Pope v. Bailey-Marsh Company
| Decision Date | 14 December 1914 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Rehearing denied February 9, 1915.
Appeal from District Court, Pierce County, A. G. Burr, J.
From a judgment in plaintiff's favor and from an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, defendant appeals.
Reversed with directions to dismiss the complaint.
Judgment and order reversed and cause remanded to the District Court with instructions.
Polda Aaker, & Greene (Walson & Abernethy, of counsel), for appellant.
The plaintiff assumed all the risks of the employment. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Jones, 7 Ann. Cas. 439 note; Umsted v. Colgate Farmers' Elevator Co. 18 N.D. 309, 122 N.W. 390; Rev. Codes 1905, § 5544; 4 Thomp. Neg. § 4640, and cases cited.
The test is not whether plaintiff knew and comprehended the danger, but whether, under the circumstances, he had the means of knowledge and ought to have known and comprehended it. Klatt v. N.C. Foster Lumber Co. 92 Wis. 622, 66 N.W. 791; Hughes v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 27 Minn. 137, 6 N.W. 553; Renne v. United States Leather Co. 107 Wis. 305, 83 N.W. 473; Ragon v. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. 97 Mich. 265, 37 Am. St. Rep. 336, 56 N.W. 612; Day v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 137 Ind. 210, 36 N.E. 854; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 Ala. 112, 24 Am. St. Rep. 863, 8 So. 371; Pennsylvania Co. v. Ebaugh, 152 Ind. 531, 53 N.E. 763; Hill v. Meyer Bros.' Drug Co. 140 Mo. 433, 41 S.W. 909, 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 229; Taylor-Craig Corp. v. Hage, 16 C. C. A. 339, 32 U. S. App. 548, 69 F. 581; Union P. R. Co. v. Monden, 50 Kan. 539, 31 P. 1002; Haley v. Jump River Lumber Co. 81 Wis. 412, 51 N.W. 321, 956; Muldowney v. Illinois C. R. Co. 39 Iowa 619, 14 Am. Neg. Cas. 612; Aldridge v. Midland Blast Furnace Co. 78 Mo. 559.
The negligence of the plaintiff was not only a proximate cause of his injury, but except for his own negligence he would not have been injured. Heckman v. Evenson, 7 N.D. 173, 73 N.W. 427; Morrison v. Lee, 16 N.D. 377, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 650, 113 N.W. 1025; Beach, Contrib. Neg. § 7; Davis v. Western R. Co. 107 Ala. 626, 18 So. 173; Thoman v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co. 92 Iowa 196, 60 N.W. 612; Miller v. Grieme, 53 A.D. 276, 65 N.Y.S. 813; Knorpp v. Wagner, 195 Mo. 637, 93 S.W. 961; 4 Thomp. Neg. § 4629.
A full and complete, valid settlement, release and payment for all claims of plaintiff for damages was made prior to the commencement of this action. There was no legal evidence sufficient to show the incapacity of the plaintiff, nor to sustain the claim of fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining the release. A mere preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient to establish such fraud or mistake as will avoid a written release, as it can only be avoided by clear, convincing, and unequivocal proof,--proof beyond all reasonable question. 6 Thomp. Neg. § 7384; Jasper v. Hazen, 4 N.D. 1, 23 L.R.A. 58, 58 N.W. 454; Riley v. Riley, 9 N.D. 580, 84 N.W. 347; Carter v. Carter, 14 N.D. 66, 103 N.W. 425; Anderson v. Anderson, 17 N.D. 275, 115 N.W. 836; Schweikert v. John R. Davis Lumber Co. 147 Wis. 242, 133 N.W. 136; Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Wilcox, 54 C. C. A. 147, 116 F. 913; Bessey v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 154 Wis. 334, 141 N.W. 244; Oakes v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 157 Iowa 15, 137 N.W. 1062.
In actions at law this rule is slightly modified. Prondzinski v. Garbutt, 8 N.D. 191, 77 N.W. 1012.
Defendant's request that the court instruct the jury "that if plaintiff had the capacity and opportunity to read the release and failed to do so, he is estopped by his own negligence to claim that same was not binding on him," should have been granted and the jury so charged. Wallace v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 67 Iowa 547, 25 N.W. 772; Pederson v. Seattle Consol. Street R. Co. 6 Wash. 202, 33 P. 351, 34 P. 665, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 77; Hartley v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 214 Ill. 78, 73 N.E. 398; Rutherford v. Rutherford, 55 W.Va. 56, 47 S.E. 240.
Plaintiff retained the benefits of the contract of release and settlement, with a full knowledge of all the facts, without offer to return them, either before suit or after, and such acts amount to a full ratification of the settlement. Laird v. Union Traction Co. 208 Pa. 574, 57 A. 897; Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 23 L.Ed. 798, 10 Mor. Min. Rep. 445; Crooks v. Nippolt, 44 Minn. 239, 46 N.W. 349; Johnson v. Burnside, 3 S.D. 230, 52 N.W. 1057; Northwestern Mut. Hail Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 12 S.D. 36, 80 N.W. 147; Fahey v. Detroit United R. Co. 160 Mich. 629, 125 N.W. 704; Gibson v. Western New York & P. R. Co. 164 Pa. 142, 44 Am. St. Rep. 594, 30 A. 308; Carroll v. United R. Co. 157 Mo.App. 247, 137 S.W. 303; Och v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 130 Mo. 27, 36 L.R.A. 442, 31 S.W. 962; Johnson v. Merry Mt. Granite Co. 53 F. 569; Vandervelden v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co. 61 F. 54; Barker v. Northern P. R. Co. 65 F. 460; Brainard v. Van Dyke, 71 Vt. 359, 45 A. 758; Conrad v. Keller Brick Co. 79 Ohio St. 461, 87 N.E. 1134; Joslyn v. Empire State Degree of Honor, 145 A.D. 14, 129 N.Y.S. 563.
