appreciate its scope, and know what she was doing. Courts of equity cannot, any more than courts of law, relieve parties from the bonds of improvident, hasty, or illy-considered agreements. But, were the question now presented to me whether the contract was a provident one for her to have made, I could not say that it was not. Manifestly, the injury was not wantonly inflicted. The cause of the accident is not revealed by the testimony. It is true, a passenger made a prima facie case, but not a conclusive one, by merely proving the derailment of the train. A trier of fact might, in the very nature of the accident, find circumstances and conditions which would repel the prima facie case, and refuse to apply an inference of negligence. This presumption may be conclusively overcome. The plaintiff's injuries are comparatively slight. They were not permanent, nor of an excruciatingly painful character. The fair inference is that her most serious injury was occasioned by an effort to extricate her from the car, in pulling her out by the arm. Her arm was dislocated at the shoulder joint, but was readily reduced. It is true that the injury was painful, but so ordinarily, for only a short time. I should say, conceding plaintiff an unquestioned and undebatable right to recover, that her damages, including loss of property, as well as personal injuries, ought not fairly to exceed twelve or fifteen hundred dollars. The prompt settlement of the case at a compromise of five hundred dollars, the amount paid plaintiff, in my opinion, was a reasonable and fair adjustment. It is true that the plaintiff had been taking medicine and was still sensitive of her injury; but the medicines administered to her were not of a character to impair her mental faculties, nor was her physical pain of a nature to subvert her judgment. If persons are to be denied the capacity to make a valid contract, because suffering a slight pain or sickness or nervousness, but few contracts could be sustained by the courts. I suppose the majority of wills are made upon beds of sickness, in appreciation by the testator of an early dissolution. Those conditions are never held sufficient to discredit and overthrow the wills. The usual inquiry and test is whether the party possessed sufficient understanding to know the nature of the act and its effects. If this be answered in the affirmative, that is an end of the matter. Why such a rule should not be applied in cases of contracts, I can find no substantial reason. It may be that a person in a condition of illness is less able to resist strong importunities and persistent persuasion than in a state of health; and undue persuasion, under these circumstances, may amount to coercion. But I find nothing of that sort in this case. The representative of the railway company, according to plaintiff's own testimony, was not so insistent.

But there is another insurmountable obstacle in the complainant's way upon this feature of this case; and that is, although she desires to set aside the contract of release, she still retains the consideration and has never offered to return it. Where a party attempts to rescind a contract,...