Barlow v. Hester Industries, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 23305,23305 |
| Citation | 479 S.E.2d 628,198 W.Va. 118 |
| Parties | Phyllis BARLOW, Plaintiff Below, Appellant v. HESTER INDUSTRIES, INC., Kenneth Davidson, Nicholas J. Gainer, and Philip Stump, Defendants Below, Appellees. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Syl. pt. 5, State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996).
2. "Parties moving for separate trials of issues pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 42(c), or the court if acting sua sponte, must provide sufficient justification to establish for review that informed discretion could have determined that the bifurcation would promote the recognized goals of judicial economy, convenience of the parties, and the avoidance of prejudice, the overriding concern being the provision of a fair and impartial trial to all litigants." Syl. pt. 6, Bennett v. Warner, 179 W.Va. 742, 372 S.E.2d 920 (1988).
3. "The West Virginia Rules of Evidence and the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure allocate significant discretion to the trial court in making evidentiary and procedural rulings. Thus, rulings on the admissibility of evidence ... are committed to 4. In an employment discrimination case when an employer discovers, after terminating an employee, evidence of the employee's wrongdoing that he or she committed before his or her discharge, a trial court may, with the exercise of reasonable discretion, admit such evidence for the limited purpose of determining which remedies are properly available to the plaintiff employee. Consistent with Rule 105 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court, upon admitting after-acquired evidence of an employee's wrongdoing, should instruct the jury as to the limited purpose of the evidence.
[198 W.Va. 122] the discretion of the trial court. Absent a few exceptions, this Court will review evidentiary and procedural rulings of the circuit court under an abuse of discretion standard." Syl. pt. 1, in part, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d 788 (1995)
5. Jury instructions in an employment discrimination case should be written to convey clearly for the lay person the operation of discrimination and should avoid obscuring the forest of discrimination with the trees of the three-step analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 457 S.E.2d 152 (1995). Accordingly, the trial court should either (1) instruct the jury that the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged discriminatory animus motivated the defendant's employment decision and that the defendant would not have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory animus, or (2) frame the evidence in the context of the McDonnell Douglas/Barefoot framework in order to focus the attention of the jury on the critical evidentiary issues of the case and to assist it in determining whether the plaintiff has proved that the defendant's proffered explanation for its employment decision was pretextual and motivated by illegal bias and that the defendant would not have made the same decision in the absence of the illegal bias.
Harley O. Staggers, Jr., Staggers & Staggers, Keyser, for Appellant.
Oscar M. Bean, Bean & Bean, Moorefield, for Appellees Hester Industries, Inc., Nicholas J. Gainer and Philip Stump.
Mark E. Baker, Crowell & Moring, Washington, DC, for Appellees Hester Industries, Inc., Nicholas J. Gainer and Philip Stump.
J. David Judy, III, Judy & Judy, Moorefield, for Appellee Kenneth Davidson.
The plaintiff below and appellant herein, Phyllis Barlow, appeals from a final order entered September 13, 1995, by the Circuit Court of Hardy County, which denied her motion for a new trial following an adverse jury verdict. On May 19, 1995, a Hardy County jury determined that the defendant employer, Hester Industries, Inc., did not discriminate against Barlow on the basis of age or sex and did not discharge her in retaliation for engaging in activities protected by the West Virginia Human Rights Act. The jury further found that although Barlow and Hester had entered a Confidentiality Agreement, Ms. Barlow had not breached this contract.
On appeal 1 to this Court, Ms. Barlow asserts that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to bifurcate Barlow's employment discrimination claims and Hester's breach of contract counterclaim; (2) excluding evidence concerning Hester's allegedly discriminatory motives; (3) admitting evidence of Barlow's alleged misconduct that Hester discovered after her termination; (4) instructing the jury as to the definition of an "at will" employee; (5) instructing the jury that Barlow must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "but for" her protected class she would not have been terminated; (6) instructing
[198 W.Va. 123] the jury that it must consider any reason Hester provided regarding its decision to terminate Barlow regardless of whether this reason was a good reason or actually motivated Hester to fire Barlow; and (7) instructing the jury that Barlow must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Hester's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. Upon a review of the record, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
Phyllis Barlow began working as a trimmer for Hester Industries, Inc., a chicken processing plant in Moorefield, West Virginia, on May 20, 1993. Upon the commencement of her employment, Hester gave Ms. Barlow an employee handbook, which described its progressive disciplinary system. The handbook provided that employees charged with disciplinary matters would first receive a verbal warning. Successive incidents would be addressed by a written warning, while future occurrences would result in suspension and, ultimately, termination. It appears that no disciplinary actions were noted in Ms. Barlow's personnel file.