E. R. Sinkler, for respondent (Greenleaf, Bradford, & Nash, of counsel).
The question whether the servant should have been informed as to his surroundings is for the jury, whenever there is evidence tending to show that it was a proper case for such instructions, and where definite conclusions may be reasonably drawn from the testimony. Richardson v. Swift & Co. 37 C. C. A. 557, 96 F. 699; New Orleans Ice Co. v. O'Malley, 34 C. C. A. 233, 92 F. 108; Nyback v. Champagne Lumber Co. 33 C. C. A. 269, 63 U. S. App. 519, 90 F. 774.
An employee cannot be said as a matter of law to have assumed the risk incident to his employment unless such assumption is shown by undisputed evidence, or is so clearly proven that no reasonable inference can be drawn to the contrary. Hollinshead v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 20 N.D. 642, 127 N.W. 993; Revolinski v. Adams Coal Co. 118 Wis. 324, 95 N.W. 122, 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 244.
The question is not whether plaintiff was aware of the conditions which produced the danger, but whether he understood the danger itself. McDonald v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 41 Minn. 439, 16 Am. St. Rep. 711, 43 N.W. 380.
When the servant is ordered by one in authority to perform an act, and the peculiar risk of the act is not obvious to the servant, and he has not been warned of the danger by the master or by the one in authority under him, the servant has the right to assume that he is not being sent into any unusual peril, and if, while in the exercise of due care, he is injured in the performance of such act, he did not assume the risk incident to the act. Daubert v. Western Meat Co. 135 Cal. 144, 67 P. 133; Merrifeld v. Maryland Gold Quartz Min. Co. 143 Cal. 65, 76 P. 710; Brazil Block Coal Co. v. Gaffney, 119 Ind. 455, 4 L.R.A. 850, 12 Am. St. Rep. 422, 21 N.E. 1102; Ferren v. Old Colony R. Co. 143 Mass. 197, 9 N.E. 608, 15 Am. Neg. Cas. 481; Brown v. Ann Arbor R. Co. 118 Mich. 205, 76 N.W. 407; Cook v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 34 Minn. 45, 24 N.W. 311, 16 Am. Neg. Cas. 247; Linderberg v. Crescent Min. Co. 9 Utah 163, 33 P. 692.
Knowledge of a defect, imperfection, or unfitness will not defeat the employee; he must have knowledge of the risk or danger. Thompson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 86 Mo.App. 141; Eichholz v. Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power & Mfg. Co. 68 A.D. 441, 73 N.Y.S. 842; affirmed in 174 N.Y. 519, 66 N.E. 1107; Southwestern Teleph. Co. v. Woughter, 56 Ark. 206, 19 S.W. 575, 13 Am. Neg. Cas. 286; Umsted v. Colgate Farmers' Elevator Co. 18 N.D. 309, 122 N.W. 390; 1 Labatt, Mast. & S. 279a; Union P. R. Co. v. Jarvi, 3 C. C. A. 433, 10 U. S. App. 439, 53 F. 65; Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 53 Ark. 117, 7 L.R.A. 283, 13 S.W. 801; Myhan v. Louisiana Electric Light & P. Co. 41 La.Ann. 964, 7 L.R.A. 172, 17 Am. St. Rep. 436, 6 So. 799; Stiller v. Bohn Mfg. Co. 80 Minn. 1, 82 N.W. 981; Schall v. Cole, 107 Pa. 1; Huddleston v. Lowell Machine Shop, 106 Mass. 282.
Where the master selects a coservant in his employment to instruct and qualify the servant for the new and more dangerous service, the master must select a competent instructor, and be and is liable for his incompetency or negligence while on such duty. In such case, where the servant is injured, the master is liable. Brennan v. Gordon, 118 N.Y. 489, 8 L.R.A. 818, 16 Am. St. Rep. 775, 23 N.E. 810, 24 N.E. 1105; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Harkins, 5 C. C. A. 326, 17 U.S. App. 22, 55 F. 932; Verdelli v. Gray's Harbor Commercial Co. 115 Cal. 517, 47 P. 364, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 6; Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Shanks, 69 Kan. 306, 76 P. 856; Baumann v. C. Reiss Coal Co. 118 Wis. 330, 95 N.W. 139; Carlson v. Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. 63 Minn. 428, 65 N.W. 914.
Where the risk incurred by the employment is latent or not usual to such employment, the burden of proof is upon the employer to show that the injured employee knew or ought to have known of the danger. National Steel Co. v. Hore, 83 C. C. A. 578, 155 F. 62; Madden v. Saylor Coal Co. 133 Iowa 699, 111 N.W. 57; Swoboda v. Ward, 40 Mich. 420, 16 Am. Neg. Cas. 1; Thompson v. Great Northern R. Co. 70 Minn. 219, 72 N.W. 962; Stephens v. Elliott, 36 Mont. 92, 92 P. 45; Walker v. McNeill, 17 Wash. 582, 50 P. 518; Nadau v. White River Lumber Co. 76 Wis. 120, 20 Am. St. Rep. 29, 43 N.W. 1135; 34 Century Dig. § 907.
Where the evidence concerning a servant's knowledge of defects or risks is conflicting, it is for the jury to determine the facts. Hollinshead v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste M. R. Co. 20 N.D. 642, 127 N.W. 993; Balhoff v. Michigan C. R. Co. 106 Mich. 606, 65 N.W. 592.
Where the complaint raises no issue of assumed risk, the burden is upon...
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