In March, 1994, several younger, female employees 2 approached Barlow and complained about the working conditions and compensation of Hester's female employees. Ms. Barlow, acting as spokesperson for this group, addressed her supervisor, Kenneth Davidson, about these concerns during the monthly employees' meeting in March, 1994. She also attempted, during the April, 1994, employees' meeting, to suggest a manner in which Hester could improve the working conditions and compensation of its female employees while receiving a benefit from this procedure. 3 However, Ms. Barlow claims that she was prevented from speaking by a male employee who interrupted her. Allegedly, Philip Stump, Davidson's supervisor, met with Ms. Barlow after this meeting and told her that she "spoke up too much at employees' meetings." Hester then changed Barlow to another line, but Ms. Barlow asserts that she was not trained for her new position.
Shortly thereafter, on May 5, 1994, Barlow was driving home from work when she witnessed the death of her close friend, Krista Smith, a fellow employee who was also driving home from work, when a drunk driver struck Ms. Smith's automobile. The next morning, while she was at home, Ms. Barlow spoke with a coworker about Ms. Smith's death. Barlow said she believed that her supervisor, Kenneth Davidson, was responsible for Ms. Smith's death. Previously, Davidson had moved Ms. Smith's husband, also a Hester employee, to a different work shift. As a result of this schedule change, Ms. Smith, and not her husband, had been driving when the accident occurred. Barlow felt that had Ms. Smith's husband been driving, he could have avoided the accident. During this telephone conversation, Hester alleges that Ms. Barlow also stated that she regretted that Davidson, himself, had not been involved in the accident because "he was a drunk who had nothing to offer the world." 4
As Hester's employees learned of these remarks, Hester claims that they became upset and severely disrupted production. Hester contends that several employees reported Barlow's remarks to Davidson and informed him of other instances of misconduct by Barlow. Specifically, these employees alleged that Barlow was (1) intentionally sabotaging production by mishandling chicken; (2) instructing other employees to slow production without authorization; (3) disrupting the work place by yelling, singing, and dancing while working on the production Davidson then met with his supervisor, Philip Stump, and Hester's Vice President of Human Resources, Nicholas Gainer, with regard to Ms. Barlow's statements and alleged misconduct. Following these meetings, it appears that Gainer conducted an investigation to corroborate the allegations. Hester states that upon verification of Barlow's disruptive conduct, Gainer and Stump met with Ms. Barlow, on May 9, 1994, and suspended her pending further investigation of her alleged wrongdoing. It seems that Gainer then met with Hester's President and Vice-President of Operations with regard to Ms. Barlow's behavior. Finally, Hester submits that following a more thorough investigation, and based upon the severity and pervasiveness of Barlow's misconduct, Hester terminated Barlow on May 16, 1994. 6
[198 W.Va. 124] line; (4) grabbing male employees on the buttocks; and (5) engaging in crude conduct of a sexual nature. 5
On July 13, 1994, Ms. Barlow filed a civil action in the Circuit Court of Hardy County against the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bailey v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co.
...liability, to prove that the same decision would have been made in the absence of the unlawful reason." Barlow v. Hester Indus., Inc., 198 W.Va. 118, 138, 479 S.E.2d 628, 648 (1996). In Page v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 198 W.Va. 378, 480 S.E.2d 817 (1996), we Although we have rejec......
-
Stone v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Parkersburg
...operation of discrimination and should avoid obscuring the forest of discrimination with the trees[.]" Barlow v. Hester Industries, Inc., 198 W.Va. 118, 135, 479 S.E.2d 628, 645 (1996). The Hospital submitted and the circuit court refused to give proposed instructions that, inter alia, cont......
-
Roberts v. Consolidation Coal Co.
...trial to all litigants." Syl. pt. 6, Bennett v. Warner, 179 W.Va. 742, 372 S.E.2d 920 (1988). Syl. pt. 2, Barlow v. Hester Indus., Inc., 198 W.Va. 118, 479 S.E.2d 628 (1996). Thus, "[t]he burden of persuasion is placed upon the shoulders of the party moving for bifurcation. A trial judge ma......
-
State ex rel. Ogden Newspapers v. Wilkes
...of Gatewood Prods., Inc., 199 W.Va. 365, 484 S.E.2d 481 (1997) (per curiam) (handicap discrimination); Barlow v. Hester Indus., Inc., 198 W.Va. 118, 479 S.E.2d 628 (1996) (age and sex discrimination); Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc., 198 W.Va. 51, 479 S.E.2d 561 (1996) (handicap discrimina......